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30 January 2010 By Dahr Jamail A core tenet of the Obama
administration’s plans for “victory” in Iraq and
Afghanistan is an increased reliance on
counterinsurgency. As previously reported on this web
site, the US military has sent shock troops -
anthropologists, sociologists and social psychologists
- with their own troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
who also donned helmets and flak jackets. By the end
of 2007, American scholars in these fields were
embedding with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq as
part of a Pentagon program called Human Terrain System
(HTS), which evolved shortly thereafter into a $40
million program that embedded four or five person
groups of scholars in the aforementioned fields in all
26 US combat brigades that were busily occupying Iraq
and Afghanistan. The program is currently comprised of
approximately 400 employees, and is actively seeking
new recruits. Anthropology, in particular, has
been referred to throughout history as the “handmaiden
of colonialism,” thus putting anthropologists, at
least those with a moral conscience, on guard against
anything that smells like exploitation or oppression
of their subjects. Roberto Gonzalez, an associate
professor of anthropology at San Jose State University
and a leading member of the Network of Concerned
Anthropologists,
told Time magazine that the militarization of
anthropology will cause the field to become “just
another weapon … not a tool for building bridges
between peoples.” Anthropology has core professional
ethics standards that require voluntary, informed
consent from subjects, and that anthropologists do no
harm. How likely do you think these will be adhered to
by the flack-jacket-wearing, gun-toting, embedded
anthropologists working directly with regimental
combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan?” The two highest ethical principles
of anthropology are protection of the interests of
studied populations and their safety. All
anthropological studies consequently are premised on
the consent of the subject society. Clearly, the HTS
anthropologists have thrown these ethical guidelines
out the window. They are to anthropology what state
stenographers like Judith Miller and John Burns are to
journalism. Truthout consulted David Price,
author of “Anthropological Intelligence: The
Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the
Second World War” and a contributor to the
“Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual,” a work of the
Network of Concerned Anthropologists, of which he is a
member. According to Price, “HTS presents
real ethical problems for anthropologists, because the
demands of the military in situations of occupation
put anthropologists in positions undermining their
fundamental ethical loyalties to those they study.
Moreover, it presents political problems that link
anthropology to a disciplinary past where
anthropologists were complicit in assisting in
colonial conquests. Those selling HTS to the military
have misrepresented what culture is and have
downplayed the difficulties of using culture to bring
about change, much less conquest. There is a certain
dishonesty in pretending that anthropologists possess
some sort of magic beans of culture, and that if only
occupiers had better cultural knowledge, or made the
right pay-offs, then occupied people would fall in
line and stop resisting foreign invaders. Culture is
being presented as if it were a variable in a linear
equation, and if only HTS teams could collect the
right data variables and present troops with the right
information conquest could be entered in the equation.
Life and culture doesn’t work that way; occupied
people know they are occupied, and while cultural
knowledge can ease an occupation, historically it has
almost never led to conquest - but even if it could,
anthropology would irreparably damage itself if it
became nothing more than a tool of occupations and
conquest.” The handbook for the HTS offers the
human terrain “toolkit” for the US military to
understand subjects living in militarily occupied
areas. It stated: “HTTs will use the Map-HT Toolkit
of developmental hardware and software to capture,
consolidate, tag, and ingest human terrain data.
HTTs use this human terrain information gathered to
assist commanders in understanding the operational
relevance of the information as it applies to the
unit’s planning processes. The expectation is that
the resulting courses of actions developed by the
staff and selected by the commander will
consistently be more culturally harmonized with the
local population, which in Counter-Insurgency
Operations should lead to greater success. It is the
trust of the indigenous population that is at the
heart of the struggle between coalition forces and
the insurgents.” (Emphasis added.) The mission of the human terrain
social scientists gains legitimacy and credibility
when expressed in terms of engineering the “trust of
the indigenous population.” The military’s benign description
specifies that HTS will “improve the military’s
ability to understand the highly complex local
social-cultural environment in the areas where they
are deployed.” Proponents of the program go as far as
to claim that its goal is to help the military save
lives. “Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are
special units that imbed with battalions in
Afghanistan and are trained to promote
counterinsurgency practices,” Price explained to
Truthout, “Each Human Terrain Teams has a team leader
who is usually retired military personnel, frequently
from Special Forces, and each team has a social
scientist. Though these social scientists are often
referred to as ‘anthropologists’ in the press, the
program has had great difficulty hiring many
anthropologists to work on the program - especially
those with relevant linguistic or cultural experience.
These Human Terrain Teams are envisioned as providing
cultural information to the occupying troops, and to
also conduct research on populations under military
control - though the American Anthropological
Association’s (AAA) recent report found that in many
instances the tasks undertaken by HTS blur
distinctions between research and intelligence work.
But the basic tasks and methods of HTT violate basic
ethical tenants of anthropological field research as
the safety of research participants cannot be assured,
nor can voluntary informed consent; and questions
remain about what becomes of HTT data gathered in the
field.” In December, the AAA held annual
meetings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where the
association made public a
significant report titled the “AAA Commission on
the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security
and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC),” co-authored
by David Price, which dealt directly with the ethical
problems of the HTS. Key findings in the executive
summary of the report state: “1. HTS and similar programs are
moving to become a greater fixture within the U.S.
military. Given still outstanding questions about
HTS, such developments should be a source of concern
for the AAA but also for any social science
organization or federal agency that expects its
members or its employees to adhere to established
disciplinary and federal standards for the treatment
of human subjects. “2. The current arrangement of
HTS includes potentially irreconcilable goals which,
in turn, lead to irreducible tensions with respect
to the program’s basic identity. These include HTS
at once: fulfilling a research function, as a data
source, as a source of intelligence, and as
performing a tactical function in counterinsurgency
warfare. Given this confusion, any anthropologist
considering employment with HTS will have difficulty
determining whether or not s/he will be able to
follow the disciplinary Code of Ethics.” And: “In summary, while we stress that
constructive engagement between anthropology and the
military is possible, CEAUSSIC suggests that the AAA
emphasize the incompatibility of HTS with
disciplinary ethics and practice for job seekers and
that it further recognize the problem of allowing
HTS to define the meaning of ‘anthropology’ within
DoD.” While there has been some
recent coverage of the HTS, Price told Truthout,
“I haven’t seen anything written that really gets to
how these HTS teams fit into Obama’s plans for
increased counterinsurgency domination in
Afghanistan.” The HTS continues to be condemned
by the AAA, and in the wake of the filing of the
CEAUSSIC, Price said, “our committee’s evaluation of
the program is purely negative and among our
conclusion we determined that: ‘When ethnographic
investigation is determined by military missions, not
subject to external review, where data collection
occurs in the context of war, integrated into the
goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially
coercive environment - all characteristic factors of
the HTS concept and its application - it can no longer
be considered a legitimate professional exercise of
anthropology.’” In a
recent article on the topic, that links the HTS
with the increasing use of drones and the US military
expansion of AFRICOM, Price wrote, “Today, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, anthropologists are being told that
they’re needed to make bad situations better. But no
matter how anthropological contributions ease and make
gentle this conquest and occupation, it will not
change the larger neocolonial nature of the larger
mission; and most anthropologists are troubled to see
their discipline embrace such a politically corrupt
cause.” While the vast majority of
mainstream media coverage of the HTS has been and
remains favorable, Time magazine wrote a
critical piece of the HTS after the CEAUSSIC was
filed. The House Armed Services Committee
is currently undertaking a review of the HTS by
directing the secretary of defense to undertake an
assessment of HTS, and another HTS team member was
wounded in Afghanistan. Given the Obama
administration’s escalation of counterinsurgent
warfare and “soft power” as the US becomes further
entrenched in Afghanistan, it is very likely more
money will be allocated to HTS, despite any
independent study indicating that HTS operates in any
way similar to how it is promoted in the media. Nevertheless, the use of HTS
continues unabated in Afghanistan, and is going to be
expanded in the future in Africa, both where,
according to Price, the future of the program rests. “The military seems increasingly
interested in adapting some sort of Human Terrain like
program for use in AFRICOM, and given AFRICOM’s
merging of military personnel and projects with
counterinsurgent tactics and goals, it stands to
reason that as AFRICOM takes on an increasing role in
exploiting civil unrest in Africa as a way to leverage
an increasing American military presence in resource
rich Africa, something like HTS will be a part of
these plans,” Price told Truthout, “Given all the bad
publicity HTS has been getting, I wouldn’t be
surprised if they changed the name but used a similar
program.” Another problem with the problems
is corruption. Currently, HTS training is geared
towards Afghanistan, not Iraq, and is being conducted
by the contracting firm
CLI Solutions. The firm is funding training
schools in Leavenworth, Omaha, and elsewhere, in
addition to having found a way to rip off taxpayers
and continue paying HTS using the “GG” scale
(different than GS, GG provides a loophole in the GS
systems that allows the government to sometimes hire
“experts” at rates off the prevailing scale), which
has elevated the pay scale back up to the levels it
did when
BAE Systems, a British military contractor, the
world’s second largest, ran the program. Of this trick, Price revealed to
Truthout that it is “a real boondoggle for the
American taxpayers” and added, “Someone leaked the
pay-scale to me and it shows scenarios where a GG-15,
working 60 hours a week in the field in Afghanistan
for 12 months would make over $230k per year, so
presto change, we’re back to the gravy train money
days of BAE. That they are allowed to use the GG scale
is scandalous: GG needs to exist in concept (so that
for example when some expensive piece of government
equipment needs to be worked on by experts, we can
find a way to hire them) but use of GG for this end
seems a clear abuse of what it was created for. So far
no one has written anything on this in the press.” When asked why US taxpayers should
be concerned about this payment scheme, Price told
Truthout, “In terms of Pentagon spending and waste,
$250,000,000 dollars spent on Human Terrain each year
is small potatoes, but the program can’t work as
advertised. Taxpayers should be concerned that their
president is committing us to a
counterinsurgency-based war that will likely be
impossible to successfully implement, and if the
failed Human Terrain program is one of the star
programs of US counterinsurgency efforts, we’re in a
lot of trouble.” Price refers to the AAA report as
“devastating” with regard to the HTS, President
Obama’s policy of a huge escalation of
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as “doomed” and said
the only way Obama’s handling of the HTS has differed
from Bush’s is to have brought about “increases in HTS
funding.” Stacey Fritz is a Ph.D. candidate
in cultural anthropology at the University of Alaska
Fairbanks, who studies cold war militarization of the
Arctic and other aspects of modern American
militarism, including its impacts on academia. She is
also a member of the Network of Concerned
Anthropologists, an independent ad-hoc group that
seeks to promote an ethical anthropology and that
believes that anthropologists should refrain from
directly assisting the US military in combat. On
November 18, Fritz debated Kathleen Reedy, an employee
in the HTS, assigned to the 1/25th Stryker Brigade out
of Fort Wainwright, Fairbanks. “She seemed to be trying to make
herself believe the HTS lines, but they are so
unbelievable that I think that it is very, very
difficult to debate/defend that perspective,
especially since I had plenty of quotes from military
leaders saying very candidly that the HTTs do HUMINT
[Human Intelligence gathering] that the military uses
to figure out who the bad guys are and which good guys
can be co-opted.” Fitz explained that Reedy opted not
to debate the central HTS issues, but rather attempted
to persuade the audience that she, as an
anthropologist, had control over her information, and
that she maintained “strong ethical guidelines
concerning what she would pass on to them.” Fritz believes the entire edifice
of ethics that anthropologists who participate in the
HTS believe it is flawed. “One of the main questions the NCA
asks concerns whether the good intentions of
anthropologists working in HTTs are being met - this
is important -the anthropologists really are or come
off as seeming well intentioned, but I don’t think
that it is believable that their actions could be
positive even on the surface since the entire
discussion presupposes that the military means the
population well, and that there is such thing as a
non-violent counterinsurgency war,” Fitz told Truthout,
“Of course, a huge portion of individuals in the
military mean well and want the best for the Iraqis,
which is great, but the policy under which they are
acting makes that impossible. If they were doing what
the Iraqis wanted, they would leave.” Price feels it is imperative for
individuals to watch how the Obama administration uses
and augments the HTS, because the mainstream media has
largely been a unwilling to carry out much overdue
critical reportage of the program. “Since its conception HTS has been
given an uncritical free ride in the press,” Price
explained, “There have been glossy profiles on its
designers and supporters in places like the Wall
Street Journal, Elle, and the New Yorker. I’ve seen
drafts of feature stories on HTS that had critical
counter-points removed by editors because they
‘complicated the narrative,’ and academics working on
HTS have not had to answer the mounting questions
about fundamental ethical, financial, and design
problems that haunt the program - in some cases
skipping out on academic conferences where they had
agreed to engage with me and others. The mainstream
media has cut HTS a lot of slack as it uncritically
portrays the program as a way to engage in less lethal
conquest; and given the severity of the findings of
this recent American Anthropological Association
report - which the New York Times did cover (in a
small story in the Arts Section) - I have a hard time
imagining a report from the American Medical
Association or the Association of Applied Biologists
declaring a key governmental program to be operating
outside the most basic ethical and practical
boundaries of the disciplines of medicine or biology,
and receiving such little notice.” Fritz explained why this likely
occurs. “I think the most important thing for the
public to understand is the bigger picture of U.S.
counterinsurgency wars. Counterinsurgency wars have
always been fought on two fronts - one against the
insurgents and the other, a propaganda war against a
less than supportive public at home. This kind of
tactic particularly appeals to liberals who are
opposed to the war and grasp at any information that
lets them feel better about it. It’s very seductive -
I think the worse people feel the more desperate they
are to just believe that something like HTS is making
a bloody illegal occupation better.” |