Note
To Muslims: About Plans To Implement 'Democratic Islam'
19 June 2010 By Markaz Kavkaz
The text of this material was developed by the
notorious "brain center" RAND Corporation, which
provides the US government with analytical
calculations and recommendations on various aspects of
the US policy.
The direct author of the work is Cheryl Benard - a
RAND senior political analyst, who known for his
fanatical anti-Islamic stance.
The KC publishes this material
without comments (including totally biased and false
claims and assessments about Islam in general and the
current processes in Islam), preserving the
language and style of Cheryl Benard's article, within
the framework of informing Muslims with plans,
intentions, tactics and goals of the enemies of Islam.
This work also gives some
idea about the ideological basis of many contemporary
leaders from among so-called "Islamic democrats",
nationalist patriots with "Islamic face" guardians of
"tolerant" and "traditional" Islam, some preachers and
activists, who attack Mujahideen, distort and disavow
the statute of Sharia and Jihad, and their necessity
at this moment.
Civil
Democratic Islam
Five Pillars of democracy for
Islam. How the West Can Promote an Islamic Reformation
Rival versions of Islam are
contending for spiritual and political dominance, with
immense implications for the rest of the world. By
understanding the ongoing ideological struggle within
Islam and by distinguishing among the competing
strains of Islamic thought, Western leaders can
identify appropriate Islamic partners and work with
them to discourage extremism and violence as well as
to encourage democratization and development.
The notion that the outside world
should try to nurture a moderate, democratic version
of Islam has been in circulation for decades but
gained great urgency after Sept. 11, 2001. There is
broad agreement that this is a constructive approach.
Islam inspires a variety of ideologies and political
actions, some of which are inimical to global
stability. It therefore seems sensible to foster the
strains within Islam that call for a more moderate,
democratic, peaceful, and tolerant social order.
It is no easy matter to transform
a major world religion. If "nation-building" is a
daunting task, "religion building" is immeasurably
more perilous and complex. Islam is neither a
homogeneous entity nor a self-contained system. Many
extraneous issues and problems have become entangled
with the religion. Many political actors in the Muslim
world deliberately seek to "Islamize" the debate in a
way that they think will further their goals.
The current crisis in Islam has
two main components: a failure to thrive on its own
terms and a loss of connection to the global
mainstream. The Islamic world has been marked by a
long period of backwardness and comparative
powerlessness. Many homegrown solutions-such as
nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and Islamic
revolution-have been attempted without success,
leading to frustration and anger. Meanwhile, the
Islamic world has both fallen out of step with
contemporary global culture and moved increasingly to
the margins of the global economy, creating an
uncomfortable situation for both sides.
Muslims disagree on what to do
about the crisis, what has caused it, and what their
societies ultimately should look like. For the West,
the question is which ideology (or ideologies) to
support; with what methods; and with what concrete,
realistic goals in mind.
An Ideological
Spectrum
There are essentially four
ideological positions in the Muslim world today:
fundamentalist, traditionalist, modernist, and
secularist. Each group contains subgroups that blur
the distinctions among the primary groups. It is
important for Western leaders to understand the
differences within groups as well as among groups.
Fundamentalists reject democratic
values and contemporary Western culture. They want an
authoritarian, puritanical state to implement their
extreme view of Islamic law and morality. They are
willing to use innovation and modern technology. They
do not shy away from violence.
There are two strands of
fundamentalism. One, grounded in theology and usually
rooted in a religious establishment, belongs to the
scriptural fundamentalists. This group includes most
of the Iranian revolutionaries, the Saudi-based
Wahhabis, and the Kaplan congregation of Turks. The
radical fundamentalists, in contrast, are much less
concerned with the literal substance of Islam, with
which they take considerable liberties either
deliberately or because of ignorance of orthodox
Islamic doctrine. Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban,
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and a large number of other Islamic
radical movements and diffuse groups worldwide belong
to this category.
Traditionalists want a
conservative society. They are suspicious of
modernity, innovation, and change. They are also
divided into two groups. The distinction is
significant.
The conservative traditionalists
believe that Islamic law and tradition ought to be
rigorously and literally followed. They see a role for
the state and for the political authorities in
encouraging or at least facilitating this. However,
they do not generally favor violence and terrorism.
They concentrate their efforts on the daily life of
society. Their goal is to preserve orthodox norms and
values and conservative behavior to the fullest extent
possible. Their posture is one of resistance to
change. The temptations and the pace of modern life
are seen as posing major threats.
The reformist traditionalists
believe that Islam, to remain viable and attractive
throughout the ages, must be prepared to make some
concessions in the application of orthodoxy. They are
prepared to discuss reforms and reinterpretations.
Their posture is one of cautious adaptation to change,
being flexible on the letter of the law to conserve
the spirit of the law.
Modernists want the Islamic world
to become part of global modernity. They want to
reform Islam to bring it into line with the modern
age. They actively seek far-reaching changes to the
current orthodox understanding and practice of Islam.
They want to jettison the burdensome ballast of local
and regional tradition that, over the centuries, has
intertwined itself with Islam.
They further believe in the
historicity of Islam-that Islam as it was practiced in
the days of the Prophet reflected eternal truths as
well as historical circumstances that were appropriate
to the time but are no longer valid. They believe that
the essential core of Islamic belief not only will
remain undamaged but will be strengthened by changes,
even very substantial changes, that reflect changing
times, social conditions, and historical
circumstances. Their core values-the primacy of the
individual conscience and of a community based on
social responsibility, equality, and freedom-are
easily compatible with modern democratic norms.
Secularists want the Islamic
world to accept a division of mosque and state in the
manner of Western industrial democracies, with
religion relegated to the private sphere. They further
believe that religious customs must be in conformity
with the law of the land and human rights. The Turkish
Kemalists, who placed religion under the firm control
of the state, represent the secularist model in Islam.
These positions should be viewed
as segments on a continuum, rather than divergent
categories. There are no clear boundaries among them.
Some traditionalists overlap with fundamentalists. The
most modernist of the traditionalists are almost
modernists. The most extreme modernists are similar to
secularists. At the same time, the groups hold
distinctly different positions on issues that have
become contentious in the Islamic world today,
including political and individual freedom, education,
the status of women, criminal justice, the legitimacy
of reform and change, and attitudes toward the West
An Agenda for
Reform
What the roiling ideological
ferment requires from the West is both a firm
commitment to fundamental Western values and a
sequence of flexible postures suited to different
Islamic contexts, populations, and countries. This
approach could help to develop civil, democratic Islam
while giving the West the versatility to deal
appropriately with different settings.
The following outline describes
what such a strategy might look like. It rests on
"five pillars of democracy" for the Islamic world. The
pillars correspond to the postures that the West
should take toward the four ideological groups and
toward ordinary citizens in Muslim countries.
1. Support the modernists first,
promoting their version of Islam by equipping them
with a broad platform to articulate and to disseminate
their views. It is tempting to choose the
traditionalists as the primary agents for fostering
democratic Islam, and this appears to be the course
that the West is inclined to take. However, some very
serious problems argue against taking such a course.
Over endorsing the
traditionalists could undermine the ongoing internal
reform effort within Islam and hinder those-the
modernists-whose values are genuinely compatible with
our own. Of all the groups, the modernists are the
most congenial to the values and spirit of modern
democratic society. We need to advance their vision of
Islam over that of the traditionalists.
Modernism, not traditionalism, is
what worked for the West. This included the necessity
to depart from, modify, and selectively ignore
elements of the original religious doctrine. The Old
Testament is not different from the Koran in endorsing
conduct and containing a number of rules and values
that are unthinkable, not to mention illegal, in
modern society. This does not pose a problem in the
West, because few people today would insist that we
should all be living in the exact literal manner of
the Biblical patriarchs. Instead, we allow our vision
of the true message of Judaism or Christianity to
transcend the literal text, which we regard as history
and legend. That is exactly the approach proposed by
Islamic modernists.
Secularists are also close to the
West in terms of their values and policies. But some
secularists are unacceptable to the West because of
their reflexive anti- Americanism or other positions.
The secularists also have trouble appealing to the
traditional sectors of an Islamic audience.
For these reasons, the modernists
are the best partners for the West. Unfortunately,
they are generally in a weaker position than the
fundamentalists and traditionalists, lacking powerful
backing, financial resources, an effective
infrastructure, and a public platform. Therefore,
Western leaders should support the modernists by these
means:
Publish and distribute their
works at subsidized cost.
Encourage them to write for mass
audiences and for youth.
Introduce their views into the
curriculum of Islamic education.
Make their religious opinions and
judgments available to a mass audience to compete with
the fundamentalists and traditionalists, who have web
sites, publishing houses, schools, institutes, and
many other vehicles for disseminating their views.
Position modernism and secularism
as counterculture options for disaffected Islamic
youth.
Use the media and educational
curricula in suitable countries to foster an awareness
of their pre-Islamic and non-Islamic histories and
cultures.
2. Support the traditionalists
enough to keep them viable against the fundamentalists
(if and wherever those are the only choices). Among
the traditionalists, the West should embolden those
who are the relatively better match for modern civil
society: the reformist traditionalists. The West
should support the traditionalists against the
fundamentalists in these ways:
Publicize traditionalist
criticism of fundamentalist violence and extremism.
Encourage disagreements between
traditionalists and fundamentalists.
Discourage alliances between
traditionalists and fundamentalists.
Encourage cooperation between
modernists and reformist traditionalists.
Where appropriate, educate the
traditionalists to debate the fundamentalists.
Fundamentalists are often rhetorically superior, while
traditionalists practice a politically inarticulate
"folk Islam." In places such as Central Asia,
traditionalists may need to be trained in orthodox
Islam to be able to stand their ground against
fundamentalists.
Increase the presence and profile
of modernists in traditionalist institutions.
Encourage the traditionalists who
support the Hanafi school of Islamic law as a way to
counter the conservative Wahhabi-supported Hanbali
school of Islamic law.
Encourage the popularity and
acceptance of Sufism, a traditionalist form of Islamic
mysticism that represents an open, intellectual
interpretation of Islam.
3. Oppose the fundamentalists
energetically by striking at the vulnerabilities in
their Islamic and ideological credentials. Expose
things that neither the youthful idealists in their
target audience nor the pious traditionalists can
condone about the fundamentalists: their corruption,
their brutality, their ignorance, the bias and
manifest errors in their application of Islam, and
their inability to lead and to govern. The West should
fight the fundamentalists in these ways:
Challenge their interpretation of
Islam, and expose their inaccuracies.
Reveal their linkages to illegal
groups and activities.
Publicize the consequences of
their violent acts.
Demonstrate their inability to
develop their countries and communities in positive
ways.
Target the messages to youth,
pious traditionalists, Muslim minorities in the West,
and women.
Portray violent extremists and
terrorists accurately as disturbed and cowardly, not
as heroes.
Encourage journalists to
investigate corruption, hypocrisy, and immorality in
fundamentalist and terrorist circles.
Encourage divisions among
fundamentalists.
One strategy holds great promise.
Despite the success of radical fundamentalism in
mobilizing discontented young people, especially young
men, it has many features that should turn young
people away. This major flaw in fundamentalist
political strategy has not so far been exploited.
Radical Islam does not value
young lives very highly. By manipulating youthful
idealism and their sense of drama and heroics, radical
Islam turns young people into cannon fodder and
suicide bombers. Madrassas (the fundamentalist
schools) specifically educate boys to die young, to
become martyrs. If Muslim youth ever begin to look at
things through a generational lens, as Western youth
did in the 1960s, they may begin to ask why most
suicide bombers and martyrs are under the age of 30.
You don't have to be young to strap explosives onto
yourself. If it's such a wonderful thing to do, why
aren't older people doing it?
4. Support the secularists on a
case-by-case basis. The West should encourage
secularists to recognize fundamentalism as a common
enemy and discourage secularist alliances with anti-US
forces. The West should also support the idea that
religion and state can be separate in Islam, too, and
that the separation will not endanger the faith but,
in fact, can strengthen it.
5. Develop secular civic and
cultural institutions and programs. Western
organizations can help to develop independent civic
organizations that can provide a space in the Islamic
world for ordinary citizens to educate themselves
about the political process and to articulate their
views.
Any strategy of this sort should
be pursued with a wariness of the potential for
backlash. The alignment of US policymakers with
particular Islamic positions could endanger or
discredit the very groups and people the West is
seeking to help. Partnerships that may seem
appropriate in the short term, such as affiliations
with conservative traditionalists, could provoke
unintended consequences in the long term. To prevent
this, the West needs to adhere consistently and
faithfully to its core values of democracy, equality,
individual freedom, and social responsibility.
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