31 May 2012 By Osman
Mirghani With the exception of
the first days of the revolution, the role of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] in Egypt
continues to raise controversy even as the Egyptians
go to the polls in the first genuine, democratic
presidential elections in their recent history. Four
issues are fuelling the controversy, and they are as
follows: The first issue is the
state of constitutional ambiguity, whereby even after
the Egyptians elect a president, his powers – and
their limits – will still not be clearly defined, in
light of the fact that the battle over the new
constitution was not resolved and approved before the
elections. This has kept the door wide open for
disputes, will all the dangerous possibilities that
may arise from that, given the ongoing tensions.
Regardless of the identity of the new president, the
battle of the constitution will be the most important
and most dangerous issue in the post-election phase,
and the president-elect, the parliament and the
various revolutionary forces will all be in the line
of fire amidst the potential confrontations that are
set to take place, whilst this will be a battle that
the army will also not be far away from. The new president will
inevitably play an important role in the constitution
battle with all its ramifications and interventions,
including the issue of the state's relationship with
the military and its role in the coming phase, and the
issue of the state's relationship with the legislative
and legal authorities. This could initiate a power
struggle, and indeed we've already seen aspects of
this given the disputes between the elected parliament
and SCAF about the government and about some laws and
legislative authorities, and also during the formation
and subsequent dissolution of the constituent
assembly. In light of the anticipated contention
surrounding the constitution, the eyes of many will be
focused in the direction of the army, which has made
no secret of its stance calling for a constitution
that maintains Egypt as a civil state, a stance that
places it at the heart of the battle ahead.
The second issue is
the fear of Islamist hegemony, especially at a time
when a new political era is being formed in Egypt,
which some are calling "the second republic". The
stances of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have
contributed to increasing these fears, especially
after the Brotherhood retracted its promise not to put
forward a candidate for the presidential elections,
even declaring their opposition to any Islamist
candidate at one stage. This ultimately led to Abdel
Moneim Aboul Fotouh splitting from their ranks for
violating the Brotherhood's decision not to run for
the presidency, according to the group's
justifications for removing a man who was considered
one of its most prominent leaders, although there are
those who question whether the two sides have truly
distanced themselves completely from one another,
given the similarities in their programs and goals.
The Brotherhood
revised their decision not to run for the presidency
in a way that sparked a storm of criticism, by putting
forward not one but two candidates, justifying this by
saying that Freedom and Justice Party leader Mohammed
Mursi was an alternative if Khairat al-Shater was not
allowed to stand. This reflects the Brotherhood's
determination and plan to try and control all
legislative and executive authorities, ignoring their
former words that this would not be in the interest of
Egypt under its current circumstances. Likewise, the
Islamists fuelled the fears of their domination with
the way in which they formed the constitutional
assembly, again leading to a storm of criticism that
even came from al-Azhar. The matter ended with the
assembly being dissolved and the battle surrounding it
being postponed until after a new president is
elected. If this president comes from the Islamist
current (the Brotherhood are standing behind their
candidate Mursi, while the Salafis have thrown their
weight behind Aboul Fotouh) then the fears and
accusations of Islamist hegemony will increase. If the
new president comes from the liberal current, then he
will face a difficult battle with the Islamists in
parliament. In either case, the army will monitor the
developments, particularly if the confrontations move
onto the streets. The third issue is the
fear of a coup if political life is crippled, the
economy remains disrupted, and security concerns
continue in light of the inability to retrain or
reorganize the police force to restore its role in
ensuring security. The history of the region is full
of coups being carried out against democratic
experiences, and Egypt itself has lived under the rule
of presidents from the military establishment ever
since the coup carried out by the Free Officers
movement in 1952. There are also many
forces working to abort the revolution in Egypt and
contributing to the spread of instability, and perhaps
they are hoping for and encouraging the coup scenario,
which would represent a "deadly" strike to the Arab
Spring that has been facing many obstacles after its
initial rapid success in Tunisia and Egypt. In
addition to this there is no reason why some within
the Islamists ranks wouldn't try to encourage a coup
if they believed that their gains were being
threatened, or if they saw a coup as a means to seize
power or impose their project, and here the experience
of the Islamists in Sudan springs to mind. The fourth issue is
the concern within the military establishment itself,
which is seeking guarantees after it hands over power
that its position will be maintained and there will be
no adverse impact upon its status or capabilities. It
has become clear to everyone that the army - which
believes that it sided with the revolution and in
doing so ensured its success, and then fulfilled its
promise to organize fair elections until the handover
of power - has specific demands: It wants its budget
to remain confidential so that it is not discussed
openly in parliament. It also wants to be granted the
right to issue its opinion on any legislation that
concerns it, and for its opinion to be taken into
account when it comes to the appointment of the
Minister of Defense. Furthermore, it wants an input in
future arms deals, and is also seeking to preserve its
economic institutions that guarantee its role,
influence and large resources, and also contribute to
the pensions of its retirees. In addition to this,
SCAF hopes to obtain guarantees that its members will
not be prosecuted, especially in light of the many
accusations and controversies that have accompanied
the transitional period, and the events and clashes we
have witnessed. Amidst all these
intricacies, the subject of the military's role and
status remains among the most important issues in the
upcoming stage, and – discounting the issue of the
constitution – perhaps the most sensitive. For every
person who talks about the army returning to its
barracks and distancing itself from the political
arena, there are many who believe that the army,
despite all the problems and criticisms of the
transitional period, remains the most cohesive
institution in Egypt, enjoying respect and popularity
among the majority of groups in society, and thus they
believe it has a role in protecting the constitution,
especially considering the talk about the Islamists'
hegemony. The dilemma is how
exactly to determine this role and draw boundaries so
as to protect democracy from the encroachment of any
party, including the military itself. Perhaps the
solution is to draft a constitution outlining the role
of the army in preventing military coups; as for
constitutional coups, the task of preventing this
falls within the remit of the judiciary. Comments 💬 التعليقات |