No Cavalry to the Rescue: Iraq, Iran and America In Real Life
21 June 2014
By Amir Taheri
Fans of classical Western movies know that whenever
the "good guys" are about to be massacred by "the
baddies," the US cavalry appears at the eleventh hour
to save the day.
Since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after
the First World War, a real-life version of that
cinematic metaphor has been part of Middle Eastern
geopolitics.
Each time those perceived as the "baddies" have laid
siege to those regarded as "the good guys," a Western
power, first the UK and later the United States, have
dispatched the "cavalry" to the rescue.
The "cavalry" protected many regimes against the
Soviet threat, as was the case in Iran under the Shah,
but they also saved other regimes from bullying by old
imperialists, as was the case with Egypt in the Suez
crisis. It prevented the Iranian mullahs from marching
on Baghdad and, later, forced Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein out of Kuwait. The "cavalry" rescued regimes
in Lebanon and Jordan while providing Israel with an
additional life insurance. It also brought regime
change in Afghanistan and Iraq while prolonging the
lives of regimes past their sell-by date.
Now, however, there is no cavalry. This is the message
that Middle Eastern leaders should contemplate. With
the US in retreat, the West lacks the leadership to
use its power to arbitrate the conflicts that dot the
region's political landscape.
One could debate the rights or wrongs of this
situation forever. The fact is that, for a number of
reasons, no cavalry is going to arrive. To start with,
the end of the Cold War reduced the region's
geopolitical importance. Even if Russian President
Vladimir Putin tried to play "superpower," few people
believe Russia would pose a global challenge.
The second reason is that Western powers are no longer
as dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil as they were
a generation ago. In 1980, the region accounted for 43
percent of the global oil market. In 2012 that figure
was down to 20 percent. Even then, new consumers such
as China and India accounted for a good part of the
total.
The third reason is that the bipartisan concord that
for decades marked foreign policy in Western
democracies has been shattered.
In the US, President Barack Obama is prepared to see
Iraq go up in flames to prove that former US President
George W. Bush was wrong to topple Saddam. At the
other end of the spectrum, US Senator John McCain is
also prepared to see the same smoke rising in the
skies to prove that Obama is an incompetent leader.
In Britain, bashing former prime minister Tony Blair
over Iraq has become a national pastime, rendering
serious discussion impossible. The trouble is that
neither Western nor Middle Eastern leaders are
prepared to acknowledge these new realities.
Western leaders still foster the illusion that they
exercise global leadership, which gives their public a
sense of self-satisfaction. For their part, many
Middle Eastern leaders still think that whatever they
do, the Western powers will be forced to come to their
rescue. They are like the big banks that thought they
were too big to fail.
The result of this double refusal of reality is that
Western and Middle Eastern leaders are dragged into a
world of make-believe in which they appear to be doing
something, while actually they are doing nothing. As a
result, we get such disingenuous remarks as those made
by US Secretary of State John Kerry with regards to
cooperation with Iran against the so-allied Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Kerry says that the
topic was "raised" on the margins of talks over Iran's
nuclear project. He added that any deal that might
emerge would not include "military cooperation."
Kerry's statement contains two important messages. The
first is that the ISIS challenge is something marginal
to be discussed on the sidelines of other
negotiations. The second is that the US is ready to do
"everything"—except the only things that could make a
difference: that is to say, using air strikes against
ISIS while Iran props up Iraqi ground forces to
recapture the lost cities.
For its part, Tehran knows that any commitment of
Iranian troops could make a bad situation worse. The
mullahs are trying to use ISIS as an excuse for
currying favor with the "Great Satan" while protecting
their nuclear project. Neither of the putative
partners gives a toss about Iraq. In Tehran, they are
suddenly talking of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin (1723)
that gives Tehran a right of inspection over the
Shi'ite regions of what was then part of the Ottoman
Empire.
Come to think of it, Obama's equivocation may be a
blessing in disguise. I shudder at the thought of the
US becoming involved in a major conflict with someone
like Obama as commander-in-chief. As a skilled
politician in the American context as far as winning
elections through trompe l'oeil populism is concerned,
Obama lacks the intellectual ability, the practical
knowledge and the moral stamina needed to lead a
superpower in a major crisis. What his position lacks
is consistency. He could correct that by synchronizing
his words with his (in)action. The Hippocratic
injunction, "first do no harm," could also be applied
to politics.
Since Obama is determined to do nothing, he had better
also say nothing, especially when it comes to drawing
"red lines." If he controlled his tongue, the leaders
and peoples of the region would have to stare at the
abyss and seek a way out. Knowing that there would be
no cavalry riding in on their white horses, they would
be forced to grow up and start sorting out their own
problems.
Right now, only Iraqis can save Iraq, if they indeed
want Iraq to continue to exist. No one else can do it
for them.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz,
southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and
Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily
Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle
East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he
served as member of the Executive Board of the
International Press Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and
2004, he was a contributor to the International Herald
Tribune. He has written for the Wall Street Journal,
the New York Post, the New York Times, the London
Times, the French magazine Politique Internationale,
and the German weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005, he
was editorial writer for the German daily Die Welt.
Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have been
translated into 20 languages. He has been a columnist
for Asharq Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book
"The Persian Night" is published by Encounter Books in
London and New York.
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