Success For Al-Qaeda In Syria? Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Al-Qaida, Zawahiri, Jowlani, Jihadism
03 January 2018By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Abstract
This article considers how far one can describe al-Qaida's experiences in
Syria as a success. A common line of analysis has been that al-Qaida has been
playing a more successful long-term game in Syria as opposed to its more
aggressive rival, the Islamic State. This article examines that argument more
closely through exploring the nature of the relationship between al-Qaida and
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the latest successor initiative to the original Syrian
al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The author considers the viability of
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project and the future of al-Qaida in Syria, reaching
a negative long-term prognosis.
Keywords: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, al-Qaida, Zawahiri, Jowlani, Jihadism
Introduction
One of the most common concepts to describe al-Qaida's presence in Syria has
been that of 'playing the long game.'[1] That is, whereas its rival the
Islamic State focused on quickly defeating other Syrian insurgent groups and
opponents, establishing a state project and imposing the harshest aspects of
Islamic law (i.e. the hudud punishments for serious crimes), al-Qaida has
chosen to embed deeply within the insurgency fighting the Assad regime. Thus,
al-Qaida affiliates and al-Qaida-linked groups have generally proven
themselves to be valuable military partners for other factions, while not
working to impose all aspects of Islamic law immediately on the populations in
their zones of control and influence, but rather working to condition the
locals to accept their imposition eventually.
The main group considered to represent this approach has been Jabhat al-Nusra,
also known by the fuller name of Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (translated:
"the support front for the people of al-Sham"). Similarly-aligned groups
ideologically, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party primarily consisting of
Uyghurs from East Turkestan in China, have also used the slogan of nusra
li-Ahl al-Sham. However, the focus here will be on Jabhat al-Nusra and its
successor organizations, being much larger entities than the likes of the
Turkestan Islamic Party.
Publicly announced in January 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra initially made its mark
with high profile bomb attacks but soon became established as an important
military actor in the insurgency. Its global jihadist orientation was clear in
the distribution of its content on jihadi forums. However, no specific
affiliation or links were publicly declared. This was in keeping with the
approach of other jihadi groups that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring,
such as the Ansar al-Shari'a movements in Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.[2] It was
only an audio message in April 2013 by Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, who had helped set up Jabhat al-Nusra and wanted to subsume it
unilaterally under his group, that prompted Jabhat al-Nusra's leader to
declare an affiliation with al-Qaida. This was likely in the hope that al-Qaida
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri would rule in his favour in the dispute with
Baghdadi.
However, the declaration of the al-Qaida affiliation did not generally lead to
Jabhat al-Nusra's isolation from the broader insurgency, as many groups
continued to cooperate with it on the battlefield. In the end, with the
expansion of Baghdadi's Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria,
Jabhat al-Nusra took the side of the insurgency against ISIS in the broader
infighting that erupted across the north and east in early 2014, while al-Qaida
central issued a formal statement denying that ISIS had any links with it. Al-Qaida's
turn against ISIS reinforced a widespread line of defense of Jabhat al-Nusra
as a vital military partner and part of the broader insurgency. This was so
even as Jabhat al-Nusra lost its most valuable assets in the east of Syria to
ISIS by summer 2014 and occasionally targeted groups for elimination, most
notably the Western-backed Syrian Revolutionaries Front in Idlib province in
October-November 2014. Indeed, in early 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra came together
with the Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham to set up and lead the Jaysh al-Fatah
alliance that drove out the regime from almost all towns in Idlib, including
the provincial capital itself.
Hence, despite some severe bumps, Syria's al-Qaida affiliate had successfully
affirmed its status by 2015-2016 as a leading actor in the insurgency,
prompting warnings that the group could pose a bigger long-term threat to the
United States than the Islamic State.[3] Today, warnings of a major al-Qaida
threat emanating from Syria continue to be repeated, with U.S. diplomat Brett
McGurk characterizing Idlib province, the main epicenter of the insurgency
today and dominated by the Jabhat al-Nusra successor group Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham, as the "largest al-Qaida safe haven since 9/11."[4] In an opinion
article for the Daily Beast, Charles Lister argued that "al Qaeda stands to
benefit the most" from continued instability in Syria deriving from Assad's
remaining in power [5], highlighting that "al Qaeda has embedded itself deeply
within the anti-Assad movement, attaching its fate to that of the indigenous
revolution."[6]
How justified are these fears of an al-Qaida threat emanating from Syria for
the long-term? This article explores this question more closely by examining
two issues. First, it is necessary to explore the nature of al-Qaida's
relationship with Jabhat al-Nusra and its successor organisations, firstly
embodied in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and then Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Second, this
article looks at the current direction of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project, its
future viability that is connected to the wider fate of Syria's insurgency,
and what that fate means for al-Qaida in Syria.
The Break from al-Qaida: The Plan All Along?
While Jabhat al-Nusra was able to form military alliances and joint
administrations with many other insurgent actors, its explicit al-Qaida
affiliation posed a problem for the often discussed aspiration of unity among
the various factions. Understandably, other groups feared that a real merger
with Jabhat al-Nusra would lead to being internationally blacklisted as
terrorists, targeted in US airstrikes and losing support from foreign state
patrons. For instance, in early 2016, talks for a merger between Jabhat al-Nusra
and other factions - in particular Ahrar al-Sham - were raised, only for the
idea to be rejected on the grounds of Jabhat al-Nusra's al-Qaida affiliation.
Ayman al-Zawahiri was clearly aware of the discussions, as illustrated in his
speech "Go forth to al-Sham," released in May 2016 but recorded in
February/March of that year (the time lag existing on account of the logistics
of communication channels with the outside world).[7] In his speech, he
portrayed the jihad in Syria as representing the best hope of the ummah for
establishing an Islamic government, and emphasized that this jihad needed to
be defended. On the issue of al-Qaida affiliation, Zawahiri appeared to be
ambiguous: while he stressed that al-Qaida itself did not seek to rule and
would go with the hypothetical Islamic government that goes above
organisational ties, he also said that he did not think that international
powers would be content simply with an end to Jabhat al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaida,
but would rather seek to humiliate it further.
[8]
Fresh impetus was given to the notion of breaking ties with al-Qaida when
reports emerged around the beginning of July 2016 regarding proposals for a
joint U.S.-Russia campaign to target Jabhat al-Nusra. On July 28, Jabhat al-Nusra
was officially rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham ("Conquest of al-Sham
Front"), declared to have no affiliation with any "external entity." The
occasion of the announcement was the first time in which Jabhat al-Nusra's
leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani revealed his face publicly, and stated that the
change came in accordance with the "general guidelines and directives" of al-Qaida's
leadership. Hours before the actual announcement, Jabhat al-Nusra's media wing
al-Manara al-Bayda had released an audio message by Abu al-Khayr al-Masri,
identified for the first time as Zawahiri's deputy. In this message, he was
urging for the necessary steps to be taken to protect the jihad in Syria and
strive for unity above organisational ties, replaying an excerpt from an old
Zawahiri speech released in January 2014, which stated that unity should come
above party affiliation.[9]
The media presentation by Jabhat al-Nusra on that day suggested a move
coordinated with Zawahiri. For instance, the particular wording regarding
affiliation implied that there could still be ties with al-Qaida figures who
had come to Syria (e.g. Abu al-Khayr al-Masri), rather than a true break with
al-Qaida. In addition, Jowlani stated in his announcement that Zawahiri and
the al-Qaida leadership would continue to be an exemplar to follow. Some
jihadi media outlets contributed to this impression, with the pro al-Qaida
outlet al-Fustaat posting some days before the announcement that "Jabhat al-Nusra
will soon sever ties with al-Qaida with the permission of Sh. Ayman al-Zawahiri."[10]
Compelling as this interpretation of a stroke of al-Qaida genius and guidance
might seem, one to which this author also subscribed, it faces two problems.
First, the short-term impetus for the rebranding, and the actual rebranding,
occurred within the timeframe of approximately one month. Yet as noted with
the Zawahiri audio recording released in May of that year but actually
produced 2-3 months earlier, there is a considerable delay in the
communication channels between Zawahiri and the outside world. While it is
clear that Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, being based in Syria himself, gave
permission for the rebranding and shift in affiliation, it seems implausible
that the matter could have been relayed to Zawahiri and a response relayed
back within the time-space of one month.
Second, there was by no means unanimous backing within the Jabhat al-Nusra
leadership for the rebranding. For instance, the Jordanians Imad al-Toubasi
(Abu Julaybib) and Bilal Khuraisat (Abu Khadija al-Shari'i) both refused to
join Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.[11] Both men clearly rejected the idea of breaking
ties with al-Qaida and the oath of allegiance to Zawahiri, and feared that the
ideological project would be compromised by merging with more 'moderate'
factions; the fear of 'dilution', it should be noted, is implied in Zawahiri's
speech released in May 2016. If the rebranding had been approved and guided by
Zawahiri, why would these men have refused to join the new entity? Surely they
would have been aware of Zawahiri's supposed role in the whole matter?
When one takes into account these 'purist' concerns about the rebranding,
another interpretation emerges behind the initial wording of not being
affiliated to an "external entity": that is, that this phrasing was an attempt
to address the 'purist' concerns, and reassure them that the rebranded entity
would still remain an al-Qaida project in its ideological essence. Subsequent
pronouncements moved away from this technical-sounding language likely in the
realisation that the 'purists' could not be won over. In any case, these
hardliners could not muster sufficient support to cause a serious split within
the organisation, on account of the disagreement.
The rebranding as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham should not be seen as something that
was in the works by al-Qaida all along. Rather, it was a response to a
particular set of circumstances that probably threatened to fracture the
group. There had likely been efforts going on for several months to push for a
new non-al-Qaida-affiliated entity by the likes of Saleh al-Hamawi, a founding
member of Jabhat al-Nusra who was expelled in summer 2015 for his criticisms
of what he saw as the group's lack of pragmatism, but who still retained a
network of supporters in the group. The threat of an American-Russian campaign
to target Jabhat al-Nusra seemed to give those efforts additional force in
July 2016, thus prompting Jowlani to have serious consultations with Abu al-Khayr
al-Masri and the leadership on the issue of the al-Qaida affiliation.
Following the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, one of the goals was to renew
merger talks with other factions, in particular Ahrar al-Sham. Now that the
al-Qaida affiliation was dropped, one could say that the ball was in the court
of Ahrar al-Sham and other factions to merge. As was widely expected at the
time by analysts, the shift to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham failed to give rise to new
mergers. The outside world considered Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to be a mere front
for al-Qaida, and so any mergers with the group would again risk seeing other
factions blacklisted and losing outside support. Thus, the mainstream Ahrar
al-Sham leadership, with its close ties to Turkey, refused to merge with
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, even as the pressure to merge intensified with the
regime's recapture of Aleppo city in its entirety in December 2016, a major
blow to the insurgency that gave rise to a sense of a wider crisis. Among
those pushing for a merger with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham was a hardline faction
within Ahrar al-Sham led by Hashim al-Sheikh, who formed his own Jaysh al-Ahrar
subgroup in Ahrar al-Sham, and groups that had developed close working
relationships with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, such as the Islamist and
opportunistic Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, which once received CIA support
through an operations room in Turkey that was cut off in 2015. The end of
CIA's support was due to the group's criminal activities (e.g. kidnapping
Italians in 2014) and a close working relationship developed with Jabhat al-Nusra.
Only a round of infighting helped bring about actual mergers though, as Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham, perceiving a conspiracy to isolate it but likely also wishing
to seize control of some key supply routes, began by launching an attack on
Jaysh al-Mujahideen, a CIA-backed group that had a presence in the west Aleppo
countryside. The round of infighting in west Aleppo countryside and Idlib led
several smaller, more 'moderate' groups to seek protection in Ahrar al-Sham by
merging under its banner. On January 28, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham came together
with Hashim al-Sheikh, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, the jihadist Jabhat Ansar
al-Din and two other groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, just two days after
the declaration of the merger of some factions under Ahrar al-Sham and
probably a reaction to it. Within Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Hashim al-Sheikh was
designated the overall leader, while Jowlani became the military commander.
No evidence shows that Zawahiri had any role in the formation of Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham. As with the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the speed at which the
merger took place suggests that there would not have been enough time to
consult with him on the matter. Following the formation of Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham, the Jordanian jurist and former Jabhat al-Nusra member Sami al-Oraidi
resigned from the new entity. Oraidi had initially served as a religious
official for Jabhat al-Nusra in the south of Syria before becoming the general
Shari'i official for the organization. In October 2013, he outlined Jabhat al-Nusra's
ideological outlook in an interview with the group's media wing.[12]
Oraidi likely stayed in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - where he served as a member of
the Shari'i council and the Shura council - for idealist reasons of unity
among jihadists in contrast to the more vocal initial critics. With Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham, however, he evidently did not feel compelled to stay silent.
On February 10, 2017, the Telegram channel "Fans of Dr. Sami al-Oraidi"
relayed the following statements by him:
"Among the reasons for the waste of the fruit of jihad is the delay of the
counsel of the 'ulama and the people of benevolence. Delaying the statement
beyond the time of need is not permissible. Among the greatest disobedience is
disobedience to the mother group; after it raised them as children, they
disobeyed it when one of them began to learn how to speak....What the
experiences in the fields of jihad have established is that if alliances are
not based on Shari'i foundations and restrictions with people who have in them
the quality of sacrifice and steadfastness, the harm of these alliances is
greater than their benefit."[13]
Although there is no mention of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham by name, it is clear,
given the context of his resignation, that he is talking about the group, and
the supposed disobedience of the parent organization al-Qaida. Oraidi
continued this line of sub-tweeting-style criticism of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham,
writing a small treatise on the subject of the pledge of allegiance (bay'a) in
jihadi groups.[14] The work features quotations from a variety of jihadi
personalities, such as al-Qaida's Atiyatullah al-Libi and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,
in order to emphasize the need to fulfill one's pledge in giving the bay'a and
not rebel against one's amirs and establish new groups. Atiyatullah al-Libi,
for instance, is quoted as saying: "The establishment of new groups is not
permitted except with a considered Shari'i justification that the jurists
decide is a Shari'i justification." As Oraidi concludes, the bay'a can only be
dissolved by "legitimate means and for legitimate reasons," meaning that there
must be a clear affirmation of the dissolution by the "general amir of the
group." Again, no reference is made to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham by name, but the
implication is that the breaking of the allegiance to al-Qaida was not done
with the appropriate consultation of its general amir Zawahiri.
In October 2017, Oraidi began to become explicit in his criticisms [15],
responding to leaked comments made by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham official Abu
Abdullah al-Shami (Abd al-Rahim Attoun) regarding Zawahiri's speech "We shall
fight you till there is no more persecution" released early that month.[16] In
that speech, Zawahiri implicitly criticizes the breaking of ties with al-Qaida,
warning that the Syrian jihad risks going to waste on "political games and
ruses." Besides issuing a standard call to unity, Zawahiri outlined his view
of the nature of an oath of an allegiance: "binding in its nature, its
violation forbidden." While he does not explicitly reference Nusra's
successors by name, the implication is that the breaking of ties constituted a
violation of that oath of allegiance.
In his own criticisms, Oraidi offers more of the backstory to the formation of
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, saying that he had kept silent
on the matters (i.e. not explicitly referring to them) for reasons such as
"the interest of the field." According to him, for example, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri
had no knowledge of the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham except through the
media. More importantly, Oraidi says that "some time after the formation of
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the first message came from Dr. Zawahiri," in which he
rejected the project and demanded a return to the prior status-quo. Oraidi
further claims that Zawahiri had described what had happened as a "violation
and act of rebellion." The separation of any branch of al-Qaida requires the
correct consultation in the organization, and Oraidi claims that Abu al-Khayr
al-Masri thus retracted his endorsement of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, accepting
Zawahiri's argument that it was not within his competencies to approve it.
On balance, therefore, the evidence suggests that the formation of Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham and then Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham was not coordinated with Zawahiri.
While one could see in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham an initial attempt to appease
'purists' and the idea of preserving al-Qaida's project while embedding the
group even more deeply in the insurgency, the central leadership's rejection
of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and the incorporation of some non-jihadist elements
into the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham merger means that the breaking of ties can no
longer be viewed as a mere media game. Rather, it has become a very serious
point of contention.
Strategic Divergence and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's Administrative Expansion
Besides the issue of breaking ties, there is also a rift in the approach to
the war on the ground. In April 2017, Zawahiri issued an audio message that
reflected a strategic divergence between him and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
regarding the situation in Syria.[17] Entitled "al-Sham will submit to none
besides God," the message contrasted with the message released in May 2016
that portrayed the Syrian jihad as the best hope of the ummah. In this
message, Zawahiri, alluding to the major setbacks suffered by the insurgency,
emphasized that "victory comes with patience, ease with hardship, deliverance
with affliction." As part of this message, Zawahiri offered three specific
points of advice. First, there must be "critical reassessment and correction
of mistakes." Second, the focus should be on guerrilla warfare rather than
holding territory. Finally, the jihad in Syria must not be turned into a
nationalist cause, but rather should be a jihad of the entire ummah, aiming to
implement the rule of God.
The second piece of advice in particular illustrates Zawahiri's realistic
understanding of the overall direction of the Syrian civil war and the trend
against the insurgency. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, however, has clearly not been
following this approach suggested by Zawahiri. On the contrary, it has sought
to expand its administrative capabilities. In part, this approach reflects a
desire to become the face of Syria's insurgency with which outside powers must
deal while insisting that the 'revolution' against the regime continues. Thus,
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seeks to dominate over all other administrative projects
of other factions in what remains of insurgent-held territory in the epicenter
of the northwest. For example, on May 11, the group announced the
establishment of a new foundation to monitor the market of currency exchange
and financial transfers.[18] On July 29, after inflicting major defeats on the
Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham, which was forced out of the provincial capital of
Idlib and the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Idlib and Turkey, Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham's electricity administration (the General Foundation for
Electricity) subsumed Ahrar al-Sham's electricity administration (the
Electricity Foundation).[19]
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's services wing is currently called the Civil
Administration for Services, a successor to Jabhat al-Nusra's Public
Administration for Services. Statements issued by the administration also
reflect the administrative expansion particularly since the defeats inflicted
on Ahrar al-Sham. For instance, the administration has issued a statement to
establish a directorate for antiquities and museums, and another forbidding
the ratification of contracts for mobile and Internet networks without
approval of the administration.[20]
At the same time, this administrative expansion comes at an additional cost
besides the strategic divergence from Zawahiri. The international community
tends to regard Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in the same way as it regarded Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham: that is, an al-Qaida front project. Therefore, the permeation
of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham into civil life in Idlib province risks jeopardizing
the work of aid organizations in the area and flow of goods across the border
from Turkey, for fears of abetting the growing rule of what is considered to
be a terrorist organization. In turn, isolation and pariah status for Idlib
are a threat to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham financially. Thus, on July 30, Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham issued a statement that addressed the issue of operation of
humanitarian organisations amid its major gains against other factions in
Idlib province, declaring that "we affirm the importance of the continuation
of humanitarian work in the liberated areas, for what it brings from
supporting and helping our people."[21] As part of this affirmation, Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham asserted that "we will work to entrench the principle of the
neutrality and independence of the humanitarian organisations, and we will
push for this principle."
In this regard, an approach towards civil society has been adopted in at least
some areas of its control that resembles the methods of al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula when it controlled the important Yemeni port city of Mukalla.[22]
Specifically, there is the issue of civilian local councils in areas
controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and the Jabal al-Summaq area of north
Idlib provides a useful case study . An originally Druze area controlled by
Jabhat al-Nusra since the end of 2014, it has remained under the control of
the group's successors to this day. Conversions to Sunni Islam were imposed on
the local population at the beginning of 2015, in accordance with the jihadist
view that the Druze are disbelievers who fall outside the framework of beliefs
that can be tolerated. This policy has never been changed: a useful indicator
for the question of whether the dropping of the al-Qaida affiliation has
actually constituted a shift away from jihadist ideology itself.
In any event, while the Jabal al-Summaq area was controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra
and its successors, services were actually being provided by civilian local
councils. However, following the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the new
organisation made clear its intention to force the local councils to become
affiliated with its services administration. Otherwise, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
would form new councils to replace them. In Kaftin, one of the largest
villages in Jabal al-Summaq [23], the local council, which was ultimately tied
to the main opposition-in-exile, rejected becoming affiliated with Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham, and so Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham set up a new local council to
replace it, sidelining the old local council. Yet according to Abd al-Majeed
Sharif, who headed the old local council, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham "compelled the
provincial council to register it [the new local council] with them or confer
with them."[24]
The provincial council here refers to the Free Idlib Provincial Council that
is tied to the main opposition-in-exile. In other words, while the new local
council is actually affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, it appears to have
been registered in the name of the Free Idlib Provincial Council. This point
is supported by documents obtained by this author from a resident of Kaftin
featuring water and cleaning bills from this new local council for July 2017
(see Appendix). Notably, the top of the documents reads "Free Idlib Province,"
a reference to the Free Idlib Provincial Council. This corroborates the
testimony of Abd al-Majeed Sharif, who added "our provincial council is now
doing everything the Jabha [Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham] wants in compliance."[25]
This modus operandi is undoubtedly intended to ensure that aid organizations
work with the local council in Kaftin, which provides services to the
population, subject to fees that constitute a source of income for Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham.
For comparison, a document emerged from May 2017 in which the head of a local
council pledged to affiliate the council with the Hama division of Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham's services administration.[26] At the same time, the document
specified that some relations with the Free Idlib Provincial Council could
still be maintained such as in provision of relief and services support. This
document lends further credence to Abd al-Majeed Sharif's interpretation.
The desire to expand and unify administrative capabilities while facing
potential problems of international stigmatization and subversion efforts
continues to prove a challenge for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. As of the time of
writing, the group appears to have had a hand in the formation of a "Salvation
Government"[27] to rival the wider interim government linked to the main
opposition-in-exile. This rival government notably declared in its covenant
that "Islamic Shari'a" should be the sole source of legislation and that "it
is necessary to preserve the identity of the Syrian Muslim people," much to
the approval of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham officials like the Egyptian Abu Fatah
al-Farghali.[28]
Conclusion: The Future
In sum, it can be seen that the relationship between al-Qaida and Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham is more complicated than the latter being a simple front group
for the former. Although the media circus on the day of the rebranding of
Jabhat al-Nusra as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham gave the impression of a move
coordinated with Zawahiri, the evidence that has since emerged does not
support that idea. The al-Qaida loyalists, despite their complaints, do not
seem to be numerous or influential enough to form a real rival faction to
compete with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which has barred the formation of new
factions in the north anyway.[29] There is also the problem of strategic
divergence between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Zawahiri. While the concerns
about Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham supposedly being tainted with Syrian nationalism
and the jihadist ideology being compromised seem to be overblown, particularly
as more obviously non-jihadist elements such as Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki
have defected, there is a clear contrast between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's
governance project and Zawahiri's advice to pursue guerrilla warfare.
Yet the viability of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project in the long run is in
doubt. Whatever the complexities of the group's relationship with al-Qaida,
the external perception of the organisation as an al-Qaida front is important
to bear in mind when considering how the outside world regards Idlib province.
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham may insist that it can maintain the apparent
independence of civil society in its areas of control, but outside donors are
increasingly likely to regard that as a mere ruse and pull out of aid efforts.
The Assad regime, meanwhile, will not leave Idlib province in insurgent hands
indefinitely. While the insurgency cannot defeat the regime, an insurgent-held
Idlib province remains a serious nuisance to cause disturbances in Hama and
Latakia provinces. As of the time of writing, the priority of the regime and
its allies is to secure the eastern areas from the Islamic State, partly to
reclaim vital resources such as oil but also to block US-backed actors from
maximizing their influence in the area. Thus, a serious regime offensive to
retake all of Idlib, which would not be an easy affair, is not imminent. But
an offensive of some sort is ultimately to be expected. The scale of that
campaign depends in part on how far Turkey decides to expand its intervention
into northwest Syria. So far, Turkey has in fact cooperated with Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham in western Aleppo countryside to deploy monitors to block any westward
expansion by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces pocket in Afrin. Indeed,
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is publicly portraying the Turkish intervention as
something that is limited.[30] There are also suggestions Turkey is trying to
play a long-game against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, initially cooperating with it
over a shared aim while also working to undermine it from within by less
confrontational methods like assassinations of officials and encouraging
defections in the rank-and-file.[31]
Whatever scenario does play out, the long-term outlook is bleak for Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham as a governance project. As is the case with the contracting
Islamic State, the logical outcome is resorting to guerrilla tactics. In this
regard though, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seems less well placed than the Islamic
State, which has had far more lucrative financial resources to exploit for a
long time since expelling Jabhat al-Nusra from eastern Syria in 2014.
The pursuit of guerrilla warfare in the end may help heal the rift between
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the al-Qaida loyalists, who do not necessarily see
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as an outright enemy in the way they view the Islamic
State but rather as merely being severely misguided. However, the future
picture hardly tells of a success story. The organisation and the al-Qaida
presence in Syria more broadly are unlikely to die out completely, but the
scenario is one of an insurgency operating in largely depopulated terrain of
relatively small size, not exactly comparable to the larger safe havens
enjoyed by al-Qaida in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.
It may be argued that the problems al-Qaida has faced in Syria do not matter
as only a few al-Qaida members are required to plot attacks against the West.
However, these individuals are vulnerable to targeted counter-terrorism
strikes. As for actual attacks conducted in the West at present, it is the
Islamic State rather than al-Qaida claiming a higher success rate, whether
through merely inspiring individuals or by communicating with sleeper
operatives.
It is often tempting to impute strategic brilliance to one's enemy when it is
not warranted. The evolution of Jabhat al-Nusra over time into Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham is a case-in-point.
Appendix: Documents from Kaftin for Water and Cleaning Services
Notes
[1] E.g. Charles Lister, "al-Qa'ida plays a long game in Syria," CTC Sentinel,
September 11, 2015; URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-plays-a-long-game-in-syria
.
[2] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "al-Qa'ida uncoupling: Jabhat al-Nusra's
rebranding as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham," CTC Sentinel, August 22, 2016; URL:https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-uncoupling-jabhat-al-nusras-rebranding-as-jabhat-fateh-al-sham
.
[3] E.g. Pamela Engel, "Al Qaeda is revealing its long game in Syria,"
Business Insider, March 23, 2016; URL: http://uk.businessinsider.com/al-qaeda-nusra-front-goals-in-syria-2016-3?r=US&IR=T
.
[4] "Assessing the Trump Administration's Counterterrorism Policy," Middle
East Institute, July 27, 2017; URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UgzqabDYK7I&t=3986s
.
[5] Charles Lister, "How the Russians Suckered Trump in Syria, and Iran Comes
Out the Big Winner," July 12, 2017; URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-russians-suckered-trump-in-syria-and-iran-comes-out-the-big-winner
.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "al-Qa'ida uncoupling."
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham: Un-troubling defections," al-Modon, August 26,
2016.
[12] "Our Manhaj and our Aqeeda: interview with Sami al-Oraidi," al-Manara al-Bayda,
October 21, 2013; URL: https://archive.org/details/Moqabla .
[13] Collected and saved at URL: https://justpaste.it/oraidi10feb2017 .
[14] "Responding to those asking about the ruling of fulfilling the pledge of
allegiance to the groups striving to implement the ruling of the law of the
Lord of the Worlds," Sami al-Oraidi, March 29, 2017; URL: http://www.jihadica.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ijabat-al-sailin.pdf .
[15] Sami al-Oraidi, "For God and then for history," October 2017.
[16] Ayman al-Zawahiri, "We shall fight you until there is no more
persecution," al-Sahab Media, October 2017; URL: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/ dr-ayman-al-zcca3awacc84hiricc84-22we-shall-fight-you-until-there-is-no-more-persecution22-en.pdf
.
[17] "al-Sham will submit to none besides God," al-Sahab Media, April 2017;
URL: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/
dr-ayman-al-zcca3awacc84hiricc84-22al-shacc84m-will-submit-to-none-except-god22.pdf
.
[18] Copy of the statement can be accessed at URL: https://justpaste.it/htsfinancialadminmay11
.
[19] Copy of the document can be accessed at URL: https://justpaste.it/htsahrarelec29jul
.
[20] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Service Documents":
Specimens N and O.
[21] "Commenting on the statement issued by Syrian organizations and
committees concerning the recent developments," Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, July
30, 2017; URL: https://justpaste.it/hts30jul2017 .
[22] Michael Horton, "The Hadramawt: AQAP and the Battle for Yemen's
Wealthiest Governorate," Jamestown, July 10, 2015; URL: https://jamestown.org/program/
the-hadramawt-aqap-and-the-battle-for-yemens-wealthiest-governorate/.
[23] A distinction is drawn between villages of Jabal al-Summaq on the plain
(e.g. Kaftin) and those further up on the mountain. A body called "The United
Mountain Council" was set up for local council services for the villages
further up on the mountain. It appears to have been more compliant with Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham's demands than the Kaftin local council, despite an official
claim to be independent. The United Mountain Council declared support for the
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-supervised "Civil Administration Initiative in the
Liberated Areas" in August 2017, see URL: https://justpaste.it/majlismuwahhidaug2017.
Cf. "Launching of the Civil Administration Initiative in the Liberated Areas,"
SMART News, August 24, 2017
[24] Conversation, August 15, 2017.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "Archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Service Documents," Specimen P.
[27] The announcement of this government was reported on by Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham's 'Iba News Agency, November 5, 2017; URL: https://justpaste.it/hts5nov2017e
.
[28] Abu Fath al-Farghali on his Telegram channel, November 2, 2017; URL:
https://justpaste.it/abufathfarghalinov2 .
[29] Statement issued July 27, 2017. Copy can be found at URL: https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/890903185044406277
.
[30] Sam Heller, "Tahrir al-Sham official on Turkey's intervention to
implement Astana: 'That's not the reality,'" Sam Heller/Abu al-Jamajem,
October 15, 2017; URL: https://abujamajem.wordpress.com/ 2017/10/15/tahrir-al-sham-official-on-turkeys-intervention-to-implement-astana-thats-not-the-reality/
.
[31] Charles Lister, "Turkey's Idlib Incursion and the HTS Question:
Understanding the Long Game in Syria," War on the Rocks, October 31, 2017;
URL: https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/
turkeys-idlib-incursion-and-the-hts-question-understanding-the-long-game-in-syria/
.
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