09 April 2010 By
Daniel Volman When President Barack Obama took office in January
2009, it was widely expected that he would
dramatically change, or even reverse, the militarized
and unilateral security policy that had been pursued
by the George W. Bush administration toward Africa and
other parts of the world. After one year in office, however, it is clear that
the Obama administration is following essentially the
same policy that has guided U.S. military policy
toward Africa for more than a decade. Indeed, the
Obama administration is seeking to expand U.S.
military activities on the continent even further. In its FY 2011 budget request for security
assistance programs for Africa, the Obama
administration is asking for $38 million for the
Foreign Military Financing program to pay for U.S.
arms sales to African countries. The administration is also asking for $21 million
for the International Military Education and Training
Program to bring African military officers to the
United States, and $24.4 million for Anti-Terrorism
Assistance programs in Africa. The Obama administration has also taken a number of
other steps to expand U.S. military involvement in
Africa. In June 2009, administration officials revealed
that Obama had approved a program to supply at least
40 tons of weaponry and provide training to the forces
of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia through several intermediaries, including
Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and France. In September 2009, Obama authorized a U.S. Special
Forces operation in Somalia that killed Saleh Ali
Nabhan, an alleged al-Qaeda operative who was accused
of being involved in the bombing of the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, as well as other
al-Qaeda operations in east Africa. In October 2009, the Obama administration announced
a major new security assistance package for Mali –
valued at $4.5-$5 million – that included 37 Land
Cruiser pickup trucks, communication equipment,
replacement parts, clothing, and other individual
equipment and was intended to enhance Mali’s ability
to transport and communicate with internal security
forces throughout the country and control its borders. Although ostensibly intended to help Mali deal with
potential threats from AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb), it is more likely to be used against Tuareg
insurgent forces. In December 2009, U.S. military officials confirmed
that the Pentagon was considering the creation of a
1,000-strong Marine rapid deployment force for the new
U.S. Africa Command (Africom) based in Europe, which
could be used to intervene in African hot spots. In February 2010, in his testimony before a hearing
by the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for
Africa Johnnie Carson declared, "We seek to enhance
Nigeria’s role as a U.S. partner on regional security,
but we also seek to bolster its ability to combat
violent extremism within its borders." Also in February 2010, U.S. Special Forces troops
began a $30 million, eight-month-long training program
for a 1,000-man infantry battalion of the army of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the
U.S.-refurbished base in Kisangani. Speaking before a Senate Armed Service Committee
hearing in March 2010 about this training program,
Gen. William Ward, the commander of Africom, stated
"should it prove successful, there’s potential that it
could be expanded to other battalions as well." During the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
Ward also discussed Africom’s continuing participation
in Ugandan military operations in the DRC against the
Lord’s Resistance Army. Despite the failure of
"Operation Lightning Thunder," launched by Ugandan
troops in December 2008 with help of Africom (included
planning assistance, equipment, and financial
backing), Ward declared, "I think our support to those
ongoing efforts is important support." And in March 2010, U.S. officials revealed that the
Obama administration was considering using
surveillance drones to provide intelligence to TFG
troops in Somalia for their planned offensive against
al-Shabaab. According to these officials, the Pentagon
may also launch air strikes into Somalia and send U.S.
Special Forces troops into the country, as it has done
in the past. This growing U.S. military involvement in Africa
reflects the fact that counterinsurgency has once
again become one of the main elements of U.S. security
strategy. This is clearly evident in the new Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) released by the Pentagon in
February. According to the QDR, "U.S. forces will work with
the military forces of partner nations to strengthen
their capacity for internal security, and will
coordinate those activities with those of other U.S.
government agencies as they work to strengthen
civilian capacities, thus denying terrorists and
insurgents safe havens. For reasons of political
legitimacy as well as sheer economic necessity, there
is no substitute for professional, motivated local
security forces protecting populations threatened by
insurgents and terrorists in their midst." As the QDR makes clear, this is intended to avoid
the need for direct U.S. military intervention:
"Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and
emphasize host-nation leadership are generally
preferable to large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns.
By emphasizing host-nation leadership and employing
modest numbers of U.S. forces, the United States can
sometimes obviate the need for larger-scale
counterinsurgency campaigns." Or, as a senior U.S. military officer assigned to
Africom was quoted as saying in a recent article in
the U.S. Air University’s Strategic Studies
Quarterly, "We don’t want to see our guys going in
and getting wacked. … We want Africans to go in." Thus, the QDR goes on to say, "U.S. forces are
working in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Colombia,
and elsewhere to provide training, equipment, and
advice to their host-country counterparts on how to
better seek out and dismantle terrorist and insurgent
networks while providing security to populations that
have been intimidated by violent elements in their
midst." Furthermore, the United States will also continue
to expand and improve the network of local military
bases that are available to U.S. troops under
base-access agreements. The resurgence of Vietnam War-era counterinsurgency
doctrine as a principal tenet of U.S. security policy,
therefore, has led to a major escalation of U.S.
military involvement in Africa by the Obama
administration that seems likely to continue in the
years ahead. The $38 million for the Foreign Military Financing program to pay for U.S. arms sales to African countries includes: $9 million for Liberia, $9 million for Morocco, $4.9 million for Tunisia, $2.5 million for Djibouti, $2 million for Ethiopia, $1.5 million for the Democratic Republic of Congo, $1.4 million for Nigeria, and $1 million for Kenya. The $21 million for the International Military Education and Training Program to bring African military officers to the United States for military training includes: $2.3 million for Tunisia, $1.9 million for Morocco, $1 million for Kenya, $1 million for Nigeria, $1 million for Senegal, $950,000 for Algeria, $825,000 for Ghana, $725,000 for Ethiopia, $600,000 for Uganda, $500,000 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and $500,000 for Rwanda. The $24.4 million for Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs in Africa includes: $8 million for Kenya, $1 million for South Africa, $800,000 for Morocco, and $400,000 for Algeria, and $14 million for African Regional Programs.
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