Bashar al-Assad And The Devil's Gambit: Has The Syrian Tyrant Used ISIS To Become A de facto U.S. Ally?
18 July 2014
By Domic Tierney
A year ago, Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria,
was reeling from an entrenched insurgency and facing
the prospect of war against the United States and its
allies. After Syrian government forces used chemical
weapons to kill more than 1,000 civilians in August
2013, Barack Obama threatened air strikes against
Damascus—before a last-minute deal to destroy Syria's
chemical stockpiles averted a conflict.
Today, Assad is almost an unofficial ally of the
United States in the fight against the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni extremist force that
has swept from Syria into neighboring Iraq. The Syrian
leader's tale of political survival offers a brutal
lesson about how dictators can use violence to
radicalize their opposition and cement their rule.
Embattled tyrants like Assad can't usually win
international allies with a charm offensive. Instead,
their best hope for gaining foreign support is to rely
on that old adage: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
As Winston Churchill said during World War II: "If
Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable
reference to the devil in the House of Commons."
Dictators can play the devil's gambit: winning
international sympathy by deliberately radicalizing
regime opponents, so that these adversaries look like
latter-day Hitlers. This approach is cynical, bloody,
and potentially effective. "It's obvious that Bashar
al-Assad's strategy is to present us with a choice of
ISIS or him so that eventually we will choose him,"
Senator John McCain has observed.
How does the devil's gambit work? The goal is to make
the opposition appear even more threatening than the
regime. If you're a despot like Assad, this is no easy
feat. For one thing, Damascus has an appalling
human-rights record, and a list of allies that reads
like the Axis of Evil, 2014 edition, including Iran
and Hezbollah.
Furthermore, back in 2011, the original Syrian
resistance won many international friends. The
opposition included a large number of moderates who
sought democratic change using peaceful mass protests
and strikes. These tactics of non-violent resistance
can successfully undermine a dictatorship, by boosting
mass participation in the resistance, peeling away
regime supporters, and winning foreign backing.
The devil's gambit requires transforming the
opposition into something far more radical and
dangerous. If non-violent resistance is effective at
toppling tyrants, then dictators can incite rebels
into using extreme tactics like terrorism. Autocrats
want to turn today's Gandhis into tomorrow's jihadists.
Here, dictators can benefit from the inherently
vicious nature of civil war. A cycle of atrocities and
revenge is like a centrifugal force that pushes all
sides to the extreme. The center cannot hold, as the
catalyst of violence hardens attitudes, marginalizes
moderates, and forges the opposition into a more
militant entity.
In Syria, three years of scorched-earth warfare, which
has left 170,000 dead and ruined much of the country,
have removed the restraints on war. Over time, the
balance of power within the opposition has shifted
from relatively moderate groups like the Free Syrian
Army to extremists like ISIS.
Dictators playing the devil's gambit can further this
process of radicalization by targeting moderate groups
for destruction, or provoking them into acts of
terror. Assad casts himself as the nation's guardian
against Sunni jihadists, but he has deliberately
encouraged the rise of extremism. The Syrian
president's forces have allowed ISIS to consolidate a
rump caliphate in northeastern Syria as a visible
warning about what the alternative to his rule looks
like. Indeed, Assad's troops rarely battle ISIS,
saving their fire for more moderate enemies. The
regime has even reportedly released jihadists from
jail to foment extremism within the opposition, and
bought oil from ISIS, effectively bolstering its
influence.
For Assad, ISIS is priceless. The Sunni extremist
boogeyman holds the key to his political survival. As
ISIS continues its assault in Iraq, employing tactics
that include beheadings, crucifixions, and systematic
torture, Assad has cemented his alliance with Baghdad,
as well as with Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.
Even Assad's enemies are rethinking their strategy.
European countries worry about the thousands of
Europeans who have traveled to Syria to fight Assad—and
their potential return as violent militants.
Meanwhile, the United States has dispatched hundreds
of advisors to join the battle against ISIS in Iraq.
Members of the Obama administration are backing away
from the goal of toppling Assad. "Anyone calling for
regime change in Syria," said one official, "is
frankly blind to the past decade; and the collapse of
eastern Syria, and growth of Jihadistan, leading to 30
to 50 suicide attacks a month in Iraq."
The devil's gambit is a chancy maneuver, since the
resulting radicals could grow too powerful to control.
For a dictator, the sweet spot is an extremist force
that's strong enough to inspire fear abroad, but not
capable enough to topple the regime—which is roughly
where ISIS is right now. If the militants become too
potent, Assad will probably turn on them with a
vengeance.
The devil's gambit is risky, yes—but a calculated
risk. A dictator looking down the barrel of regime
change may be inclined to gamble. Perhaps Muammar
Qaddafi and Hosni Mubarak lost power because they
failed to play the game as ruthlessly or effectively
as Assad has.
What can Washington do? The devil's gambit works
precisely because it presents the West with a stark
alternative: a greater evil or a lesser evil. Before
we cast our lot with Assad, however, we need to think
not just about today's choice, but also about the
long-term outlook. Is Damascus the root source of the
problem? Is a sustainable solution possible if Assad
remains in power? Is there a third alternative?
More than anything, the devil's gambit provides
another argument for early action to prevent civil
wars from breaking out or escalating. Otherwise, we
may find that the enemy of our enemy is a fiend.
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