Iran Nuclear Deal Has No Future: As Long As The Region's Issues Remain Unresolved
24 July 2014
By Samih Maaytah
When we talk about a possible agreement between Iran
and the P5 +1, not only are we talking about a
technical military agreement regarding the Iranian
nuclear program, but we are also implicitly engaging
with Iran's expansionist ambitions, which are part and
parcel of its foreign policy. It is this expansionism,
in the context of Iran's nuclear program, that raises
concerns in Israel and the West. But these concerns do
not include fears of Israel being wiped off the map or
Iran championing Arab interests in Palestine.
Iran is not interested in developing a full nuclear
program. Rather, it wants to control certain levers of
power that will allow it to realize its expansionist
ambitions. Its incomplete nuclear program is one of
these levers, as is Hezbollah, which has high levels
of influence in Lebanon, on Israel's northern border.
Iran is aware that expanding its influence in the
region requires posing a risk, albeit theoretically,
to Israel. This means doing some saber-rattling and
calling for the liberalization of Arab land, but in
reality its aim is to force the major powers to
placate Iran by ceding to its demands on regional
issues. This allows Iran to interfere in the Gulf and
even infringe upon those countries' internal affairs.
Coming to an agreement on the nuclear program is not,
in and of itself, a goal for Iran. Resolving the
matter through a definitive agreement does not advance
Iran's expansionist platform. This is because the
nuclear program must remain a tool Iran can use to
exert pressure and further its wider interests.
Iraq, for example, occupies a special place in Iranian
foreign policy. It will be decades before it has
disentangled itself from Iraq's internal affairs.
Iran, which aligned itself militarily with the United
States on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, has achieved a
remarkable amount of influence in that country. But
the situation in Iraq has now changed, to the
detriment of Tehran. Iraq has relapsed into chaos and
its Sunni minority has reclaimed some clout, and Iran
continues to engage with the Iraqi Kurds and their
ambitions for statehood.
Then there's Syria, where Iran has waged war as though
its own existence depended on the outcome. It has
provided extensive financial support to the Syrian
regime and has dispatched advisors with field
experience in Iraq. It continues to exploit the
presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
in its fight against opposition forces. This has all
been done in order to preserve Iranian influence,
which would suffer a fatal blow if the Syrian
regime—its key ally—were to fall. Tehran knows that
change in Syria means a change in the landscape in
Lebanon. This in turn would affect Hezbollah's
influence and increase the strength of those opposed
to Iranian expansionism.
If Iran becomes mired in political and military
conflicts on two fronts—Syria and Iraq—its influence
will be threatened, just as it lost influence along
the Lebanese–Israeli border when Hezbollah committed
to Security Council Resolution 1701. Iran's commitment
to the Syrian regime has weakened its relationship
with Hamas, which has taken an anti-regime stance
after having previously benefited from the regime's
political and security cover.
Iran is aware that the most important aspects of its
expansionist toolkit are located close to the Israeli
border. It must be close geographically, through
Hezbollah and Hamas, and close politically, through
the influence of its nuclear program.
This is why I do not foresee any future agreement
between the major powers and Iran regarding its
nuclear program—not because the agreement would be
difficult to reach, but because Tehran wants the
project to act as a platform from which it can advance
its interests in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf, and
elsewhere in the region. Iran wants to force the
international community to accept that it will always
be a presence on the regional stage. This is why Iran
will draw out the talks for years and years, until,
finally, negotiations reach an impasse. All the while,
it will have been pursuing its actual goals.
As long as the region's issues remain unresolved, the
crux of Iran's foreign policy will be to ensure
negotiations on the nuclear issue continue. Iran will
be at the table as long as this subject is on the
table, and that will allow it to influence other
issues in the region. It will never resolve issues it
can use as leverage to achieve its goals and further
its sectarian agenda.
Last but not least, one of the obstacles to the
nuclear deal is that it concerns the Arabs, and
especially the Gulf. The weight of the Gulf countries'
concern will always be brought to bear in the
negotiations. Gulf states recognize that a real
agreement would strengthen Iran's influence, both
because it would hold nuclear technology and because
the economic blockade on the country would be reduced,
if not completely eliminated. More importantly, this
agreement—if it takes the form of a contract—would
include understandings between the world powers and
Iran on key issues in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, which
are also of great interest to the Gulf countries.
Again, the nuclear issue is not independent of the
already existing understandings between major powers
and the countries of the region, and it cannot be made
independent. Thus, the negotiations over Iran's
nuclear program cannot succeed without first gaining a
comprehensive reading of the region's political
landscape.
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EsinIslam.Com
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