Turkey
And Brazil’s Bargain Involved Far More Than Iran
25 May 2010
By Alan Philps
For one day last week it seemed as if a new regional
power had been born in the Middle East. Or, more
precisely, reborn, since the country concerned is
Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire that
ruled the region for more than 500 years.
On Monday, it was announced that the Turkish prime
minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan and the Brazilian
president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, had persuaded
Iran to accept a compromise to fend off UN sanctions
over its nuclear ambitions. Under the deal,
superficially similar to the one proposed by the U.S.
last year, Iran would export some of its low-enriched
uranium to Turkey, and receive in its place nuclear
fuel for a medical research reactor.
For a day the world’s media was full of headlines
about how the U.S. had been outsmarted by a couple of
medium-sized powers. Some declared a new era:
diplomacy was no longer the preserve of the big
powers, the five self-appointed victors of the Second
World War who, for reasons unclear at the start of the
21st century, hold veto power on the UN Security
Council.
In Washington the tone was dismissive: the leaders of
Turkey and Brazil had become the dupes of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, in his bid to
avoid a new round of sanctions.
It did not take long for the old warhorses of
diplomacy to counter-attack. On Tuesday, the U.S.
announced that Russia and China had accepted a plan
for stepped up sanctions against Iran. This looked
like the triumph of U.S. efforts to get the Security
Council’s permanent members to sign up to new
sanctions. But the timing cannot be divorced from the
need of the old powers to stamp politely on the
upstarts.
The Turkish-Brazilian deal was clearly full of holes.
But supporters point out that if it had been
implemented – admittedly, a big if – it would have
marked Iran’s first real compromise: agreement to
export some of its enriched uranium. This could have
served as the basis for a deal to avert a looming war
in the Middle East. But for the Obama administration
the clincher was that the deal allowed Iran to
continue to enrich uranium, which the Security Council
has declared illegal.
Unfortunately the agreement on sanctions will no doubt
prove to be more a triumph of presentation than a
winning plan to stop Iran in its tracks. Russia and
China both have significant energy interests in Iran;
it is clear they have agreed to meet Washington’s
minimal demands for action, while ensuring that Iran
escapes real sanctions.
The story is not over yet. When the Security Council
imposes sanctions on a member state, it is desirable
for the body to vote unanimously in favour. But Turkey
and Brazil are currently members of the council. If
they vote against, they would not defeat the
sanctions. But dissent by two countries friendly to
the United States would damage the Security Council’s
already contested claim to express the will of the
world.
This is certainly not the last we shall hear of
Turkey’s diplomatic ambitions in the region. Power is
ebbing away from the U.S., which is burdened by debt
and hobbled by its military entanglements in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Europe is likewise focused on its own
financial problems, and its attempts to project a
unified foreign policy have been lamentable. In the
Arab world the situation is not much better. The big
hitters are weakened: Iraq will take years to recover
from the U.S. invasion, while Egypt seems sclerotic
and focused on its internal problems. Summits of the
Arab League are best passed over in silence.
All the more reason, therefore, for public opinion in
the Arab world to welcome the revival of Turkey. This
of course brings back painful memories of Turkish
domination under the Ottomans, and more recently, the
role of the Turkish Republic as the forward post of
Nato projecting American power in the region. But that
changed in 2003 when, with the Cold War safely over,
Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to invade Iraq
from its territory.
Under the rule of Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development
Party, known by its Turkish initials as the AKP,
Turkey has spread its wings, setting out to improve
its fraught relations with neighbours such as Syria,
Greece and Armenia, and opening embassies farther
afield.
In diplomatic shorthand, this is called a
“neo-Ottoman” foreign policy. But this tells us
nothing more than that the Turks under Mr Erdogan have
regained the confidence to use half-forgotten
diplomatic skills. There will be no new empire. The
aim is to mould relations with the outside world in a
way which primarily suits their commercial interests.
In Turkey’s case, the tensions between its European
ambitions – endlessly thwarted by the European Union’s
reluctance to admit a large Muslim nation – and the
rediscovery of its Islamic heritage under Mr Erdogan
have proved immensely creative.
As the EU enters what looks like an impotent,
inward-looking old age, Turkey is becoming ever more
vibrant. Ankara seems to be saying to the Europeans:
we have the secret of combining Islamic values with
democracy and a growing economy. We are the bridge
between Europe and your neighbours in the Middle East.
Europe, alas, has other things on its mind.
Turkey is not, of course, going to be the new regional
superpower. There is an enormous gap between
recognising that the U.S. is weakening and the ability
of smaller states to step in and exert the same power.
For the moment, Turkey’s entry into big power politics
still smacks of attention grabbing. But given the
failures of the old powers, the region is crying out
for some fresh input.
©
EsinIslam.Com
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