Turkey And Brazil’s Bargain Involved Far More Than Iran

25 May 2010

By Alan Philps

For one day last week it seemed as if a new regional power had been born in the Middle East. Or, more precisely, reborn, since the country concerned is Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire that ruled the region for more than 500 years.

On Monday, it was announced that the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan and the Brazilian president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, had persuaded Iran to accept a compromise to fend off UN sanctions over its nuclear ambitions. Under the deal, superficially similar to the one proposed by the U.S. last year, Iran would export some of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey, and receive in its place nuclear fuel for a medical research reactor.

For a day the world’s media was full of headlines about how the U.S. had been outsmarted by a couple of medium-sized powers. Some declared a new era: diplomacy was no longer the preserve of the big powers, the five self-appointed victors of the Second World War who, for reasons unclear at the start of the 21st century, hold veto power on the UN Security Council.

In Washington the tone was dismissive: the leaders of Turkey and Brazil had become the dupes of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, in his bid to avoid a new round of sanctions.

It did not take long for the old warhorses of diplomacy to counter-attack. On Tuesday, the U.S. announced that Russia and China had accepted a plan for stepped up sanctions against Iran. This looked like the triumph of U.S. efforts to get the Security Council’s permanent members to sign up to new sanctions. But the timing cannot be divorced from the need of the old powers to stamp politely on the upstarts.

The Turkish-Brazilian deal was clearly full of holes. But supporters point out that if it had been implemented – admittedly, a big if – it would have marked Iran’s first real compromise: agreement to export some of its enriched uranium. This could have served as the basis for a deal to avert a looming war in the Middle East. But for the Obama administration the clincher was that the deal allowed Iran to continue to enrich uranium, which the Security Council has declared illegal.

Unfortunately the agreement on sanctions will no doubt prove to be more a triumph of presentation than a winning plan to stop Iran in its tracks. Russia and China both have significant energy interests in Iran; it is clear they have agreed to meet Washington’s minimal demands for action, while ensuring that Iran escapes real sanctions.

The story is not over yet. When the Security Council imposes sanctions on a member state, it is desirable for the body to vote unanimously in favour. But Turkey and Brazil are currently members of the council. If they vote against, they would not defeat the sanctions. But dissent by two countries friendly to the United States would damage the Security Council’s already contested claim to express the will of the world.

This is certainly not the last we shall hear of Turkey’s diplomatic ambitions in the region. Power is ebbing away from the U.S., which is burdened by debt and hobbled by its military entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Europe is likewise focused on its own financial problems, and its attempts to project a unified foreign policy have been lamentable. In the Arab world the situation is not much better. The big hitters are weakened: Iraq will take years to recover from the U.S. invasion, while Egypt seems sclerotic and focused on its internal problems. Summits of the Arab League are best passed over in silence.

All the more reason, therefore, for public opinion in the Arab world to welcome the revival of Turkey. This of course brings back painful memories of Turkish domination under the Ottomans, and more recently, the role of the Turkish Republic as the forward post of Nato projecting American power in the region. But that changed in 2003 when, with the Cold War safely over, Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to invade Iraq from its territory.

Under the rule of Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish initials as the AKP, Turkey has spread its wings, setting out to improve its fraught relations with neighbours such as Syria, Greece and Armenia, and opening embassies farther afield.

In diplomatic shorthand, this is called a “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy. But this tells us nothing more than that the Turks under Mr Erdogan have regained the confidence to use half-forgotten diplomatic skills. There will be no new empire. The aim is to mould relations with the outside world in a way which primarily suits their commercial interests.

In Turkey’s case, the tensions between its European ambitions – endlessly thwarted by the European Union’s reluctance to admit a large Muslim nation – and the rediscovery of its Islamic heritage under Mr Erdogan have proved immensely creative.

As the EU enters what looks like an impotent, inward-looking old age, Turkey is becoming ever more vibrant. Ankara seems to be saying to the Europeans: we have the secret of combining Islamic values with democracy and a growing economy. We are the bridge between Europe and your neighbours in the Middle East. Europe, alas, has other things on its mind.

Turkey is not, of course, going to be the new regional superpower. There is an enormous gap between recognising that the U.S. is weakening and the ability of smaller states to step in and exert the same power. For the moment, Turkey’s entry into big power politics still smacks of attention grabbing. But given the failures of the old powers, the region is crying out for some fresh input.

 

 

©  EsinIslam.Com

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