10 September 2010 By Mshari
Al-Zaydi The anticipated hour arrived and US President Obama
began to carry out his electoral promise to withdraw
the US forces from Iraq. Remaining US soldiers in Iraq
will take over the task of providing the Iraqi army
advice, assistance, and training until they leave by
the end of 2011. Thus, the withdrawal of the US forces
- the biggest US army deployment since the Second
World War - will be complete by the end of 2011. Obama was careful to emphasize the connection
between his current practical policy and his electoral
pledges that brought him to the presidential seat in
the White House, the most dangerous seat in the world.
It is true that his other promise about shutting down
the detention camp in Guantanamo has not had the same
fate as the decision to withdraw from Iraq; however,
the man is trying to project himself as the President
that cares about his "credibility" before the US voter
and before the world. A lot has been said and many
people have reacted to this major decision. The
strangest reaction was voiced by former Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz, one of the prominent faces of
Saddam's Baath Party hostile to the United States.
Aziz appealed to Obama's America not to abandon Iraq
to the wolves of the opportunist and fundamentalist
parties. Perhaps this same worry troubles the leaders
of the Sunni "Awakening Councils". These Sunni tribal
councils - that were the sharpest sword that struck
the Al-Qaeda organization in Iraq - were created at
American hands and with tactics of building confidence
and friendship that started with Sheikh Abu-Rishah the
first, the most famous Awakening leader that was the
victim of this understanding and cooperation. What
will be the fate of these awakening councils after the
Americans leave between the wrath of Al-Qaeda and the
letdown of the government in Baghdad? What will be the
fate of the entire peace process after the American
guarantor of this process decided to pull down the
wall against which this process leaned? Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani says that
eight Iraqi provinces are ready for the Iraqi security
forces to assume the responsibility there after the
withdrawal of the US forces, while the rest of the
provinces need reinforcement by the Iraqi army in view
of the dangerous presence of Al-Qaeda in them.
Speaking about Al-Qaeda, it seems that the intense
bloody operations that Al-Qaeda carried out were meant
to coincide with the departure of the US military
units from Iraq. In a press conference last Sunday,
Major General Qasim Ata, Baghdad Operations official
spokesman, said that Al-Qaeda elements have lately
been active in altering their strategic confrontation
tactics and carrying out armed operations in order to
assert their presence and their ability to move here
and there. He pointed out that intelligence
information reveals that the Al-Qaeda organization is
gathering all the internal and external support it can
obtain to time it with the completion of the US
withdrawal. This discussion leads to a bigger debate related to
the beginning of the toppling of Saddam Hussein's
regime and the US invasion of Iraq. This subject led
to major division in the Arab world. Even similar
ideological currents were divided based on their
stands on the "benefits" of the process for change and
the fall of Saddam's timeworn regime. The Iraqi
Islamic Party (the Muslim Brothers) was not hostile to
the change process, unlike the rest of the Muslim
Brothers in the Arab world. Iyad Allawi, the pan-Arabist
(and former Baathist), was one of the stars of the
process for change unlike the rest of the pan-Arabists
in the Arab world. As for the symbols of
fundamentalist Shiite Islam - from Al al-Hakim to the
Al-Dawa Party to Ibrahim Jaafari and to Nuri al-Maliki
- they were the "knights" of the American moment in
Iraq unlike the stand of Hasan Nasrallah in Lebanon or
Hasan al-Huthi's group in Yemen with their motto of
"Death to America". The features of the division on
the prominent US even t in Iraq are not clear; they
cannot be easily explained as either agentry or
patriotism, as some "orators" of nationalism or
fundamentalism imply or as some superficial writers
claim. The division reflects diversity in evaluation
and analysis as well as conflict in the interests
intended from this change. Moreover, the issue of change in Iraq was not
confined to within Iraq but was part of a broader
process in the Middle East region. We all remember the
"onslaught for democracy" in the days of Bush's first
term in office when "estranged" friends joined this
campaign. We saw how the Muslim Brothers in Syria
opposed the regime by forming an alliance with Abdul-Halim
Khaddam, one of the pillars of the regime of Al-Assad
the father, who left in anger against Al-Assad the
son. We saw how the Muslim Brothers in Egypt began to
promote democracy under US pressure during Bush's
first term in office. This internal and external
pressure brought 80 Muslim Brotherhood deputies for
the first time to the Egyptian People's Assembly.
Almost the same thing took place with Hamas in
Palestine. The amazing thing is that all these
"onslaughts" for democracy took place, as everyone
knows, under US pressure or, to be more accurate, the
US factor was the most important factor in bringing
about this change. Nevertheless, the US factor was the
most maligned and cursed by those opportunists. Does this mean that the United States started to
promote democracy only after realizing that the 11
September 2001 tragedy at the hands of terrorist Osama
Bin Laden was a cultural and political problem before
being a security or military problem? Is that why it
pulled out from its desk drawers past research studies
by American experts on the need for the United States
to promote its civilized "message" in planting
democracy and protecting freedom in the world? Or is
it no such thing and no such "message" but sheer
financial "greed" by the oil cartels, such as
Halliburton, to suck Iraq's oil, protect the Israeli
"entity", and nothing else? If viewed separately,
perhaps the two possibilities cannot explain the US
onslaught on the region. Thus, in our analysis, it
would not be fair to ignore the "shock" that struck US
consciousness regarding the danger of Arab and Islamic
fundamentalism, a shock that necessitated a major and
different reaction. But perhaps or rather it is
certain that those with oil or economic interests had
other motives or even an ideological agenda. But these
goals were not enough to persuade Washington to move
its forces and fleets across the oceans. Ordinarily,
such wars do not erupt except based on ideological and
moral factors. This is what has happened and will
happen in history. At any rate, what is done is done. Obama is
thinking of withdrawal not only from Iraq but also
from Afghanistan had it not been for General David
Petraeus, the commander of the US and international
forces in Afghanistan, who stated that he reserves the
right to tell President Barack Obama that it may be
too early to begin to withdraw the US forces from
Afghanistan by July 2011. In an interview with the US
network NBC and in answer to a question on whether he
may submit a recommendation to the US President in
July 2011 saying that beginning to withdraw from
Afghanistan is premature, Petraeus answered: "Yes,
definitely". It is easy to show hindsight after the
dam bursts and the waters begin to flows. But it is
hard to show responsibility and try to emerge from the
tunnel of the crisis distant from speeches of heroism
or support for suicidal options. Had it not been for
the weakness of the Arab world and the Islamic
countries in Afghanistan or Somalia or elsewhere,
foreign forces would have been unable to interfere.
The world would not have been forced to preoccupy
itself with us had it not been for the fact that these
Muslim countries and others have turned into exporters
of crises to the world and all kinds of international
security perils. The question is: Where did we go wrong? Are we
suffering because the outside world is interfering in
our affairs? Or are we suffering because this world is
ignoring us and not helping us? We are living in a
futile maelstrom of self-ravishment and fighting
windmills. The outside world, regardless of its
motives or ambitions, is only a symptom of our deep
ailment. The outside world does not understand us and
may be stupid, as General Raymond Odierno, the
outgoing commander of the US forces in Iraq, admitted
when he said - according to the New York Times - that
his country acted naively in Iraq and its actions may
have made matters worse in that country. But these
"foreign" stupidities and ignorance of our history and
culture are not enough alone to explain the state of
loss and extinction that we are living. Our ailment is
more serious than to be restricted to the mere exit of
US troops or NATO forces from our countries. Perhaps
it is our ailment that brought them in the first
place. A Saudi journalist and expert on Islamic
movements and Islamic fundamentalism as well as Saudi
affairs. Mshari is Asharq Al-Awsat’s opinion page
Editor, where he also contributes a weekly column. Has
worked for the local Saudi press occupying several
posts at Al -Madina newspaper amongst others. He has
been a guest on numerous news and current affairs
programs as an expert on Islamic extremism. Comments 💬 التعليقات |