30 November 2010 By Tariq Alhomayed In his memoirs (Decision Points), former U.S.
President George W. Bush accepts that he did not
foresee the consequences of his decision to disband
the Baath party, saying "The Shiites and Kurds in
Iraq, who constitute the majority of the population,
welcomed liberation from Saddam. However, the decision
had a psychological impact that I had not predicted –
many Sunnis regarded it as an indication that they no
longer had a place in the future of Iraq. This
situation was wrought with danger, particularly with
regards to the army, where thousands of soldiers had
been notified that they were no longer needed. Instead
of joining the new military establishment, many of
them joined the rebels". He says "Regarding the orders of Jerry (Paul
Bremer), it was necessary to insist on further
discussions, especially in relation to the message
that the decision to disband the army would bring, and
how the policy of Debathification would affect a lot
of Sunnis". He added "Over time, it became clear that
the program of Debathification, which was presided
over by Ahmad Chalabi, who spent a long time in exile,
had led to deeper repercussions than we calculated,
including its impact on party members in mid-level
positions, such as teachers". Then he adds, and this is the crux of the point:
"Decisions were difficult. Like any alternative; it
created another set of problems. If the Shiites had
concluded that we were not serious in putting an end
to the era of Baath rule, maybe they would have turned
against the coalition forces, and rejected the goal of
building a united, democratic Iraq, instead entering
into an alliance with Iran." The question now, after all these years, is: Did
some Iraqi politicians, particularly those in the
Shiite parties, distance themselves from Iran [as a
result of this U.S. policy]? The answer: No! The day
before yesterday, an Iranian official told our
newspaper that Tehran was dissatisfied with the latest
political agreement in Iraq. The source argued that
the government which has been agreed upon, headed by
Prime Minster Nuri al-Maliki, "is not expected to work
in the same way that the previous government operated.
Perhaps [al-Maliki] will have obstacles in front of
him. Perhaps he [al-Maliki] will be forced to tolerate
the Baathists". This Iranian statement, not to mention
Tehran's actions, shows that the Americans were
victims of a trick, conducted by Iran's allies in the
Iraqi opposition. The Americans were also victims of
Bush's incompetence, and the tendency of his
administration to resolutely stand behind one
sentiment, which was formed after the September 11th
terrorist attacks. From reading Bush's memoirs, it can
be noted that he only sees the world from the 9/11
perspective, when time effectively stopped for him,
particularly since bush was a president of isolation
before the terrorist events, without inclinations
towards foreign affairs, and this was exploited by
Iran's allies in the Iraqi opposition, to the clear
anger of Saddam Hussein's regime. To date, it seems that Americans do not understand
the danger of Iran and its allies in Iraq. Regarding
the concept of majority and minority, a significant
national Iraqi figure told me that the Americans have
yet to realize: "The Sunnis, even if they are a
minority, act with the mentality of a majority, whilst
the Shiites, even though they are the majority, act
with the mentality of the minority. The Sunnis want
Arabism in Iraq, and independence, whilst some Shiite
leaders want to depend on Iran". This is the bottom
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