The Muslim Brotherhood Wins…And So Do
Their Opponents
27 Jan 2012By Hamad Al-Majid
The statement issued last Thursday by a spokesperson
for the US State Department, to the effect that the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had provided the US with
assurances that it will respect the peace treaty with
Israel, did not surprise us. Rather, we would have
been surprised if the Muslim Brotherhood had not
provided such guarantees. Even the Brotherhood denial,
issued by Essam el-Erian, one of the group's leading
figures can only be taken within the context of
political pragmatism to counteract the public response
to the US statement, which might harm the Muslim
Brotherhood's popularity.
In Gaza, there is a similar scene with the impact of
the US statement, specifically amongst the Hamas
leaders who are reviewing their resistance strategy.
The British "Independent" newspaper reported that the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had secretly asked Hamas
to completely halt its military activities, and only
carry out political activity, in the wake of the
outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions which were
characterized by an overwhelmingly peaceful nature,
and the victory of Islamic parties in the recent
elections. This was confirmed by the US State
Department spokesperson, although Essam el-Erian later
denied this. Furthermore, Western sources have
reported that [Hamas chief] Khaled Mishal has hinted,
over the past few weeks, that his movement will
undertake a strategic shift from armed struggle to
popular, non-violent resistance. However [senior Hamas
figure] Mahmoud al-Zahar later denied that there has
been any change in relation to "our approach and way
of thinking about the conflict".
This marathon of statements and denials is reminiscent
of the 1980s, when Fatah transformed its focus from
armed struggle to diplomatic struggle. At the time,
Yasser Arafat, may God rest his soul, had to take into
consideration his people's reaction to such a shift,
whilst simultaneously seeking to move towards
reconciliation with Israel. In this endeavour, he
sometimes used the statements issued by the rear guard
of the Fatah movement, such as Yasser Abed Rabbo, to
gauge public reaction. If the reaction was strong,
Arafat would then retract the statement and claim that
it did not reflect the views of the PLO.
In any case, our purpose here is not to investigate
the veracity of the statements, or the credibility of
the denials. Rather, the important thing here is to
demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood and other
Islamist factions with political expertise modify
their strategies and plans as soon as they come to
power. This is what we saw extensively in the late
1980s and 1990s, when the Islamists' victories in the
Algerian and Palestinian elections were aborted. At
the time, we said that giving the Islamists the
opportunity to hold power - through the victories they
achieved in the elections – would result in one of the
following results: either the Islamists would fail in
governance, or their wings would be clipped and their
radical discourse would become more moderate in an
attempt to be pragmatic amidst the complicated state
of affairs, both domestically and internationally.
This is exactly what we can detect in the "realistic"
statements being issued by the Muslim Brotherhood's
victorious leadership today, regarding a number of
political issues including the nature of relations
with Israel, an issue that is extremely sensitive and
complex. Even the Egyptian Salafists, a more
conservative and hardline Islamist group who long
accused the Muslim Brotherhood of "indecisiveness" in
their policies regarding a number of religious, social
and political issues, have now been infected by such
political pragmatism. Hence we have begun to hear a
different Salafist rhetoric regarding the nature of
relations with Israel, as well as social issues and
tourism.
To prove the validity of this theory, let us suppose
that the Palestinian Authority sportingly accepted
Hamas' overwhelming victory in the elections, and that
a Hamas Prime Minister was appointed and subsequently
given a free rein – rather than being a mere
figurehead. Would Hams then have rushed into a
completely one-sided conflict with Israel, like that
which it waged in the past, causing suffering and
horror in the Gaza Strip? I do not think so. Indeed
after Hamas assumed control of the Gaza Strip and got
a taste of power, it refrained from engaging in any
direct military conflict with Israel, and is even
pressuring other factions not to aggravate the
situation with Israel.
Dr. Hamad Al-Majid is a journalist and former
member of the official Saudi National Organization for
Human Rights. Al-Majid is a graduate of Imam Muhammad
Bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh and holds an
M.A. from California and a Doctorate from the
University of Hull in the United Kingdom.
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EsinIslam.Com
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