Sudan…On The Threshold Of A Difficult
Year: Overthrowing President al-Bashir By "All Means
Possible"
02 Jan 2012
By Osman Mirghani
The year 2011 began in Sudan with much talk about
peace, along with an event that changed the features
of the country and its history. Now the year has ended
with the reality of more than one war in the region,
the developments of which will have implications
possibly resulting in further changes to the form of
the Sudanese state, and its political map. The
beginning of the year witnessed the division of the
country after South Sudan voted to secede, in a
referendum stipulated by the terms of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the al-Bashir
regime and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).
[Under the terms of the CPA] the Khartoum regime was
supposed to create an atmosphere to make unity an
attractive option, but instead it has led the way
towards separation, and has fueled new wars. As we
enter 2012, there are currently three wars raging in
the north, stretching along the newly-formed southern
front across the breadth of the country, from Darfur
to South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. There is already
a strained relationship between Sudan and the newly
formed state of South Sudan, with relations already
ranging from a cold war to open confrontation.
These fronts are likely to intensify greatly in the
new year, and there is much evidence to support this.
Relations between Sudan and South Sudan are
increasingly tense, especially with the war over oil
revenues and the economic impact of this. This has
prompted South Sudan to explore alternative means of
exporting its oil, perhaps through Uganda, despite the
high cost of such a project. The two sides are also
engaged in a proxy conflict, with threats and
accusations of each side supporting the other's
opponents and encouraging rebels.
There is also the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF),
which was formed from among the northern branch of the
SPLM, and three armed movements in Darfur, with the
declared aim of overthrowing President al-Bashir by
"all means possible". This Front incorporates a large
number of forces, especially if we take into account
the estimates which indicate that the number of former
northern militants in the SPLM lies between 24 and 30
thousand troops, most of them from the Nuba Mountains
and the Southern Blue Nile. In addition, the Front now
incorporates three of the biggest armed movements in
Darfur. It is no secret that the SRF has Juba's
support, and with the escalation of tensions on both
sides of the border and the intensification of the
SRF's activities, confrontations could soon turn into
a war between the North and the South. This particular
development would have dire consequences.
The National Salvation government had previously tried
to reach agreements with the major armed movements in
Darfur, in order to end the war there and then portray
this achievement as a "return to piece" and as
compensation for the secession of the South. It sought
this goal through the Doha peace forum, and Qatari
mediation, and when it failed the government then
decided to use all power at its disposal to try and
deliver a knockout blow to the armed movements that
rejected the Doha forum, in particular the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM), led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim,
which it considers to be the greatest danger. The
government also sought to prevent the consolidation of
a SRF alliance, capable of effective coordination on
the ground.
Indeed, the al-Bashir regime, which has "got rid of
the burden of the South" in the words of some of its
affiliates, is now devoting itself to the "second
republic" project, seeking to change the face of the
country politically, after changes to its geographical
map. The al-Bashir regime wanted to enter the year
2012 being able to close the file on the war in Darfur,
for two reasons. Firstly, the first half of next year
will see a referendum on the administrative status of
Darfur, and whether the territory will become one
region or remain as three separate districts, as is
the current situation. JEM has already announced its
opposition to this referendum. The other reason is
that the coming months are scheduled to witness the
drafting of the new constitution, which is bound to
touch upon the form of the government, the state, and
the relationship between the center and the regions,
in addition to addressing the issue of identity.
The National Salvation government considers the draft
constitution to be a fundamental pillar of what it
calls the "second republic", and thus it sought to try
to attract various political forces to participate in
a "broad-based government". This was in order to grant
legitimacy to the planned constitution, to ensure that
its opponents would also bear responsibility for it,
and to thwart any moves to transfer the Arab Spring's
achievements to Sudan. This is especially considering
the intensification of economic hardships and growing
signs of discontent towards both the situation and the
regime.
In this context, we should consider the killing of Dr.
Khalil Ibrahim, in what Khartoum claimed to be an
armed battle, while JEM reported it as an
"assassination" strike by a guided missile fired from
a plane flying over Ibrahim's camp. The National
Salvation government considered the man to be its most
dangerous opponent in Darfur, especially after his
attempt to implement a coup with an armed invasion of
the capital, orchestrated from Omdurman in 2008.
Despite the arrest of a number of militants after the
operation, who were accused of treason and sentenced
to death, the government entered into a dialogue with
Khalil Ibrahim, with Chadian-Qatari mediation, which
led to the signing of a framework agreement. The
government also issued an amnesty for the JEM
affiliates who had been sentenced to death.
However, the agreement soon faltered, and did not
produce the government's desired results, namely for
JEM to join the Doha peace forum. Having abandoned
this plan, it then seemed that the government had
decided to liquidate Ibrahim. JEM announced that
Ibrahim had been exposed to a failed assassination
attempt in Tripoli, during the recent events in Libya,
where he was staying as Gaddafi's guest. Ibrahim then
fled from Libya after the collapse of the regime, and
the newly established rebel control. Since his return
from exile back across Sudanese borders, the al-Bashir
regime undertook a process of monitoring his
movements. His camp was targeted and Ibrahim was
killed before he could cross into South Sudan and
rendezvous with the SRF.
This operation has since raised tensions in Darfur,
and has also led to an increase in preparations on
Khartoum's behalf, in anticipation of any form of
retaliation from JEM. Thus the year has ended and
Sudan is far from peace and stability, and ever closer
to heightened confrontation and polarization.
Pressures will increase with the beginning of 2012,
which will be a difficult year in any case.