The Sudanese Trojan Horse: Spreading
Rumors Of Coup, Taking The Pulse Of The Opposition
12 Jan 2012
By Osman Mirghani
The National Islamic Front that is led by Dr.
Hassan al-Turabi, not to mention its former member and
current Sudanese First Vice President Ali Osman Taha,
as well as former General and current Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, betrayed democracy in Sudan
and seized power via a cunning and duplicitous
military coup. This is something that is well-known
and well-documented, acknowledged even by National
Islamic Front elements and members of the Sudanese
"salvation" government. So why are we now hearing talk
about something that is well known and which happened
more than 22 years ago, during which time Sudan has
witnessed what it has witnessed with regards to
misfortune and crises?
The reasons for this is talk, or let us say rumors
and speculation, which have preoccupied the Sudanese
people over the past day regarding a coup d'état plot
to change the situation in the country by overthrowing
the current regime, or putting an end to the
"salvation" [government], as some people are framing
the matter. This is after the Sudanese regime,
represented by the head of the security service,
accused the Popular Congress Party [PCP] that is led
by al-Turabi of planning to overthrow the government,
based upon documents that it claims to have seized in
the possession of one of al-Turabi's closest aides,
Ibrahim al-Senoussi. These documents, according to the
head of the Sudanese security service, reveal that the
PCP views coup d'état as being one of the options to
topple the regime; with another option being popular
uprising. However according to this story, the
government has not interrupted an active plot but
rather uncovered documentation that refers to coup
d'état as being one of the available options, indeed
this is something that al-Turabi has previously spoken
publicly about, and he has even repeated such talk in
public forums and press interviews, however this did
not move from talk into action.
It was conceivable for this accusation to be viewed
in the context of a "verbal duel" between al-Turabi
and his students who reached power via a real coup in
1989. Perhaps this is what head of the National Umma
Party and former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi
was making reference to in the speech that he issued
last Friday; however there was [also] a
misunderstanding in the media's reporting of his
words. Al-Mahdi had indicated that "we received news
that one of the [political] parties [of Sudan] wants
to carry out a coup d'état." There was not the least
amount of doubt in his speech that he was talking
about al-Turabi's party. Following this, he went on to
question the accusation against the PCP, describing
this as being false, "not because we know the
intentions of this party, but it is false because this
is an incapable party, a party that cannot do
anything, each time crying wolf."
The talk [in Sudan] therefore revolves around the
recent accusation that were made by the regime that
the PCP was plotting to carry out a coup, the same
accusations that al-Mahdi described as false, from the
viewpoint that in the past al-Turabi has issued many
threats of coup and uprising without anything
materializing. We must here recall that al-Turabi has
been arrested around six times since the division
occurred between himself and his students, who he
claims turned against him around 11 years ago. Every
time he is arrested, al-Turabi and his party are
accused of plotting to carry out a coup or conspiring
against national security or cooperating with the
Darfur-based [rebel] Justice and Equality Movement [JEM]
or being involved in subversive operations and plots.
However each time al-Turabi is freed from detention
without being brought to trial, only for this series
of events to be repeated once more.
The misunderstanding that has raised this
controversy is due to previous statements made by al-Mahdi,
during which he claimed that elements of the PCP had
invited him to cooperate with them to carry out a coup
to overthrow the "salvation" government; an invitation
that he says he refused. This misunderstanding brought
more attention to the accusation, particularly after
al-Turabi launched his fiercest attack on al-Mahdi to
date, calling him a liar and casting doubt on his
testimony to the government. Al-Turabi then went even
further, describing the government's claims as being
lies and claiming that the documents that the Sudanese
security services had seized were nothing more than
internal notes about a discussion which had taken
place within the PCP regarding Sudan's future
prospects, which included [discussions of] the
possibility of a coup or popular revolution taking
place. As for the option options [included in this
documents], this was the regime resorting to the bluff
of reconciliation, or an internal coup being carried
out.
The regime resorting to the reconciliation bluff is
something that is being carried out today and can be
seen in the recent call for a so-called broad-based
government, which would see other parties joining the
current government, however this government has failed
to convince the Sudanese people that this will result
in a change in its orientation, or that it is prepared
to relinquish its grip on genuine power. In any case,
the regime has resorted to such methods for years in
order to divide the ranks of the opposition and give
the impression that it is moving towards more openness
after years of oppression and tyranny. As for the
scenario of an internal coup taking place, al-Turabi
knows his students and their capabilities well,
particularly as he masterminded and implemented a coup
against democracy with them.
The Sudanese National Islamic Front's ability to
deceive and betray has been clear for all to see since
the "salvation" coup and the manner that it
orchestrated all the subtle details of this [coup],
which is something that is known by many people today,
indeed there is not enough space to mention all these
details here. However it will be sufficient for me to
indicate one detail which has become well known today,
namely the National Islamic Front resorting to
disguise and camouflage to seize power. This saw
members of the National Islamic Front placing its
leaders in detention with other politicians detained
in the early hours of the coup, in order to protect
itself it the coup failed, and ensure that it could
return to the political arena with the deceived
political parties as if nothing happened. Therefore,
Ali Osman Taha remained outside of prison monitoring
the details of the coup and the transfer of power,
whilst al-Turabi and other members of the National
Islamic Front were detained along with other
[Sudanese] political leaders. This was not just to
disguise their involvement with the coup, but also to
spy on the other detainees and uncover any attempts or
plans to regain power and prevent this.
The question that must be asked here is: if the
National Islamic Front has shown that it is this
cunning and duplicitous, whilst during the "salvation"
government era it demonstrated that it is prepared to
do anything to cling to power, is it out of the
question that it will utilize this cunning and
duplicity to spread the talk of division within its
ranks and between its leaders in order to sneak a
Trojan Horse into the ranks of the opposition,
particularly as this would allow it to spread rumors
of coup whenever it likes and take the pulse of the
opposition, and prevent their action if necessary?
That is the question.