From Post-modernism To Post-secularism:
Ne Egypt To Take Inspiration From The Quran
30 July 2012
By Eric Walberg
After more than a century of secuarlisation, Egypt's
cultural life is set to revolve again around the Quran.
"The Quran is our Constitution" exhorted President
Mohamed Morsi during the cliff-hanger presidential
election, Egypt's first ever bona fide presidential
election, in which he trounced the old guard's
representative. But what does this arresting image
really mean, asks Eric Walberg
This Ramadan is a historic one, celebrating the
triumph of the political vision of Egypt's legendary
Muslim Brotherhood (MB): to take inspiration from the
Quran to regenerate Egyptian society. Gamal Abdel-Nasser's
socialist vision lies in ruins, dismantled in the 40
years since his death, replaced by a neoliberal
nightmare dreamed up in American thinktanks.
The vision will not be realised by sticking to the
political and economic policies of the past 40 years,
policies which turned Egypt into a poor imitation of
Western societies, with shocking disparities of income
and extreme poverty, environmental degradation and
human degradation. Egypt was shattered into fragments
-- gated communities for the super-rich, sprawling
slums for the poor, traffic-choked streets for
everyone, crowded jail cells for thousands of
innocent, devout people caught in the treadmill of a
justice system that produced little justice.
The West's vision once again brought Egypt to the
point where the quip by Muhammad Abduh, chief mufti of
Al-Azhar 1899--1905, rings all too true: "I went to
the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to
the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam."
The task before the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
and the Islamist president is daunting beyond
description. He begins office in a political and
economic straightjacket bequeathed to him by interim
prime minister Kamal Al-Ghanzuri and acting head of
state Field Marshall Mohamed Tantawi -- a budget
already approved by the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces, without a parliament, with the military
supreme council holding almost all the cards.
But so far, these road blocks haven't stopped the
forces of the new Egypt. We are left to ask: How did
the Brotherhood triumph against all odds, with the
media, courts and the all-powerful military doing
everything to undermine them? The answer is simple. It
was the desperation of the poor and the quiet
commitment of devout Muslims among all classes of
Egyptian society.
However, even as they struggle against the entrenched,
corrupt establishment, they can count on enthusiasts
and a new spirit of reform within Muslim intellectual
circles to help navigate the rocky shoals of the
global secular establishment. Two such British
Muslims, who washed up on the shores of the Emerald
Isles from British colonies Egypt and India, and who
have made important contributions to the debate about
Islam and modernity, are Tariq Ramadan and Ziauddin
Sardar, who advocate not just "modernising Islam", but
"Islamising modernity", not just "adaptation reform"
but "transformation reform", as Ramadan writes in
Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2009).
The trouble is, the West arrogantly demands that
countries such as Egypt adapt to the Western version
of modernity -- the neocolonial order based on the US
dollar, dominated by large Western corporations and a
bristling military on hair-trigger alert around the
world. It is okay for the US to run huge trade and
budget deficits decade after decade, squandering its
dollars on war, while forcing poor countries to
"tighten their belts" when the mysterious flows of
"capital" and the vagaries of the market result in
even one year in the red. But this modernity, with its
manifest injustices, is not the only one, and it is
certainly not moral, as Egyptians have learned the
hard way.
Tariq Ramadan is a Swiss-Egyptian academic, whose
father was a prominent MB member exiled by Nasser and
whose mother was MB founder Hassan Al-Banna's eldest
daughter. He has written about Islamic reform from a
European Muslim's point of view, rejecting the
assimilationist position that Islam must adapt to
modernity. "The Western equation secularisation =
freedom = religious pluralism = democracy has no
equivalent in Muslim-majority societies where, through
the historical experiences of the past century, the
equation would rather sound like secularisation =
colonialism = de-Islamisation = dictatorship."
He sees the very heterogeneous Western Muslims as
playing a key role in developing a new approach to
their religion, taking advantage of the West's high
level of education to promote ijtihad -- independent
reasoning based on a thorough knowledge of the Quran
and hadiths -- to adapt to modern life. For instance,
to bring zakat up to date, "establishing a real system
of collective solidarity and social security, woven
into the very fabric of society, that aims at freeing
the poor from their dependence so that eventually they
themselves will pay zakat," as he wrote in Western
Muslims and the Future of Islam (2004).
Already, Western Muslims have decided that a very
restricted use of interest -- for mortgages on private
homes -- is acceptable, "a need which ... becomes a
constraining necessity", according to a fatwa issued
by the European Council for Research and Fatwas (ECRF)
and the League of Scholars of Sharia in the US, using
Abu Hanifa's terminology. Interest is allowed for
Muslims living in the non-Muslim societies in dealings
with non-Muslims, but only when used to protect the
property of Muslims.
But tweaking the old laws to meet dire needs today is
not enough for Tariq Ramadan. He calls for
alternatives to Western banking for the Muslims
community in Europe and America, based on banks
sharing lenders' risks - the intent of the prohibition
of interest in the Quran -- so that they become an
integral part of people's economic concerns, not just
parasites taking their "pound of flesh".
The 8th--10th cc categories of dar al-islam (abode of
peace), dar al-harb (abode of war), dar al-ahd (abode
of treaty), and dar al-kufr (abode of unbelief,
referring to Muhammad's early Mecca period) -- which
do not occur in the Quran but only in the much later
hadiths but are now integral to Islamic law -- must be
redefined. Formally an abode of war, the West, with
its guaranteed civil rights, ironically allows more
religious freedom these days than many oppressive,
nominally Muslim states (pre-revolution Egypt being a
prime example), where Muslims are in danger and unable
to practice their beliefs freely.
At the same time, mass migration and the globalisation
of economic, financial and political power means that
the concept of physical borders lose their meaning.
Sheikh Faysal al-Mawlawi, a founder of the ECRF,
proposes the concept of dar al-dawa (abode of
invitation to God) to refer to the early Mecca period
and the whole of the Arabian Peninsula at that time,
and, by inference, the world today. Ramadan suggests
his own characterisation of the West as dar al-shahada
(abode of testimony to the Islamic message). He argues
that Muslims are "witnesses before mankind". They must
continue to review the fundamental principles of Islam
and take responsibility for their faith, building on
the maqasid (goals) movement within Islamic legal
philosophy.
This movement was developed by the 12th century
Islamic scholar Muhammad Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who
established the Quran's goals as the preservation of
religion, life, lineage, intellect and property. As
part of the renewal of Islamic legal theory, scholars
such as Tunisian Muhammad Al-Tahir Ibn Ashur (d. 1973)
and Ramadan have shown a renewed interest in the
maqasid in relation to maslahah (public interest). As
opposed to reading verses of the Quran in isolation,
this approach requires a comprehensive reading of the
text as an integrated whole in order to identify the
higher objectives and then interpreting particular
verses on a given topic according to the maqasid's
intent.
Sardar's Reading the Qur'an: The Contemporary
Relevance of the Sacred Text of Islam (2011) put flesh
on this theoretical skeleton with his careful analysis
of Al-Baqara (the basis of much of Islamic legal
theory) and other suras, distinguishing between the
circumstantial and the general principles which the
Quran reveals. For instance, the discourse on murder
(2:178) reveals two of the most important principles
of Islamic law. Murder is one of the worst sins, but
there are boundaries (hudud) within which justice is
to be sought: the extreme punishment is "just
retribution" (qisas), but there is also compensation
and even forgiveness.
The "law of equity" is the Quran's primary principle,
revealed here: the law must be applied equally to all
-- man or woman, free or not. This passage also
reveals another important principle: punishment must
be proportionate to the crime. Yet another principle
revealed is that compassion and forgiveness are always
preferable to harsh physical punishment. Human life is
sacrosanct, as eloquently revealed in Al-Maidah: "If
anyone kills a person unless in retribution for murder
or spreading corruption in the land -- it is as if he
kills all humanity." (5:32) Capital punishment is a
last resort in exceptional cases.
Sardar criticises the blind application of sharia as
accumulated over the centuries after the death of the
Prophet, as it has led in some cases to the very
opposite of Quranic principles: capital punishment for
apostasy, but recall: "There is no compulsion in
religion." (2:256) Recently, some countries
reinstituted stoning for adultery (nowhere mentioned
in the Quran), and made hudud (extreme) punishments
the norm, whereas the Quran would avoid almost all
capital punishment. Life is precious.
Sharia should be a problem-solving methodology
requiring reinterpreting the Quran and life of
Muhammad with fresh eyes, distinguishing between legal
enactments subject to change and universal moral
injunctions. Sardar points out that colonial regimes
actually encouraged the petrification of sharia and
then limited it to personal and family matters.
The murder passage also shows how Islam inevitably
deals with economics, which, whether we like it or
not, are infused with moral issues. The murder of a
family's breadwinner is not only a family tragedy, but
a severe economic blow. Compensation is in this
situation could well be preferable to lopping off the
offender's head.
Following the discourse on murder, the next passage in
Al-Baqara abruptly switches to deal with inheritance
and charity. Sardar argues this abrupt change of topic
is not in fact so abrupt, that the two topics are very
much related, linked via economics. Just punishment
leads to a discourse on just distribution -- of
inheritance (for the family) and charity (for society
as a whole). He points out two more principles
implicit here: women have a right to inheritance and
by corollary property (a radical proposition in
seventh century Arabia), and individual rights must be
considered in a social context, adjusted to guard
against need.
This social principle accounts for the different
shares in inheritance which so obsess Western critics,
with the men (sole breadwinners at the time) getting
more than the women. But those critics may just have a
point, infers Sardar. By implication, in a society
where both men and women work, sharing financial
burdens equally, a son and daughter should get equal
shares in any inheritance.
And where there is poverty, everyone who is not living
in penury has a social obligation, including in their
wills, to provide for the poor. "Balance and equity
apply across the whole range of human life. The
insights and lessons of spiritual discipline apply to
and operate in all the mundane aspects of our human
nature and daily life."
This process of ijtihad, which Sardar so deftly
exercises, is exciting but also fraught with danger.
The reluctance of the Islamic scholars over the ages
to allow its exercise, and their preference for
relying on existing legal decisions, is not just a
case of being self-serving.
For example, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) argued in his
exegesis In the Shade of the Quran that Muslims must
fight "to make God's word supreme in the world" and
that for the enemy to simply desist from fighting was
just not good enough. Enemies are "required to
renounce their denial of God and their rejection of
His message." This directly contradicts that great
Quranic principle: "There is no compulsion in
religion." (2:256)
By looking afresh at these contentious issues, in
light of the Quran, such writers as Ramadan and Sardar
strive to establish the overall mindset, the outlook
the Quran seeks to promote. They logically look at
both the text and the context of the
text-within-the-text, so to speak. For instance, the
famous "sword verse" -- "Kill the associators wherever
you find them" (9:5) -- was a specific instruction, a
rally-the-troops call prior to the battle of Badr in
624, against "those with whom you make an agreement,
then they break their agreement every time". (8:56)
Or the "terror verse" -- "We will put terror into the
hearts of the unbelievers" (3:149) - was addressed
specifically to Muhammad before the battle of Ujud in
625, when the Muslims' small ill-equipped army was
going up against a much larger, well-equipped enemy.
These verses cannot be taken as a principle for
warfare, which is clearly stated in Al-Baqara: "Fight
in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not
commit aggression." (2:195)
Islam inevitably deals with politics, too. That Islam
is a religion of peace has been amply demonstrated by
the MB's patient endurance of injustice over the
years, which has finally borne fruit. Their
participation through the FJP in the legislative and
presidential elections, gaining their mandate from the
people in democratic elections, is also in accord with
the revelations of the Quran about governance. "God
grants rule to whomsoever He wills" (2:247), but "Put
your trust in those who are worthy of such trust."
(4:58) Rulers must govern via shura (consultation),
which means the people must not just passively follow
their leaders, but active understanding and holding
leaders to account.
At the same time, "The head of state is not a deputy
of God; he cannot be, as he does not have the
attributes of God. Rather, he is a representative of
the people who have chosen him; and like everyone else
he is responsible to God for his actions, including
the exercise of authority," argues Sardar. And "while
some aspects of a country's law may be based on, or
draw from Divine injunctions, not all law is Divine...
The Prophet did not declare that the Quran was his
constitution, but framed the Constitution of Medina
through a process of consultation, involving
negotiations, contested arguments and the inclusion of
both Muslims and non-Muslims."
So Morsi's rally-to-the-Quran cry, like the "sword
verse", must be taken in context, in this case, the
breathtaking elections, which required MB supporters
to stare down the nay-sayers and their powerful
backers. No one disputes that Egypt's new constitution
will be agreed "through a process of consultation and
the inclusion of both Muslims and non-Muslims".
And don't expect another prophet. In other words, it's
up to us from now on to take responsibility for
resolving our moral and ethical dilemmas, both as
individuals and as a society. No need to return to a
seventh century lifestyle, but we can use the Quran
not so much as a constitution, but as the inspiration
for a present day constitution imbued with Quranic
moral principles. As the Justice and Development Party
showed in Turkey, it is possible to work within the
rules that the imperialists have set up and still make
a go of it.
These two British writers, Ramadan and Sardar, might
both be thinking: True, the British didn't really
encourage too much education of the masses in either
Egypt or India, and they nurtured sectarianism and
other evils, but it's time to move on. Let's thank
them for waking us Muslims up to the challenges of the
modern world, and at least leaving us with an
electoral system and a functioning economy.
And don't just sit back and wait for heaven on earth.
"God does not change the condition of a people unless
they first change their conditions themselves."
(13:11) Each generation must draw lessons from history
and move forward by adjusting to change.
Morality doesn't end with the Quran; rather, it begins
with the Quran. We must not just think in terms of
adapting ourselves to an inherently unjust world
order, but to transform it. We must read the Quran,
insists Sardar, as a "way to think and learn about how
to make peace, justice and equity triumphant".
*** Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/
His Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great
Games http://claritypress.com/Walberg.html You can
reach him at http://ericwalberg.com