Egypt: The Dangers Of The
Sulk-And-Retreat Strategy
22 December 2012
By Amir Taheri
Are Egyptian democrats trying to make every mistake in
the book? Assuming there could be any democrats in a
country emerging from six decades of dictatorship, the
answer seems to be yes.
The first mistake they made came in early 2011 when a
weakened Mubarak regime was offering a negotiated deal
for a mutually agreed transition. The Tahrir Square
crowd rejected that out of hand, although, in
hindsight, they might have dictated their terms to an
ailing dictator who was looking for an honourable way
out of history. Through daily demonstrations they
transformed the streets into Egypt's principal
political arena. They did not realise that street
politics is different from democratic politics and
that if the fate of Egypt's were to be decided in the
streets they would not be able to match the
organisational resources of the Islamist groups.
Once Mubarak had stepped down, Egypt's democrats, or
at least those who describe themselves as such, made
their second mistake. This time they boycotted
contacts with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) that, in the absence of other institutions, was
keeping the ship of state afloat.
The Tahrir crowd systematically scripted itself out of
real politics, leaving the stage to the military and
its long-time partner-cum-adversary the Muslim
Brotherhood.
While the self-styled democrats sat in Zamalek
coffeehouses to sulk and moan, the military and the
Brotherhood wrote and performed their own script. In
the parliamentary election, they managed to attract
around 40 percent of the electorate. In the
presidential election they seduced almost 50 percent,
with the votes split between the candidate of the
military and that of the Islamists in the second
round.
A simple calculation would show that had the Tahrir
camp fielded a credible candidate, or had they backed
the candidate of the military Ahmad Shafiq, Mohamed
Mursi would not be President of Egypt today.
Once the presidential election was over, as democrats
they should have acknowledged Mursi as president and
offered to work with him to manage the transition and
shape the future. Instead, they clung to their policy
of sulking and cursing from the sidelines. Worse
still, they boycotted the committee charged with
drafting the new constitution. Not surprisingly, that
gave the Islamists a free hand to produce a long,
confused and thoroughly retrograde document that is
bound to create more problems for Egypt.
Demonstrations, boycotts, hunger strikes, and protest
marches are effective in destabilizing a government
or, in rare cases, even causing its demise. However,
no democratic system could be built with such tactics.
More importantly, perhaps, when there is a possibility
of institutional participation, there is no need for
such tactics. Egyptian democrats could have
participated in the parliamentary and presidential
elections. They could have filled their seats on the
committee drafting a new constitution.
Even now, if they don't like the draft submitted by
Mursi and his friends, Egyptian democrats should try
to fight it with something better than street riots.
They could demand a dialogue with the president to
negotiate amending the text. At the same time, they
should tell the Egyptian people which sections of the
text they oppose and why and what they propose
instead. Saying "no" is easy and, perhaps, an
inevitable tactic where no open space exists for
political activity. In Egypt today there is such a
space. Thus, those who say "no" should also be able to
say what they recommend instead.
In contrast to democrats, Egypt's Islamists have
learned their lessons. They no longer claim that a
Muslim nation needs no constitution because the Quran
could be regarded as such. Nor do they assert that
Islam is "the only solution". They have abandoned
their decades-long opposition to a Western-style
republic with an elected president instead of a
caliphate with a Caliph.
Islamists have also abandoned the tactics that failed
to get them any closer to power. At least for the time
being, they have abandoned assassinations, car bombs,
suicide attacks, kidnapping and murdering foreign
tourists, and the use of facial attributes and special
dress codes as props of visual terror.
In other words, the Islamists have made concessions to
reality. They realise that their hard-core support
base is too small for imposing the kind of religious
despotism they have always dreamt of. This is a major
development and an opportunity that must not be
wasted.
Of course, the Islamists may not be honest in their
acceptance of the rules of the game. They may be
wolves dressed as sheep. However, no democrat should
judge his adversaries on the basis of assumed
intentions.
Egyptian democrats should not boycott the process of
approving a new constitution. If they do, they would
be signing a blank cheque to the Islamists.
In a democratic system whoever manages to persuade a
majority of the people would succeed in having his
programme adopted. Thus, Egyptian democrats should
unite behind a common strategy for dealing with the
draft prepared by the rump council. Judging how small
the hard-core Islamist base is, I believe it is
possible to persuade a majority of Egyptian to reject
the draft in the planned referendum. Democrats should
get out of Tahrir and the cafes and go to villages,
shantytowns, souks, factories, universities and
offices to inform the voters about the implications of
approving the proposed draft.
The only problem is a shortage of time; changing a
sulk-and-retreat strategy into one of active and
combative participation needs time. This is why Mursi
is trying to speed things up, hoping that his
opponents will continue making mistakes.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.
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