For decades, the dream of making a deal with Iran has
nurtured a veritable industry in the United States.
Like other industries, this has been subjected to
cyclical change, booming at times and suffering bust
at others.
Since President Barack Obama's re-election, the ?talk
to Iran? industry has experienced an unprecedented
boom. Obama's second administration looks as if it is
designed to cajole the mullahs into a fresh attempt at
deal-making.
Obama's choices of a new Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, National Security Adviser and CIA chief
show that Tehran could not have hoped for a more
sympathetic team in Washington.
The ?talk to Iran' lobby uses some old clichés.
?Talking is better than fighting? we are told. Also,
it is ?better to be a trouble-shooter than a
trouble-maker?. And who could disagree? Because
deal-making is part of their culture Americans admire
politicians who can end conflicts with a compromise.
Thus, appeasement marketed as creative diplomacy has
generated what the American establishment knows as
?the realistic school of foreign policy.? That
?school? is founded on a number of assumptions.
The first is that conflicts among nations are
exclusively caused by divergent material interests.
Countries compete over access to raw materials,
markets, and, in the old days, colonies. They may have
territorial claims or harbor irredentist dreams
against one another. They may also have security
concerns about trade routes and/or treatment of ethnic
kith-and-kin in other countries.
Remarkably Marxian in nature, that analysis puts
material differences at the root of human conflicts,
implicitly ruling out the possibility of existential
threats caused by ideological differences.
That leads to a second assumption: differences cam be
narrowed down to one or two ?concrete? issues.
Successive US administrations narrowed down the
conflict with the Soviet Union to the issue of arms
control and, over decades, made several deals with
Moscow.
Few noticed the absurdity of the exercise. We were
told that nuclear weapons prevented war because of the
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) principle. ?Nuclear
weapons are an instrument for peace,? President John
Kennedy's Defense Secretary Robert McNamara claimed.
If that were the case, why would anyone want to reduce
the effectiveness of an ?instrument for peace?? In
three decades of ?creative diplomacy? the US and the
USSR reduced their capacities for destroying the earth
with nuclear weapons from 40 times to just 22 times!
Meanwhile the Soviet Union continued its expansionist
strategy and remained an existential threat to the
United States.
In the 1970s, the USSR reached the peak of its global
influence, ironically, with financial support from the
United States.
In the end, it was only when Russia stopped being the
Soviet Union that it ceased being an existential
threat to the US and its allies.
Obama's appeasement squad seems to be heading towards
repeating the mistakes of the ?realistic school.? It
is trying to reduce issues of conflict with Iran to a
single one: Iran's nuclear ambitions.
It then reduces that issue further by narrowing it
down to Iran's right to enrich uranium.
That is then narrowed down further to Iran's right to
enrich uranium up to 20 per cent. The final narrowing
down would let Iran do pretty much what it pleases
under ?international supervision?.
But what guarantee is there that the Islamic Republic
would not continue a clandestine program? According to
Ramin Mehmanparast, spokesman for the Islamic
Republic's foreign ministry, Tehran proposes to submit
a ?fatwa? from ?Supreme Guide? Ali Khameneni to the
United Nations as a guarantee for its commitment not
to ?develop, test or deploy? nuclear weapons.
Supposing it exists, the ?fatwa? does not legally
commit the Islamic Republic to anything. Nor could it
have any effect in accordance with international law.
In 1989, when the late Ayatollah Khomeini issued his
?fatwa? for the murder of British novelist Salman
Rushdie, successive Tehran officials publicly
described it as a religious ?opinion? that did not
commit the Iranian government.
At that time, Khamenei was President of the Islamic
Republic. On a state visit to Belgrade he told a press
conference that Khomeini's ?fatwa? concerned ?all
Muslims throughout the world? but could not be
regarded as ?the official position of the Islamic
Republic.? Even inside Iran the ?fatwa? has no legal
authority.
Though the highest political authority in the regime,
Khamenei lacks the theological status of a ?Marja'a
al-Taqlid? (Source of Emulation).
A ?fatwa? is a religious opinion issued in response to
a question put to a ?marj'aa?. It must not be confused
with a papal bull.
To become legally binding any ?fatwa? by Khamenei must
go through the constitutional process of legislation,
verification and final assent.
However, even if all of that is done, there is no
guarantee that Khamenei would not issue another
?fatwa? later to cancel the previous one. A regime
that violates its own constitution on a daily basis
would have little difficulty deceiving the ?Infidel?
by issuing ?fatwas? to buy time. The practice acquires
some theological sanctions through the principle of ?taqiyah?
or dissimulation to deceive an ?Infidel? foe.
No doubt Obama thinks that he is a genius and can
succeed where five US presidents before him have
failed. Obama may be a genius in the American context
if only because he has persuaded more than 60 million
Americans to vote for him on two occasions. However,
when it comes to dealing with mullahs he might fall
victim to hubris. Signs indicate that the mullahs are
preparing to lead Obama up the same garden path as
followed by his predecessors.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran,
and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was
Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
(1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for
the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of
the Executive Board of the International Press
Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and 2004, he was a
contributor to the International Herald Tribune. He
has written for the Wall Street Journal, the New York
Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French
magazine Politique Internationale, and the German
weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005, he was editorial
writer for the German daily Die Welt. Taheri has
published 11 books, some of which have been translated
into 20 languages. He has been a columnist for Asharq
Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian
Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and
New York.
From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena :: EsinIslam The Muslim World Portal For Islamic News And Opinions
From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena
14 January 2013
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
As soon as I heard the name Iyad Ag Ghaly in relation
to the events in Mali I began to wonder if this could
be the same man from the same country? Could it really
be him? Iyad Ag Ghaly heads up the military operations
of armed terrorist groups in northern Mali; whilst
there was a man with the same name who served as
Mali's consul in Jeddah. I called some friends and
confirmed that Iyad Ag Ghaly is indeed the same man
that I met at Jeddah's Hilton hotel less than three
years ago.
We are facing a truly strange world where those who
are legitimate today could be fugitives tomorrow.
At the time, I knew-from those who had dealt with
Ghaly as a Tuareg tribal chief and diplomatic
consul-that he was the best source to find
intermediaries to negotiate the release of hostages
taken in the Azawad region. Now, he is said to be
commander of the Ansar Dine movement fighting the
Malian army, as well as international French and
African forces.
When I read a profile about him in yesterday's Asharq
al-Awsat newspaper, I was even more confused, for this
stated that he was close to Libyan dictator Muammar
Qadhafi who reportedly sent him to fight in Lebanon.
Yet, Ghaly only recently displayed extremist
tendencies.
This kind of confusion and uncertainty has become
quite common as shown by the emergence of extremists
like Tarek al-Zomor and Mohamed al-Zawahiri on Egypt's
political scene. So how did a man like Iyad Ag Ghaly
turn from being a moderate Sunni Muslim to an
extremist armed fighter? Is it rational to suppose
that a man in his fifties, like Ghaly, should suddenly
become radicalized? This is truly hard to believe. I
sense that this may be some kind of political maneuver
where politicians have pretended to adopt extremist
ideologies in order to recruit impulsive youths. These
politicians provide these youth with funding under the
pretext of ?religious duty?, convincing them to
sacrifice their lives for a false cause in return for
a place in heaven! Since there is a general
international lack of will to fight anywhere in the
world, the French-alongside a few African states-will
fight this war on their own before realizing that
desert wars never end and withdraw. What makes matters
more complicated is that conflicts that involve
religious slogans and tribal powers can last for
decades without any side being defeated.
Our problem with those who are keen on fighting these
extremists, like the French today and the Americans
yesterday in Afghanistan and perhaps tomorrow in
Syria, is their inability to understand the
fundamental nature of the problem. These extremist
groups represent the smallest part of the equation;
rather the greatest and most important challenge is to
confront extremist ideologies. Had the West, as well
as the Arab countries involved and other relevant
parties invested their money and effort in fighting
extremist ideologies, this crisis might have come to
an end. Instead they spent billions of dollars on tens
of thousands of soldiers, advanced weaponry, and
combat drones managing to eliminate a number of Al
Qaeda's leaders; however Al Qaeda's ideology remains
the same and in fact continues to spread like a
disease. Most people find it easier to jump to easy
conclusions by laying the blame on one group or
another like Sunnis, Shi'ites, clerics, or even
religion as a whole; however all these groups were
present prior to this and were never a source of
trouble.
We are living in a different world in which political
powers are establishing and nourishing extremist
ideologies and generations. These politicians have the
project, the expertise, and the will to propagate such
extremist ideology and they are practically immune to
punishment because the wrong parties are always held
accountable. Who could have imagined that Mali would
become an international battlefield after Afghanistan?
The West is repeating the same mistake in Syria by
allowing it to fall prey to extremists who are
emotionally manipulate the general public under the
pretext that they are their only source of salvation
from the tyranny of the Assad regime. In reality, they
are the only faction active on the scene because
everybody else has left the arena.
Al
Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya
television. He is also the former editor-in-chief of
Asharq Al- Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly
magazine, Al Majalla. He is also a senior Columnist in
the daily newspapers of Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is
a US post-graduate degree in mass communications. He
has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs.
He is currently based in Dubai.
Add Comments