Iran: Embracing The Bear At Last - Many Iranians Still Regard Russia With Suspicion
30 January 2013
By Amir Taheri
Last week, in what might be his administration's last
important foreign policy move, Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad concluded a major security treaty
with Russia. Signed in Tehran by Interior Minister
Muhammad Mostafa Najjar and his Russian counterpart
Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the agreement represents a break
with an old principle in Iran's defense and security
doctrines.
Ever since the 18th century when it emerged as an
organized state, Russia has been a source of fear and
fascination for its Iranian neighbors.
Having coped with attacks by Turkic hordes from the
east for centuries, Iran perceived Russia as a new
threat from the north. Several wars of varying
magnitude proved that analysis right. In terms of
territory, Russia became the largest empire in
history. However, bordering on mostly frozen seas and
thus virtually landlocked, it could not project naval
power, the principal instrument of global domination.
Successive czars dreamed of the warm waters of the
Indian Ocean. And that meant annexing or dominating
Iran.
In Iranian political folklore, Russia was depicted as
a bear whose embrace, even if friendly, could smother
you. Haj Mirza Aghasi, an Iranian Grand Vizier in the
19th century, insisted that Iran should neither get
too close nor too far from the bear. If too close, the
bear could crush it. If too far the bear could mount a
deadly ambush.
During both world wars, Iran tried to stay neutral, a
policy that antagonized the ?bear? and led to invasion
by Russia and its allies. The late Shah learned the
art of living with the bear. While allying Iran with
the ?Free World? he also took care not to provoke the
Soviet Union. Thus he would not allow Western business
interests, including oil companies, to operate in
provinces close to the Soviet border. At the same
time, he resisted pressure to enter into security
cooperation with the USSR, to allow the Soviet navy
mooring facilities in the Gulf and to buy Soviet
weapons on a large scale. Moscow tried to go around
Iran by signing pacts with several Arab states,
notably Egypt and Iraq, and establishing a foothold in
Communist-dominated South Yemen.
After the Shah's fall and the end of the USSR, the
tradition of keeping the Russian bear at arms' length
continued under the Khomeinist regime.
The new Irano-Russian security pact provides for
cooperation in intelligence gathering across the world
and the fight against terrorism, people-trafficking,
and drug-smuggling.
More significantly, it commits Russia to training and
equipping Iranian security forces in crowd control and
dealing with civil unrest. Tehran and Moscow are
nervous about being hit by "Arab Spring" style
uprisings. Under the agreement, Moscow will help
Tehran create special police units patterned on the
500,000-strong ?internal army? controlled by the
Russian Interior Ministry.
Created in 1802 the Russian Interior Ministry has
always been the principal security arm of the state.
Initially known by the acronym MVD, the ministry's
intelligence unit was renamed NKVD under Stalin. In
1953 it was absorbed into the security network
controlled by Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's fellow Georgian
and, for long, regarded as the most brutal member of
the Soviet ruling elite. Under Nikita Khrushchev the
NKVD was reborn as the KGB, impacting both domestic
and foreign policies.
Contrary to expectations, the fall of the USSR did not
spell the end of the dreaded security apparatus. It
helped Boris Yeltsin crush the remnants of the
Communist Party and, from 2004 on-wards, served as a
ladder for Vladimir Putin's ascent to the summit in
the Kremlin. Last year, Rashid Nurgaliyev, the man in
charge of the ministry for eight years, was sacked,
ostensibly because he had grown too big for his boots.
Nurgaliyev, who is of Muslim origin, played a key role
in helping Putin crush Islamist uprisings in Chechnya,
Ingushetia and Dagestan.
The Irano-Russian security deal is the latest sign
that something may be changing in Moscow-Tehran
relations. Last week, Iran played host to Russian
warships visiting Bandar-Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz
in what looks like the opening gambit for a Russian
naval presence in the strategic waterway. Next week,
Iran is slated to take part in naval exercises by the
Russian fleet in Syrian waters around Tartus where
Tehran and Moscow have mooring rights.
Ahmadinejad has always appeared keen on drawing the
Islamic Republic closer to Moscow as part of his dream
of a Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis. Russia, however, has
played hard-to-get, mostly because Yeltsin and, for
some time after him, Putin hoped to strike a deal with
the US. Yeltsin and Putin declined repeated
invitations by the mullahs to pay a state visit to
Tehran.
Observers in Tehran say the change in Irano-Russian
relations is caused by several factors.
Both regimes are involved in the Syrian civil war on
the side of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Both believe
that the ?Arab Spring? is the result of ?plots?
hatched by Washington under the Bush administration a
decade ago. Both fear that the ?velvet revolution?
recipe for regime change could be used against them.
They wish to draw a line in the sand: no more ?Arab
Spring? regime change! Moscow and Tehran regard what
they see as an American strategic retreat under
President Barack Obama as an opportunity. They think
that, with the US out, no other ?hostile? power has
the capacity to check their regional ambitions.
Ahmadinejad and Putin also share an interest in
curbing the appetite of Sunni Islamists, something
that could threaten both regimes.
All in all, however, dancing with the bear would be
unpopular in both countries. Many Iranians still
regard Russia with suspicion while many Russians would
rather see their country as part of the Western world
and not an ally of a regime caught in the cobweb of
time.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena :: EsinIslam The Muslim World Portal For Islamic News And Opinions
From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena
14 January 2013
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
As soon as I heard the name Iyad Ag Ghaly in relation
to the events in Mali I began to wonder if this could
be the same man from the same country? Could it really
be him? Iyad Ag Ghaly heads up the military operations
of armed terrorist groups in northern Mali; whilst
there was a man with the same name who served as
Mali's consul in Jeddah. I called some friends and
confirmed that Iyad Ag Ghaly is indeed the same man
that I met at Jeddah's Hilton hotel less than three
years ago.
We are facing a truly strange world where those who
are legitimate today could be fugitives tomorrow.
At the time, I knew-from those who had dealt with
Ghaly as a Tuareg tribal chief and diplomatic
consul-that he was the best source to find
intermediaries to negotiate the release of hostages
taken in the Azawad region. Now, he is said to be
commander of the Ansar Dine movement fighting the
Malian army, as well as international French and
African forces.
When I read a profile about him in yesterday's Asharq
al-Awsat newspaper, I was even more confused, for this
stated that he was close to Libyan dictator Muammar
Qadhafi who reportedly sent him to fight in Lebanon.
Yet, Ghaly only recently displayed extremist
tendencies.
This kind of confusion and uncertainty has become
quite common as shown by the emergence of extremists
like Tarek al-Zomor and Mohamed al-Zawahiri on Egypt's
political scene. So how did a man like Iyad Ag Ghaly
turn from being a moderate Sunni Muslim to an
extremist armed fighter? Is it rational to suppose
that a man in his fifties, like Ghaly, should suddenly
become radicalized? This is truly hard to believe. I
sense that this may be some kind of political maneuver
where politicians have pretended to adopt extremist
ideologies in order to recruit impulsive youths. These
politicians provide these youth with funding under the
pretext of ?religious duty?, convincing them to
sacrifice their lives for a false cause in return for
a place in heaven! Since there is a general
international lack of will to fight anywhere in the
world, the French-alongside a few African states-will
fight this war on their own before realizing that
desert wars never end and withdraw. What makes matters
more complicated is that conflicts that involve
religious slogans and tribal powers can last for
decades without any side being defeated.
Our problem with those who are keen on fighting these
extremists, like the French today and the Americans
yesterday in Afghanistan and perhaps tomorrow in
Syria, is their inability to understand the
fundamental nature of the problem. These extremist
groups represent the smallest part of the equation;
rather the greatest and most important challenge is to
confront extremist ideologies. Had the West, as well
as the Arab countries involved and other relevant
parties invested their money and effort in fighting
extremist ideologies, this crisis might have come to
an end. Instead they spent billions of dollars on tens
of thousands of soldiers, advanced weaponry, and
combat drones managing to eliminate a number of Al
Qaeda's leaders; however Al Qaeda's ideology remains
the same and in fact continues to spread like a
disease. Most people find it easier to jump to easy
conclusions by laying the blame on one group or
another like Sunnis, Shi'ites, clerics, or even
religion as a whole; however all these groups were
present prior to this and were never a source of
trouble.
We are living in a different world in which political
powers are establishing and nourishing extremist
ideologies and generations. These politicians have the
project, the expertise, and the will to propagate such
extremist ideology and they are practically immune to
punishment because the wrong parties are always held
accountable. Who could have imagined that Mali would
become an international battlefield after Afghanistan?
The West is repeating the same mistake in Syria by
allowing it to fall prey to extremists who are
emotionally manipulate the general public under the
pretext that they are their only source of salvation
from the tyranny of the Assad regime. In reality, they
are the only faction active on the scene because
everybody else has left the arena.
Al
Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya
television. He is also the former editor-in-chief of
Asharq Al- Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly
magazine, Al Majalla. He is also a senior Columnist in
the daily newspapers of Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is
a US post-graduate degree in mass communications. He
has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs.
He is currently based in Dubai.