Iran: Embracing The Bear At Last - Many Iranians Still Regard Russia With Suspicion

30 January 2013

By Amir Taheri

Last week, in what might be his administration's last important foreign policy move, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad concluded a major security treaty with Russia. Signed in Tehran by Interior Minister Muhammad Mostafa Najjar and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the agreement represents a break with an old principle in Iran's defense and security doctrines.

Ever since the 18th century when it emerged as an organized state, Russia has been a source of fear and fascination for its Iranian neighbors.

Having coped with attacks by Turkic hordes from the east for centuries, Iran perceived Russia as a new threat from the north. Several wars of varying magnitude proved that analysis right. In terms of territory, Russia became the largest empire in history. However, bordering on mostly frozen seas and thus virtually landlocked, it could not project naval power, the principal instrument of global domination. Successive czars dreamed of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. And that meant annexing or dominating Iran.

In Iranian political folklore, Russia was depicted as a bear whose embrace, even if friendly, could smother you. Haj Mirza Aghasi, an Iranian Grand Vizier in the 19th century, insisted that Iran should neither get too close nor too far from the bear. If too close, the bear could crush it. If too far the bear could mount a deadly ambush.

During both world wars, Iran tried to stay neutral, a policy that antagonized the ?bear? and led to invasion by Russia and its allies. The late Shah learned the art of living with the bear. While allying Iran with the ?Free World? he also took care not to provoke the Soviet Union. Thus he would not allow Western business interests, including oil companies, to operate in provinces close to the Soviet border. At the same time, he resisted pressure to enter into security cooperation with the USSR, to allow the Soviet navy mooring facilities in the Gulf and to buy Soviet weapons on a large scale. Moscow tried to go around Iran by signing pacts with several Arab states, notably Egypt and Iraq, and establishing a foothold in Communist-dominated South Yemen.

After the Shah's fall and the end of the USSR, the tradition of keeping the Russian bear at arms' length continued under the Khomeinist regime.

The new Irano-Russian security pact provides for cooperation in intelligence gathering across the world and the fight against terrorism, people-trafficking, and drug-smuggling.

More significantly, it commits Russia to training and equipping Iranian security forces in crowd control and dealing with civil unrest. Tehran and Moscow are nervous about being hit by "Arab Spring" style uprisings. Under the agreement, Moscow will help Tehran create special police units patterned on the 500,000-strong ?internal army? controlled by the Russian Interior Ministry.

Created in 1802 the Russian Interior Ministry has always been the principal security arm of the state.

Initially known by the acronym MVD, the ministry's intelligence unit was renamed NKVD under Stalin. In 1953 it was absorbed into the security network controlled by Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's fellow Georgian and, for long, regarded as the most brutal member of the Soviet ruling elite. Under Nikita Khrushchev the NKVD was reborn as the KGB, impacting both domestic and foreign policies.

Contrary to expectations, the fall of the USSR did not spell the end of the dreaded security apparatus. It helped Boris Yeltsin crush the remnants of the Communist Party and, from 2004 on-wards, served as a ladder for Vladimir Putin's ascent to the summit in the Kremlin. Last year, Rashid Nurgaliyev, the man in charge of the ministry for eight years, was sacked, ostensibly because he had grown too big for his boots. Nurgaliyev, who is of Muslim origin, played a key role in helping Putin crush Islamist uprisings in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The Irano-Russian security deal is the latest sign that something may be changing in Moscow-Tehran relations. Last week, Iran played host to Russian warships visiting Bandar-Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz in what looks like the opening gambit for a Russian naval presence in the strategic waterway. Next week, Iran is slated to take part in naval exercises by the Russian fleet in Syrian waters around Tartus where Tehran and Moscow have mooring rights.

Ahmadinejad has always appeared keen on drawing the Islamic Republic closer to Moscow as part of his dream of a Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis. Russia, however, has played hard-to-get, mostly because Yeltsin and, for some time after him, Putin hoped to strike a deal with the US. Yeltsin and Putin declined repeated invitations by the mullahs to pay a state visit to Tehran.

Observers in Tehran say the change in Irano-Russian relations is caused by several factors.

Both regimes are involved in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Both believe that the ?Arab Spring? is the result of ?plots? hatched by Washington under the Bush administration a decade ago. Both fear that the ?velvet revolution? recipe for regime change could be used against them. They wish to draw a line in the sand: no more ?Arab Spring? regime change! Moscow and Tehran regard what they see as an American strategic retreat under President Barack Obama as an opportunity. They think that, with the US out, no other ?hostile? power has the capacity to check their regional ambitions.

Ahmadinejad and Putin also share an interest in curbing the appetite of Sunni Islamists, something that could threaten both regimes.

All in all, however, dancing with the bear would be unpopular in both countries. Many Iranians still regard Russia with suspicion while many Russians would rather see their country as part of the Western world and not an ally of a regime caught in the cobweb of time.

Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the International Herald Tribune. He has written for the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have been translated into 20 languages. He has been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York. From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena :: EsinIslam The Muslim World Portal For Islamic News And Opinions





 

 
From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena

14 January 2013

By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed

As soon as I heard the name Iyad Ag Ghaly in relation to the events in Mali I began to wonder if this could be the same man from the same country? Could it really be him? Iyad Ag Ghaly heads up the military operations of armed terrorist groups in northern Mali; whilst there was a man with the same name who served as Mali's consul in Jeddah. I called some friends and confirmed that Iyad Ag Ghaly is indeed the same man that I met at Jeddah's Hilton hotel less than three years ago.

We are facing a truly strange world where those who are legitimate today could be fugitives tomorrow.

At the time, I knew-from those who had dealt with Ghaly as a Tuareg tribal chief and diplomatic consul-that he was the best source to find intermediaries to negotiate the release of hostages taken in the Azawad region. Now, he is said to be commander of the Ansar Dine movement fighting the Malian army, as well as international French and African forces.

When I read a profile about him in yesterday's Asharq al-Awsat newspaper, I was even more confused, for this stated that he was close to Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi who reportedly sent him to fight in Lebanon. Yet, Ghaly only recently displayed extremist tendencies.

This kind of confusion and uncertainty has become quite common as shown by the emergence of extremists like Tarek al-Zomor and Mohamed al-Zawahiri on Egypt's political scene. So how did a man like Iyad Ag Ghaly turn from being a moderate Sunni Muslim to an extremist armed fighter? Is it rational to suppose that a man in his fifties, like Ghaly, should suddenly become radicalized? This is truly hard to believe. I sense that this may be some kind of political maneuver where politicians have pretended to adopt extremist ideologies in order to recruit impulsive youths. These politicians provide these youth with funding under the pretext of ?religious duty?, convincing them to sacrifice their lives for a false cause in return for a place in heaven! Since there is a general international lack of will to fight anywhere in the world, the French-alongside a few African states-will fight this war on their own before realizing that desert wars never end and withdraw. What makes matters more complicated is that conflicts that involve religious slogans and tribal powers can last for decades without any side being defeated.

Our problem with those who are keen on fighting these extremists, like the French today and the Americans yesterday in Afghanistan and perhaps tomorrow in Syria, is their inability to understand the fundamental nature of the problem. These extremist groups represent the smallest part of the equation; rather the greatest and most important challenge is to confront extremist ideologies. Had the West, as well as the Arab countries involved and other relevant parties invested their money and effort in fighting extremist ideologies, this crisis might have come to an end. Instead they spent billions of dollars on tens of thousands of soldiers, advanced weaponry, and combat drones managing to eliminate a number of Al Qaeda's leaders; however Al Qaeda's ideology remains the same and in fact continues to spread like a disease. Most people find it easier to jump to easy conclusions by laying the blame on one group or another like Sunnis, Shi'ites, clerics, or even religion as a whole; however all these groups were present prior to this and were never a source of trouble.

We are living in a different world in which political powers are establishing and nourishing extremist ideologies and generations. These politicians have the project, the expertise, and the will to propagate such extremist ideology and they are practically immune to punishment because the wrong parties are always held accountable. Who could have imagined that Mali would become an international battlefield after Afghanistan? The West is repeating the same mistake in Syria by allowing it to fall prey to extremists who are emotionally manipulate the general public under the pretext that they are their only source of salvation from the tyranny of the Assad regime. In reality, they are the only faction active on the scene because everybody else has left the arena.

Al Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya television. He is also the former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al- Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly magazine, Al Majalla. He is also a senior Columnist in the daily newspapers of Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is a US post-graduate degree in mass communications. He has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs. He is currently based in Dubai.

 

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