Egypt: A Difficult Learning Curve - Trying To Surf To Power On A Wave Of "Street" Anger
05 February 2013
By Amir Taheri
Entering its second year, the uprising that brought
down President Mubarak is still trying to define
itself. Would it evolve into full-fledged revolution
with ALL the risks involved? Or will it be a
parenthesis between two military regimes? Judging by
events of the past week Egypt may appear to be bracing
for a giant revolutionary leap into the unknown.
Footage of hooded youths in street battles against the
security forces, with burning vehicles in the
background, depicted scenes of urban guerrilla. Groups
using the Black Bloc brand name have been on hand to
add color, recalling anarchist violence in Europe in
the 1960s.
However, the possibility of the second option, that of
a new military-dominated regime, also looks serious if
only thanks to General Abdul-Fattah al-Sissi's musings
on his Facebook page.
The general has warned that ?differences concerning
the management of the country could lead to a collapse
of the state and threaten the future generations.? I
think a third option may be possible and, hopefully,
more likely. Egypt is neither moving towards
revolution nor a new military dictatorship.
The rioters, including Black Bloc, have nothing
positive to offer the Egyptian people. As for the
military, they would do well to find other subjects to
play with on their Facebook page.
Of the three options available, the third one,
building the institutions of a pluralist state is
hardest to achieve. It requires patience and
imagination on the part of President Muhammad Mursi
and those of his opponents who take a longer view of
things.
Mursi must never forget that he is president of all
Egyptians and as such must bear even with those who
challenge him with street riots. In the past week or
so, however, he has overreacted, triggering the reflex
of the old regime by calling in the army. Imposing he
state of emergency was a mistake, not only because it
reminded people of the bad old days but because it
exposed his government's nervousness.
Facing opponents who want to provoke him, Mursi's best
bet was not to be provoked. Mursi, however, played
into the hands of the party of provocation.
The party of provocation is divided into two camps.
One wants to pull the nation's politics into the
streets and provoke the Muslim Brotherhood into urban
guerrilla. It would then use such an event as the
excuse to call on the military to ?save the nation
from annihilation? as suggested on General al-Sissi's
Facebook page.
A second camp hopes to turn the ?street? into a
counter-weight to a presidency backed by the
Brotherhood's shadowy underground networks.
In both cases, the politics of provocation could bring
nothing but misery for Egypt. The last thing Egypt
wants is another military dictatorship. Also, putting
the ?street? in the driving seat could prevent Egypt
from dealing with its problems in a serious manner.
Contrary to al-Sissi's claim, street riots do not
threaten the survival of the state. The general should
also know that ?differences concerning the management
of the country? are normal in any civlised society.
Mursi and his government do not have a monopoly on
wisdom and patriotism and should be challenged where
and when necessary.
However, the opposition also needs to review its copy.
Right now, we have a great deal of dissent but little
real opposition in Egypt.
Dissent means rejecting the options offered by the
power in place without subjecting them to critical
analysis and offering alternatives.
A dissenter says: I don't like this! But he cannot say
what he does want. In the politics of dissent those in
charge of government are judged by intentions
attributed to them. The dissident rejects the man in
charge because of what that man did in the past or
might do in the future.
Opposition is something different. Real opposition is
capable of indicating both what it does not like and
what it does want. More importantly, it judges those
in charge not on the basis of assumed intentions but
concrete acts.
Thus, Mursi should be judged not by what he might do
but by what he has done and is doing.
In virtually all circumstances, governments and
oppositions learn from one another and modulate their
respective strategies accordingly. An opposition that
pushes politics towards violence is bound to end up
facing violence from the state. Conversely, a
government using violence against opponents sows the
seeds of violence against itself.
An intellectually lazy government breeds an opposition
that is equally lazy intellectually. Birds of the same
feather not only fly together but, in politics at
least, also fight one another.
Unleashing the police to bludgeon demonstrators into
silence is a sign of intellectual laziness on the part
of Mursi's government. At the same time, setting
dustbins on fire, to the chagrin of the zabbaleen in
Cairo, exposes dissidents who cannot offer credible
opposition to Mursi's fragile government.
Mursi and "street" dissidents are in the same boat. If
the boots return to the presidential palace both Mursi
and the Black Bloc could share the same dungeon. If on
the other hand, Egyptian cities are turned into
battlegrounds for rival armed bands there would be no
place for Mursi, who is not a street-fighter, and the
opportunist politicians who are trying to surf to
power on a wave of "street" anger.
New Egypt is on a learning curve. Both Mursi and those
of his opponents who want a democratic Egypt must take
a deep breath. Mursi should learn to behave like a
president rather than a party leader. His opponents
should learn to behave like an opposition not a bunch
of dissidents.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.
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