Qatar And U.S.: Collusion Or Conflict Of Interests
06 February 2013
By Nicola Nasser**
In
his inaugural address on January 21, U.S. President
Barak Obama made the historic announcement that "a
decade of war is ending" and declared his country's
determination to "show the courage to try and resolve
our differences with other nations peacefully," but
his message will remain words that have yet to be
translated into deeds and has yet to reach some of the
U.S. closest allies in the Middle East who are still
beating the drums of war, like Israel against Iran and
Qatar against Syria.
In view of the level
of "coordination" and "cooperation" since bilateral
diplomatic relations were established in 1972 between
the U.S. and Qatar, and the concentration of U.S.
military power on this tiny peninsula, it seems
impossible that Qatar could move independently apart,
in parallel with, away or on a collision course with
the U.S. strategic and regional plans.
According to the US State department's online fact
sheet, "bilateral relations are strong," both
countries are "coordinating" diplomatically and
"cooperating" on regional security, have a "defense
pact," "Qatar hosts CENTCOM Forward Headquarters," and
supports NATO and U.S. regional "military operations.
Qatar is also an active participant in the U.S. led
efforts to set up an integrated missile defense
network in the Gulf region. Moreover, it hosts the
U.S. Combined Air Operations Center and three American
military bases namely
Al Udeid Air Base,
Assaliyah Army Base and
Doha International Air Base, which are
manned by approximately
5,000 U.S. forces.
Qatar, which is bound by such a most intimate and
closest alliance with the United States, has recently
developed into the major sponsor of Islamist political
movements. Qatar appears now to be the major sponsor
of the international organization of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which, reportedly, disbanded in Qatar in
1999 because it stopped to view the ruling family as
an adversary.
The
Qatar Brotherhood marriage of convenience has created
the natural incubator of Islamist armed
fundamentalists against whom the U.S., since September
11, 2001, has been leading what is labeled as the
"global war on terrorism."
The
war in the African nation Mali offers the latest
example on how the U.S. and Qatar, seemingly, go on
two separate ways. Whereas US Secretary of Defense,
Leon Panetta, was in London on January 18 "commending"
the French "leadership of the international effort" in
Mali to which his country was pledging logistical,
transportation and intelligence support, Qatar
appeared to risk its special ties with France, which
peaked during the NATO led war on Libya, and to
distrust the U.S. and French judgment.
On
January 15, Qatari Prime and Foreign Minister, Sheikh
Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, told reporters he did not
believe "power will solve the problem," advised
instead that this problem be "discussed" among the
"neighboring countries, the African Union and the
(U.N.) Security Council," and joined the Doha based
ideologue for the Muslim Brotherhood and their Qatari
sponsors, Yusuf Abdullah al Qaradawi -- the head of
the International Union of Muslim Scholars who was
refused entry visa to U.K. in 2008 and to France last
year in calling for "dialogue," "reconciliation" and
"peaceful solution" instead of "military
intervention."
In a
relatively older example, according to WikiLeaks,
Somalia's former president in 2009, Sharif Ahmed, told
a U.S. diplomat that Qatar was channeling financial
assistance to the al-Qaeda linked Shabab al-Mujahideen,
which the U.S. listed as "terrorist."
In
Syria, for another example, the Brotherhood is the
leading "fighting" force against the ruling regime and
in alliance with and a culprit in the atrocities of
the terrorist bombings of the al-Qaeda linked Al-Nusra
Front, designated by the United States as a terrorist
organization last December; while the Brotherhood
led and U.S. and Qatar sponsored Syrian opposition
publicly protested the U.S. designation, the silence
of Qatar on the matter could only be interpreted as in
support of the protest against the U.S. decision.
Recently, Qatar has, for another example, replaced
Syria, which has been on the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism since 1979, as the sponsor of
Hamas, whose leadership relocated from Damascus to
Doha, which the U.S. lists as a "terrorist" group, and
which publicly admits being the Palestinian branch of
the Brotherhood.
Qatar, in all these examples, seems positioning itself
to be qualified as a mediator, with the U.S. blessing,
trying to achieve by the country's financial leverage
what the U.S. could not achieve militarily, or could
achieve but with a much more expensive cost in money
and souls.
In
the Mali case, the Qatari PM Sheikh Hamad went on
record to declare this ambition: "We will be a part of
the solution, (but) not the sole mediator," he said.
The U.S. blessing could not be more explicit than
President Obama's approval of opening the Afghani
Taliban office in Doha "to facilitate" a "negotiated
peace in Afghanistan," according to the Qatari Foreign
Ministry on January 16.
However, a unilateral Qatari mediation failed in
Yemen, a Qatar led Arab mediation in Syria has
similarly proved a failure two years on the Syrian
crisis, the "Doha Declaration" to reconcile
Palestinian rival factions is still a paper
achievement, the Qatari mediation in Sudan's Darfur
crisis has yet to deliver, the Qatari "mediation" in
Libya was condemned as intervention in the country's
internal affairs by the most prominent among the post
Gaddafi leaders, and in post "Arab Spring" Egypt
Qatar dropped its early mediation efforts to align
itself publicly to the ruling Brotherhood. But in
spite of these failures, Qatar's "mediation" efforts
were successful in serving the strategy of its U.S.
"ally."
Hence
the U.S. blessing. The Soufan Group's intelligence
analysts on last December 10 concluded that "Qatar
continues to prove itself to be a pivotal U.S. ally,
Qatar is often able to implement shared U.S.-Qatari
objectives that Washington is unable or unwilling to
undertake itself."
The
first term Obama administration, under the pressure of
"fiscal austerity," blessed the Qatari funding of
arming anti Gaddafi Islamists in Libya, closed its
eyes to Qatar's shipment of Gaddafi's military arsenal
to Syrian and non Syrian Islamists fighting the
regime in Syria, "understood" the visit of Qatar's
Emir to Gaza last October as "a humanitarian mission,"
and recently approved to arm the Qatar backed and
Brotherhood led Egypt with
20 F-16 fighter jets
and 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks.
This
contradiction raises the question about whether this
is a U.S. - Qatari mutual collusion or it is really a
conflict of interests; the Obama administration during
his second term has to draw the line which would give
an explicit answer.
Seemingly nowadays, Doha and Washington do not see eye
to eye on Islamic and Islamist movements, but on the
battle grounds of the "war on terror" both capitals
could hardly argue that in practice their active roles
are not coordinated and do not complement each other.
Drawing on the historical experience of an Iranian
similar "religious" approach, but on a rival "Shiite"
sectarian basis, this Qatari "Sunni" Islamist"
connection will inevitably fuel sectarian polarization
in the region, regional instability, violence and
civil wars.
Given
the U.S. Qatar alliance, the Qatari Islamist
connection threatens to embroil the U.S. in more
regional strife, or at least to hold the U.S.
responsible for the resulting strife, and would
sustain a deep seated regional anti Americanism,
which in turn has become another incubator of
extremism and terrorism and which is exacerbated by
the past "decade of war," which President Obama in his
inaugural address promised to "end."
Traditionally, Qatar, which stands in the eye of the
storm in the very critical geopolitical volatile Gulf
region, the theatre of three major wars during the
last three decades, did its best to maintain a
critical and fragile balance between the two major
powers which determine its survival, namely the
decades old U.S. military presence in the Gulf and
the rising regional power of Iran.
In
1992 it signed a comprehensive bilateral defense pact
with the United States and in 2010 it signed a
military defense agreement with Iran, which explains
its warming up to closer ties with the Iran
supported Islamic anti Israel resistance movements
of the Hezbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Israeli
occupied Palestinian territories and explains as well
Qatar's "honey moon" with Iran's ally in Syria.
However, since the eruption of the bloody Syrian
crisis two years ago, the Qatari opening up to
regional pro Iran state and non-state powers was
exposed as merely a tactical maneuver to lure such
powers away from Iran. In the Syrian and Hezbullah
cases, the failure of this tactic has led Qatar to
embark on a collision course with both Syria and Iran,
which are backed by Russia and China, and is leading
the country to a U-turn shift away from its long
maintained regional balancing act, a shift that Doha
seems unaware of its threat to its very survival under
the pressure of the international and regional
conflicting interests as bloodily exposed in the
Syrian crisis.
During the rise of the massive Pan-Arab, nationalist,
socialist and democratic movements in the Arab world
early in the second half of the twentieth century, the
conservative authoritarian Arab monarchies adopted the
Brotherhood, other Islamists and Islamic political
ideology and used them against those movements to
survive as allies of the United States, which in turn
used both, spearheaded by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
against the former Soviet Union and the communist
ideology, to their detriment after the collapse of the
bipolar world order.
However history seems to repeat itself as the U.S.
backed Arab monarchies, spearheaded by Qatar, are
resorting to their old tactic of exploiting the
Islamist ideology to undermine and preempt an Arab
anti authoritarian revolution for the rule of law,
civil society, democratic institutions and social and
economic justice in Arab countries on the periphery of
their U.S. protected bastion in the Arabian peninsula,
but they seem unaware they are opening a Pandora's box
that would unleash a backlash in comparison to which
al Qaeda's fall back on the U.S. will prove a minor
precedent.
*
Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in
Bir Zeit, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied
Palestinian territories.
*
nassernicola@ymail.com