Tehran Nervous As Election Process Starts: Iranian Sunni Muslims, Believed To Number Around 12 Million, Excluded
24 May 2013
By Amir Taheri
On Tuesday, Iran's presidential election was kick
started, with would-be candidates beginning to
register at the start of a 40-day sprint to polling
day. By all accounts, the Tehran leadership is nervous
about the whole exercise. On the eve of registration,
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a curtain-raising
speech, urging the people to "create a historic epic."
Reading between the lines, Khamenei is calling for a
massive turnout, bigger than in 2009, to show that the
regime maintains momentum. In 2009, the authorities
claimed that over 40 million people had voted.
Khamenei did not mention his ideal figure. But
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is not allowed to
stand for a third term, has said that the ideal would
be "100% participation."
The first figure to bear in mind in connection with
the coming election is 55 million—the number eligible
voters.
The regime is determined to show that the election is
inspiring as much enthusiasm as ever. This leads us to
the second figure, cited by the daily Kayhan
newspaper: thousands of people seeking to register as
candidates. On Tuesday, Kayhan—published under
Khamenei's supervision—reported long queues at
registration offices.
The third figure, the number of approved candidates,
will not be known until three weeks before polling
day.
Here there are two views. One is that the supreme
leader wants a large number of candidates to avoid the
kind of confrontation seen in 2009 when two men,
Ahmadinejad and former prime minister Mir-Hossein
Moussavi, dominated the process from the start.
Another goal, however, may be to wrap the whole thing
up in one round, avoiding tension spread over weeks.
Former foreign minister Ali-Akbar Velayati, a
potential candidate, has argued in favor of that
tactic. He said: "It would be preferable to have a
candidate who wins straightaway," adding, "this leaves
no room for bickering and bitterness."
That view ignores the fact that the Khomeinist
establishment is currently divided into at least four
factions, each of which would like to put forward a
candidate.
Elections in Iran are not like normal elections in
countries with a genuine pluralist system.
Iranian elections resemble the primaries of political
parties in the United States. Though not organised as
a party, the Khomeinist establishment is a single
ideological bloc divided into different tendencies.
One faction is led by Khamenei, with a support base in
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the
security services, the network of mullahs paid by
government, and a portion of population benefiting
from the various "foundations" that dominate segments
of the economy.
The second faction's father figure is former President
Hashemi Rafsanjani. It includes former officials,
technocrats, businessmen and sections of the urban
middle classes wary of Ahmadinejad's populism.
The third faction has Ahmadinejad as standard-bearer,
with Esfandiar Mashaei as chief strategist. That
faction is backed by part of the civil service,
elements in the IRGC, and those mullahs who regard
Khamenei as a usurper.
The fourth faction consists of dissidents who profess
loyalty to Khomeinism as an ideology, but accuse
Khamenei of establishing a despotic system with
support from the military and security apparatus.
Because they cannot operate openly, even within the
limits set by the regime, it is difficult to gauge the
extent of the support such dissidents might have
within the establishment. The fact that this faction's
two key leaders, Moussavi and former Majlis speaker
Mehdi Karroubi, are under house arrest makes it
difficult to estimate its weight.
The rules set for the election exclude many who might
have been able to stand under normal circumstances.
The entire opposition, ranging from Communists to
monarchists and passing by nationalists and liberals,
are branded as "enemies" and thus are excluded.
Rules published by the Ministry of the Interior, which
is responsible for organizing the election, spell out
other exclusions.
Half of the population—women—are barred from the
start: only men can apply as candidates. Although
legally recognized as religious minorities,
Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians—altogether numbering
around one million—are also excluded. In addition to
this, Bahá'is, an illegal religious minority believed
to number over 300,000, are also excluded.
However, just being Muslim is not enough for
candidacy. Iranian Sunni Muslims, believed to number
around 12 million, are also excluded.
"The would-be candidates must be Shi'ite Muslims," the
ministry declares.
Even then, not all brands of Shi'ism are accepted. The
Seveners (Ismailis) are excluded, as are Zaidis, not
to mention smaller, esoteric offshoots of Shi'ism.
However, being a Twelver (Ithna'ashari) is not enough,
either. The candidate must be "a political or
religious" figure. This means that others—for example
a businessman, an opera singer or a taxi driver—cannot
seek the presidency.
Another condition is that the candidate should
"believe in" and be "loyal" to the system in place.
But what if a candidate wanted to stand on a platform
of radical reform, for example by abolishing velayat-e
faqih (guardianship of the jurist) while maintaining
the Islamic Republic in its basic structure?
The ministry's statement sets other problematic
conditions. It states that a candidate must be of
"Iranian origin". What does that mean? Under Iranian
law, anyone born in Iran automatically becomes Iranian
regardless of the origins of their parents or
ancestors. At the same time, anyone born outside of
Iran to at least one Iranian parent can also demand
Iranian citizenship.
The published rules include other oddities. The
candidate must be "pious and trustworthy" and have "a
good record." He must also offer "managerial skills"
and be "careful." But how could we find out if someone
fulfills such subjective conditions?
Clearly, such conditions would give the authorities
ample opportunity for blocking the candidacy of
figures regarded as a threat to Khamenei.
This is not about electing a president in the normal
sense of the term. It is about choosing a "yes-man"
for the supreme leader. Are the Iranians still
interested in this? We shall know on polling day.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest
Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was
Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
(1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for
the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of
the Executive Board of the International Press
Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and 2004, he was a
contributor to the International Herald Tribune. He
has written for the Wall Street Journal, the New York
Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French
magazine Politique Internationale, and the German
weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005, he was editorial
writer for the German daily Die Welt. Taheri has
published 11 books, some of which have been translated
into 20 languages. He has been a columnist for Asharq
Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian
Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and
New York.
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