Russia's Strategy Is Based On Fear And Fantasy: Putin's Narratives - Conspiracies
17 December 2013
By Amir Taheri
What does Vladimir Putin want? In Western "think
tanks" and chancelleries, the question has been making
the rounds for almost two decades as "Tsar" Vladimir's
star has continued to rise.
One answer may be that Putin sees post-Soviet Russia
as a character in search of a role in a script it did
not write.
The brief tactical alliance dictated by the Second
World War notwithstanding, under Lenin and Stalin the
USSR regarded the US and its "capitalist" allies as
enemies.
Then, leaders from Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid
Brezhnev saw the post-World War system as a duopoly
defined by the Yalta accords and the subsequent
grammar of the Cold War. They regarded the United
States as an adversary but did not wish to upset a
system that guaranteed the USSR parity as a
"superpower."
Mikhail Gorbachev tried to redefine the USSR's
position as a partner for the US and its European
allies. Adopting the concept of "universal values" he
de-emphasized the role of ideology.
Boris Yeltsin developed Gorbachev's analysis further
by trying to re-cast the Russia that re-emerged from
the debris of the Soviet Empire as an ally of the
"capitalist camp."
However, a good part of the Russian elite started to
feel that the end of the Cold War did not guarantee
their nation the place it deserved in the global
system. Strategies based on Russia acting as enemy,
adversary, partner and ally of the West had all
failed.
Putin became the symbol of the new elite's quest for a
new role for Russia. Over the years, Putin has tried
to redefine Russia as an adversary of Western powers
led by the United States.
Putin's strategy catered for some of Russia's
deep-rooted needs.
From its earliest stages as a nation, Russia has been
an ideological construct defined against real or
imagined enemies.
First, Russians had to shake off the Tatar yoke and
become the core-nation of a Slavic confederation. The
onion-shaped cupolas that adorn the cathedral of Saint
Basil on Moscow's Red Square symbolize the turbaned
heads of Tatar chiefs cut off by Ivan (The Terrible).
Russia defined itself as the "Third Rome" and claimed
Moscow as the final "bastion of Christianity" after
Rome fell to Catholics and Constantinople to Muslims.
Pan-Slavism, a cocktail of nationalism and religious
zeal provided the ideological template.
Pan-Slavism, developed by people like Aleksey
Khomyakov among others, emphasized Russia's "specialness",
as a nation chosen by God to spread the Good News. "We
are a New Testament nation," Khomyakov liked to boast.
The trouble was that, from the beginning, while it
wanted to be itself, Russia also dreamed of becoming
another. That dream of otherness was reflected in the
Westernization movement symbolized by Peter the Great
who hoped to make Russia a Western nation.
Russia's political schizophrenia is nowhere better
reflected than in the complex of palaces that
constitute the Kremlin, the seat of Russian power
since the 13th century. Initially erected as a wooden
structure to house the Tsar's guard, the Kremlin was
intended to intimidate in a very Russian way. Over the
centuries, however, it was redesigned to reflect
Russia's dream of otherness. New stone structures
copied from Italian Renaissance buildings, especially
in Bologna, were erected within six-meter high walls.
The complex expanded into a 62 acres "city within the
city" with giant-size reception halls, endless
corridors, and nooks and crannies to entice fear and
fantasy in equal measures.
The fears reflected in the Kremlin's memory are not
abstract concepts. Its capture by Boris Godunov, the
usurper Tsar of Tatar origin, sounded a warning that
reverberated for centuries. Worse still, the heart of
Russian power was seized by Polish conquerors and then
by Napoleon. Russians had to burn much of it to make
sure that the French invader ended up with a hollow
victory.
Today, claims of Western, especially American,
"conspiracies" provide the fear ingredient of the
Putin ideology. Russians are told the US is trying to
undermine their nation by sowing dissension, creating
opposition groups, and inciting the youth to rebellion
through pop groups such as Pussy Riot. Worse still, so
the Putin message runs, the US is "invading" Russia
through Christian evangelists who hope to destroy the
Orthodox Church.
Putin fears that the US might try to topple his regime
through a "velvet revolution" of the kind that
produced regime change in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and
Georgia, among others. This is why he is determined to
prevent regime change in Syria even if that meant
derailing Moscow's relations with Arab nations.
The Putin narrative also claims that the "conspiracy"
includes an Islamic ingredient. The plan, we are told,
is to help Russia's Muslim citizens become a majority
in a few decades. Today, Muslims account for 25
percent of Russia's population of 140 million.
However, thanks to higher birth rates Muslim numbers
are rising by 2.3 million while the Orthodox Russian
population is falling by around 800,000 annually.
Muslim numbers are also on the rise thanks to
conversions, including by many Orthodox Russians.
Fear of Islam is fanned through racist groups such as
Alexander Belov's "Movement Against Illegal
Immigration." Since the overwhelming majority of
Russian Muslims are Sunnis, Putin regards Shi'ite-majority
Iran as a natural ally. Neither Putin nor Iranian
"Supreme Guide" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei want to see
regimes based on Sunni majorities achieve power in
their geo-political habitat from central Asia to North
Africa.
Russia has always been torn between the Asiatic and
Western halves of its national identity. As a result
it has not been fully accepted by either side as a
legitimate family member. Emphasizing one aspect has
always provoked violent reaction from the other. Only
a Russia that assumes the totality of its identity can
hope to dispel the fears and fantasies that have
marked its history, often with tragic results. Many,
including some within the ruling elite, understand
that.
I am not sure Vladimir Putin is one of them.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.
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