When It Comes To ISIS, Iranian Help Is Useless And Dangerous
21 September 2014
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
"It is often forgotten that ever since the Iranian
revolution, and the ousting of the Shah in 1979, there
have been several occasions when the Iranians have
been working, informally, with the Americans, though
neither side found it convenient to draw attention to
it. Whenever this has happened it has not been because
of hypocrisy or double standards on either side. It
has been because their national interests have
coincided on specific issues, and cooperation has been
an entirely logical consequence." So said Sir Malcolm
Rifkind, the chairman of the Intelligence and Security
Committee at the British Parliament, in a recent
article in the Daily Telegraph.
Rifkind suggested that the US government should
cooperate with Iran to fight the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. It's an unrealistic
suggestion, not because cooperation with Iran is
forbidden, but because the value of this cooperation
is equal to zero in the equation of the struggle with
ISIS.
Sir Malcolm, these are the basics of politics in this
region: Muslims, like Christians of all different
sects and doctrines, accuse each other of infidelity,
and there's a long history of bloodshed and warfare
between them. On the one hand, Iran is a state ruled
by an extremist Shi'ite religious regime, and on the
other hand, ISIS is an extremist Sunni organization in
Iraq and Syria. So, how can Shi'ite Iran help America
fight a Sunni insurgent group? It's like saying
Britain, with a Protestant majority, must help fight a
Catholic group or state during a sectarian dispute!
The West could cooperate with Iran to curb the
terrorist activities of the Lebanese group Hezbollah,
since it is a Shi'ite organization. The West could
also cooperate with the Iranian government of
President Hassan Rouhani to pressure dictator Syrian
President Bashar Al-Assad to step down, since he is an
ally of Iran and he belongs to a non-Sunni minority.
The US could cooperate with Iran to ensure the
handover of Sunni Al-Qaeda leaders who live in Iran
and work from there—including infamous terrorist Saif
Al-Adel—and those who are under the protection and
care of the Iranian regime. These are areas where the
West could try its luck cooperating with its rival
Iran. However, I am confident the West would not
achieve any success, considering the nature of the
Iranian regime, which is similar to Al-Qaeda: the
former is an extremist religious regime, just as the
latter is an extremist religious group.
Enlisting Iranian help to fight against groups such as
ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front outside of Iran is doomed
to failure. This is because these groups will not
submit to Iran's authority; they don't follow its
religious doctrine and consider Iran to be their
enemy.
Rifkind's suggestion is the worst possible advice
Washington could have received, especially given that
it considers Britain the most experienced country with
regards to Middle Eastern affairs. A US alliance with
Shi'ite Iran against ISIS would push Sunni moderates
to align with terrorist organizations. This would be
the worst possible scenario because Sunnis are the
majority of the 1 billion Muslims across the world. It
would make the US a target in a sectarian war, and it
would bolster the position of terrorist groups. During
the previous war against the Sunni Al-Qaeda between
2001 and 2010, the US's major allies were
Sunni-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Pakistan. This represents a logical approach in
international relations, and is similar to the
situation in which the US agreed with the Iranian
regime to remove Nuri Al-Maliki from the Iraqi
premiership, as Iran's regime is Shi'ite and the Iraqi
premiership is a post reserved for Shi'ites.
Sir Malcolm could benefit from the experience of US
Gen. David Petraeus when he was a military officer
fighting Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus altered his
approach towards managing the crisis in Iraq, away
from seeking to destroy enemies towards making allies.
In September 2007, he reconciled with Shi'ite leader
Moqtada Al-Sadr and cooperated with him in Shi'ite-dominated
areas where he had considerable influence. Also in
2007, he struck deals with leaders of the tribes of
Anbar, the Sunni province plagued by Al-Qaeda, and
recruited more than 100,000 Sunni tribesmen to fight
the terrorist organization.
The lesson to be learned from the story is that, with
Iran against the Sunni insurgents of Iraq or Syria,
this will open the doors of hell and grant ISIS a new
lease of life after it has come under siege by Anbar's
Sunnis and Kurds who are pursuing it and fighting it
on Iraq's mountains and plains.
Al Rashed is
the general manager of Al -Arabiya television. He is
also the former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al- Awsat,
and the leading Arabic weekly magazine, Al Majalla. He
is also a senior Columnist in the daily newspapers of
Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is a US post-graduate
degree in mass communications. He has been a guest on
many TV current affairs programs. He is currently
based in Dubai.