Will ISIS Prolong Assad's Rule? ISIS Has Definitely Tipped The Balance, But Not In Favor Of The Opposition
03 November 2014
By Osman Mirghani
The welcome extended by Syrian state
media to the US airstrikes on the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its subsequent remarks about
Washington being in one trench with the Syrian
government forces may seem a ridiculous and
embarrassing joke to Washington. But indeed it
reflects how ISIS has changed the course of events in
the Syrian war, shaking up regional alliances and
positions. Bashar Al-Assad's regime is without doubt
benefiting from US strikes against ISIS, and is
pleased with the international coalition's stated
objective of eliminating the Islamist organization.
True, the international coalition's strategy does not
necessarily aim to help the Syrian government, but it
cannot prevent Damascus seeking to capitalize on the
campaign. Damascus is taking advantage of this issue
both politically and in terms of the struggle for
global public opinion, with the aim of promoting the
notion that the US is fighting alongside it against
terrorism.
The true turning point would be when—if
the various interpretations made on the basis of the
developments on the ground were true—the US
administration reviews its stance on Syria, and
actually slows down the process of toppling Assad.
Washington is concerned about the vacuum created after
the disintegration of the Syrian opposition and the
growing influence of "Islamist" movements that, along
with ISIS, control most of the rebel-held territory.
There are some who are of the opinion that keeping the
Syrian regime in power will be less harmful than
seeing the country fall to the hands of extremist
organizations, as ISIS continues to extend its
influence on the ground and attract fighters from
every direction. Some Western countries—those that do
not hide their concern over the return of war-hardened
fighters exposed to radicalism and the culture of
slaughter and suicide operations—hold the same belief.
For over two years the Western strategy
in Syria has been to dismantle the Syrian regime and
maintain the structure of the state. But the opposite
has happened. Syria has been completely destroyed in a
long, costly war and foreign fighters have been
allowed into the country with the aim of toppling
Assad from power. It was in light of this strategy
that armed groups, particularly Islamist ones, grew in
size and strength, leading to the creation of the
monster that is ISIS. Before this shift took place on
the ground, some Western officials were working to
unite the Syrian opposition's ranks, pushing them into
adopting a unified political vision and training them
on how to run the affairs of the areas under their
control and at the same time building public support
by giving residents the services they used to get from
the government.
The idea was that the Syrian opposition—with military,
financial and technological support from the
West—should seek to tighten its control on areas under
its control and set up local councils to reconstruct
the infrastructure to secure the return of refugees.
Budgets were allotted to these councils in order to
offer services and create jobs so that the opposition
would gradually replace the government in these areas.
In other words, the aim was to restore the structure
of the state without reinstating the regime,
disassociating Assad's regime from the Syrian state.
The strategy—accompanied by the
presence of Western "volunteers" offering humanitarian
services and expertise to the opposition—was going
reasonably well until ISIS emerged, taking control of
several areas and reshuffling the cards. ISIS fought
other opposition factions, including Islamist ones,
more than it fought government forces. The irony is
that ISIS used the very same strategy as the West,
setting out to create local councils and offering
services in the areas it controls while it rushed to
declare its own "Islamic" state. On the other hand,
the West seemed to be confused about how to deal with
ISIS after its strategy in Syria collapsed. The
equation on the ground changed after ISIS's emergence,
adding a third side to the initial two rivals—the
government and the opposition. The "moderate"
opposition has vanished today and one barely hears
about it as ISIS and news of its progress on the
ground dominates the scene. It annoys the West that
ISIS has succeeded in attracting fighters from other
opposition groups, including Islamist ones that were
previously described as "moderate."
There are many question marks over the
west's strategy in Syria, and how ISIS can be defeated
and alternative opposition factions rebuilt. Achieving
these objectives requires time and new tactics, which
means that the toppling of Assad may be delayed by the
West. Syria may be of more significance than Iraq to
the West because chaos in the Mediterranean country
will affect Israel, which has enjoyed calm along its
northeastern border for over 40 years. Since it is no
secret that preserving the security of Israel is a key
part of US strategy, it will not be hard to conclude
that Washington, in terms of its fight against ISIS
and in its view of the Syrian conflict, does not want
unforeseen developments that worry Israel.
ISIS has definitely tipped the balance,
but not in favor of the opposition. Perhaps this is
just one more of the ironies that has resulted from
the rise of this bizarre group.