The Real American Exceptionalism: From Torture to Drone Assassination, How Washington Gave Itself a Global Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card
10 April 2015
By Al-Ikhwah Al-Mujahidun
"The sovereign is he who decides on the exception,'' said conservative
thinker Carl Schmitt in 1922, meaning that a nation's leader can defy the law
to serve the greater good. Though Schmitt's service as Nazi Germany's chief
jurist and his unwavering support for Hitler from the night of the long
knives to Kristallnacht and beyond damaged his reputation for decades, today
his ideas have achieved unimagined influence. They have, in fact, shaped the
neo-conservative view of presidential power that has become broadly
bipartisan since 9/11. Indeed, Schmitt has influenced American politics
directly through his intellectual protégé Leo Strauss who, as an émigré
professor at the University of Chicago, trained Bush administration
architects of the Iraq war Paul Wolfowitz and Abram Shulsky.
All that should be impressive enough for a discredited, long dead
authoritarian thinker. But Schmitt's dictum also became a philosophical
foundation for the exercise of American global power in the quarter century
that followed the end of the Cold War. Washington, more than any other power,
created the modern international community of laws and treaties, yet it now
reserves the right to defy those same laws with impunity. A sovereign ruler
should, said Schmitt, discard laws in times of national emergency. So the
United States, as the planet's last superpower or, in Schmitt's terms, its
global sovereign, has in these years repeatedly ignored international law,
following instead its own unwritten rules of the road for the exercise of
world power.
Just as Schmitt's sovereign preferred to rule in a state of endless exception
without a constitution for his Reich, so Washington is now well into the
second decade of an endless War on Terror that seems the sum of its
exceptions to international law: endless incarceration, extrajudicial
killing, pervasive surveillance, drone strikes in defiance of national
boundaries, torture on demand, and immunity for all of the above on the
grounds of state secrecy. Yet these many American exceptions are just surface
manifestations of the ever-expanding clandestine dimension of the American
state. Created at the cost of more than a trillion dollars since 9/11, the
purpose of this vast apparatus is to control a covert domain that is fast
becoming the main arena for geopolitical contestation in the twenty-first
century.
This should be (but seldom is considered) a jarring, disconcerting path for a
country that, more than any other, nurtured the idea of, and wrote the rules
for, an international community of nations governed by the rule of law. At
the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899, the U.S. delegate, Andrew Dickson
White, the founder of Cornell University, pushed for the creation of a
Permanent Court of Arbitration and persuaded Andrew Carnegie to build the
monumental Peace Palace at The Hague as its home. At the Second Hague
Conference in 1907, Secretary of State Elihu Root urged that future
international conflicts be resolved by a court of professional jurists, an
idea realized when the Permanent Court of International Justice was
established in 1920.
After World War II, the U.S. used its triumph to help create the United
Nations, push for the adoption of its Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and ratify the Geneva Conventions for humanitarian treatment in war. If you
throw in other American-backed initiatives like the World Health
Organization, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank, you pretty
much have the entire infrastructure of what we now casually call ''the
international community.''
Breaking the Rules
Not only did the U.S. play a crucial role in writing the new rules for that
community, but it almost immediately began breaking them. After all, despite
the rise of the other superpower, the Soviet Union, Washington was by then
the world sovereign and so could decide which should be the exceptions to its
own rules, particularly to the foundational principle for all this global
governance: sovereignty. As it struggled to dominate the hundred new nations
that started appearing right after the war, each one invested with an
inviolable sovereignty, Washington needed a new means of projecting power
beyond conventional diplomacy or military force. As a result, CIA covert
operations became its way of intervening within a new world order where you
couldn't or at least shouldn't intervene openly.
All of the exceptions that really matter spring from America's decision to
join what former spy John Le Carré called that ''squalid procession of vain
fools, traitors... sadists, and drunkards,'' and embrace espionage in a big
way after World War II. Until the creation of the CIA in 1947, the United
States had been an innocent abroad in the world of intelligence. When General
John J. Pershing led two million American troops to Europe during World War
I, the U.S. had the only army on either side of the battle lines without an
intelligence service. Even though Washington built a substantial security
apparatus during that war, it was quickly scaled back by Republican
conservatives during the 1920s. For decades, the impulse to cut or constrain
such secret agencies remained robustly bipartisan, as when President Harry
Truman abolished the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
right after World War II or when President Jimmy Carter fired 800 CIA covert
operatives after the Vietnam War.
Yet by fits and starts, the covert domain inside the U.S. government has
grown stealthily from the early twentieth century to this moment. It began
with the formation of the FBI in 1908 and Military Intelligence in 1917. The
Central Intelligence Agency followed after World War II along with most of
the alphabet agencies that make up the present U.S. Intelligence Community,
including the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), and last but hardly least, in 2004, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. Make no mistake: there is a clear correlation between
state secrecy and the rule of law -- as one grows, the other surely shrinks.
World Sovereign
America's irrevocable entry into this covert netherworld came when President
Truman deployed his new CIA to contain Soviet subversion in Europe. This was
a continent then thick with spies of every stripe: failed fascists, aspirant
communists, and everything in between. Introduced to spycraft by its British
''cousins,'' the CIA soon mastered it in part by establishing sub rosa ties
to networks of ex-Nazi spies, Italian fascist operatives, and dozens of
continental secret services.
As the world's new sovereign, Washington used the CIA to enforce its chosen
exceptions to the international rule of law, particularly to the core
principle of sovereignty. During his two terms, President Dwight
Eisenhowerauthorized 104 covert operations on four continents, focused
largely on controlling the many new nations then emerging from centuries of
colonialism. Eisenhower's exceptions included blatant transgressions of
national sovereignty such as turning northern Burma into an unwilling
springboard for abortive invasions of China, arming regional revolts to
partition Indonesia, and overthrowing elected governments in Guatemala and
Iran. By the time Eisenhower left office in 1961, covert ops had acquired
such a powerful mystique in Washington that President John F. Kennedy would
authorize 163 of them in the three years that preceded his assassination.
As a senior CIA official posted to the Near East in the early 1950s put it,
the Agency then saw every Muslim leader who was not pro-American as ''a
target legally authorized by statute for CIA political action.'' Applied on a
global scale and not just to Muslims, this policy helped produce a distinct
''reverse wave'' in the global trend towards democracy from 1958 to 1975, as
coups -- most of them U.S.-sanctioned -- allowed military men to seize power
in more than three-dozen nations, representing a quarter of the world's
sovereign states.
The White House's ''exceptions'' also produced a deeply contradictory U.S.
attitude toward torture from the early years of the Cold War onward.
Publicly, Washington's opposition to torture was manifest in its advocacy of
the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Geneva
Conventions in 1949. Simultaneously and secretly, however, the CIA began
developing ingenious new torture techniques in contravention of those same
international conventions. After a decade of mind-control research, the
CIAactually codified its new method of psychological torture in a secret
instructional handbook, the "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation"
manual, which it then disseminated within the U.S. Intelligence Community and
to allied security services worldwide.
Much of the torture that became synonymous with the era of authoritarian rule
in Asia and Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s seems to have originated
in U.S. training programs that provided sophisticated techniques, up-to-date
equipment, and moral legitimacy for the practice. From 1962 to 1974, the CIA
worked through the Office of Public Safety (OPS), a division of the U.S.
Agency for International Development that sent American police advisers to
developing nations. Established by President Kennedy in 1962, in just six
years OPS grew into a global anti-communist operation with over 400 U.S.
police advisers. By 1971, it had trained more than a million policemen in 47
nations, including 85,000 in South Vietnam and 100,000 in Brazil.
Concealed within this larger OPS effort, CIA interrogation training became
synonymous with serious human rights abuses, particularly in Iran, the
Philippines, South Vietnam, Brazil, and Uruguay. Amnesty
Internationaldocumented widespread torture, usually by local police, in 24 of
the 49 nations that had hosted OPS police-training teams. In tracking
torturers across the globe, Amnesty seemed to be following the trail of CIA
training programs. Significantly, torture began to recede when America again
turned resolutely against the practice at the end of the Cold War.
The War on Terror
Although the CIA's authority for assassination, covert intervention,
surveillance, and torture was curtailed at the close of the Cold War, the
terror attacks of September 2001 sparked an unprecedented expansion in the
scale of the intelligence community and a corresponding resurgence in
executive exceptions. The War on Terror's voracious appetite for information
produced, in its first decade, what the Washington Post branded a veritable
"fourth branch" of the U.S. federal government with 854,000 vetted security
officials, 263 security organizations, over 3,000 private and public
intelligence agencies, and 33 new security complexes -- all pumping out a
total of 50,000 classified intelligence reports annually by 2010.
By that time, one of the newest members of the Intelligence Community, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, already had 16,000 employees, a $5
billion budget, and a massive nearly $2 billion headquarters at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia -- all aimed at coordinating the flood of surveillance data pouring
in from drones, U-2 spy planes, Google Earth, and orbiting satellites.
According to documents whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked to theWashington
Post, the U.S. spent $500 billion on its intelligence agencies in the dozen
years after the 9/11 attacks, including annual appropriations in 2012 of $11
billion for the National Security Agency (NSA) and $15 billion for the CIA.
If we add the $790 billion expended on the Department of Homeland Security to
that $500 billion for overseas intelligence, then Washington had spent nearly
$1.3 trillion to build a secret state-within-the-state of absolutely
unprecedented size and power.
As this secret state swelled, the world's sovereign decided that some
extraordinary exceptions to civil liberties at home and sovereignty abroad
were in order. The most glaring came with the CIA's now-notorious renewed use
of torture on suspected terrorists and its setting up of its own global
network of private prisons, or ''black sites,'' beyond the reach of any court
or legal authority. Along with piracy and slavery, the abolition of torture
had long been a signature issue when it came to the international rule of
law. So strong was this principle that the U.N. General Assembly voted
unanimously in 1984 to adopt the Convention Against Torture. When it came to
ratifying it, however, Washington dithered on the subject until the end of
the Cold War when it finally resumed its advocacy of international justice,
participating in the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993 and,
a year later, ratifying the U.N. Convention Against Torture.
Even then, the sovereign decided to reserve some exceptions for his country
alone. Only a year after President Bill Clinton signed the U.N. Convention,
CIA agents started snatching terror suspects in the Balkans, some of them
Egyptian nationals, and sending them to Cairo, where a torture-friendly
autocracy could do whatever it wanted to them in its prisons. Former CIA
director George Tenet later testified that, in the years before 9/11, the CIA
shipped some 70 individuals to foreign countries without formal extradition
-- a process dubbed ''extraordinary rendition'' that had been explicitly
banned under Article 3 of the U.N. Convention.
Right after his public address to a shaken nation on September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush gave his staff wide-ranging secret orders to use
torture, adding (in a vernacular version of Schmitt's dictum),''I don't care
what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass.'' In this
spirit, the White House authorized the CIA to develop that global matrix of
secret prisons, as well as an armada of planes for spiriting kidnapped terror
suspects to them, and a network of allies who could help seize those suspects
from sovereign states and levitate them into a supranational gulag of eight
agency black sites from Thailand to Poland or into the crown jewel of the
system, Guantánamo, thus eluding laws and treaties that remained grounded in
territorially based concepts of sovereignty.
Once the CIA closed the black sites in 2008-2009, its collaborators in this
global gulag began to feel the force of law for their crimes against
humanity. Under pressure from the Council of Europe, Poland started an
ongoing criminal investigation in 2008 into its security officers who had
facilitated the CIA's secret prison in the country's northeast. In September
2012, Italy's supreme court confirmed the convictions of 22 CIA agents for
the illegal rendition of Egyptian exile Abu Omar from Milan to Cairo, and
ordered a trial for Italy's military intelligence chief on charges that
sentenced him to 10 years in prison. In 2012, Scotland Yard opened a criminal
investigation into MI6 agents who rendered Libyan dissidents to Colonel
Gaddafi's prisons for torture, and two years later the Court of Appeal
allowed some of those Libyans to file a civil suit against MI6 for kidnapping
and torture.
But not the CIA. Even after the Senate's 2014 Torture Report documented the
Agency's abusive tortures in painstaking detail, there was no move for either
criminal or civil sanctions against those who had ordered torture or those
who had carried it out. In a strong editorial on December 21, 2014, the New
York Times asked ''whether the nation will stand by and allow the
perpetrators of torture to have perpetual immunity.'' The answer, of course,
was yes.Immunity for hirelings is one of the sovereign's most important
exceptions.
As President Bush finished his second term in 2008, an inquiry by the
International Commission of Jurists found that the CIA's mobilization of
allied security agencies worldwide had done serious damage to the
international rule of law. ''The executive… should under no circumstance
invoke a situation of crisis to deprive victims of human rights violations…
of their… access to justice,'' the Commission recommended after documenting
the degradation of civil liberties in some 40 countries. ''State secrecy and
similar restrictions must not impede the right to an effective remedy for
human rights violations.''
The Bush years also brought Washington's most blatant repudiation of the rule
of law. Once the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC)
convened at The Hague in 2002, the Bush White House ''un-signed'' or
''de-signed'' the U.N. agreement creating the court and then mounted a
sustained diplomatic effort to immunize U.S. military operations from its
writ. This was an extraordinary abdication for the nation that had breathed
the concept of an international tribunal into being.
The Sovereign's Unbounded Domains
While Presidents Eisenhower and Bush decided on exceptions that violated
national boundaries and international treaties, President Obama is exercising
his exceptional prerogatives in the unbounded domains of aerospace and
cyberspace.
Both are new, unregulated realms of military conflict beyond the rubric of
international law and Washington believes it can use them as Archimedean
levers for global dominion. Just as Britain once ruled from the seas and
postwar America exercised its global reach via airpower, so Washington now
sees aerospace and cyberspace as special realms for domination in the
twenty-first century.
Under Obama, drones have grown from a tactical Band-Aid in Afghanistan into a
strategic weapon for the exercise of global power. From 2009 to 2015, the CIA
and the U.S. Air Force deployed a drone armada of over 200 Predators and
Reapers, launching 413 strikes in Pakistan alone, killing as many as 3,800
people. Every Tuesday inside the White House Situation Room, as the New York
Times reported in 2012, President Obama reviews a CIA drone ''kill list'' and
stares at the faces of those who are targeted forpossible assassination from
the air. He then decides, without any legal procedure, who will live and who
will die, even in the case of American citizens. Unlike other world leaders,
this sovereign applies the ultimate exception across the Greater Middle East,
parts of Africa, and elsewhere if he chooses.
This lethal success is the cutting edge of a top-secret Pentagon project that
will, by 2020, deploy a triple-canopy space ''shield'' from stratosphere to
exosphere, patrolled by Global Hawk and X-37B drones armed with agile
missiles.
As Washington seeks to police a restless globe from sky and space, the world
might well ask: How high is any nation's sovereignty? After the successive
failures of the Paris flight conference of 1910, the Hague Rules of Aerial
Warfare of 1923, and Geneva's Protocol I of 1977 to establish the extent of
sovereign airspace or restrain aerial warfare, some puckish Pentagon lawyer
might reply: only as high as you can enforce it.
President Obama has also adopted the NSA's vast surveillance system as a
permanent weapon for the exercise of global power. At the broadest level,
such surveillance complements Obama's overall defense strategy, announced in
2012, of cutting conventional forces while preserving U.S. global power
through a capacity for ''a combined arms campaign across all domains: land,
air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.'' In addition, it should be no surprise
that, having pioneered the war-making possibilities of cyberspace, the
president did not hesitate to launch the first cyberwar in history against
Iran.
By the end of Obama's first term, the NSA could sweep up billions of messages
worldwide through its agile surveillance architecture. This included hundreds
of access points for penetration of the Worldwide Web's fiber optic cables;
ancillary intercepts through special protocols and ''backdoor'' software
flaws; supercomputers to crack the encryption of this digital torrent; and a
massive data farm in Bluffdale, Utah, built at a cost of $2 billion to store
yottabytes of purloined data.
Even after angry Silicon Valley executives protested that the NSA's
''backdoor'' software surveillance threatened their multi-trillion-dollar
industry, Obama called the combination of Internet information and
supercomputers ''a powerful tool.'' He insisted that, as ''the world's only
superpower,'' the United States ''cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence
agencies.'' In other words, the sovereign cannot sanction any exceptions to
his panoply of exceptions.
Revelations from Edward Snowden's cache of leaked documents in late 2013
indicate that the NSA has conducted surveillance of leaders in some 122
nations worldwide, 35 of them closely, including Brazil's president Dilma
Rousseff, former Mexican president Felipe Calderón, and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel. After her forceful protest, Obama agreed to exempt Merkel's
phone from future NSA surveillance, but reserved the right, as he put it, to
continue to ''gather information about the intentions of governments… around
the world.'' The sovereign declined to say which world leaders might be
exempted from his omniscient gaze.
Can there be any question that, in the decades to come, Washington will
continue to violate national sovereignty through old-style covert as well as
open interventions, even as it insists on rejecting any international
conventions that restrain its use of aerospace or cyberspace for unchecked
force projection, anywhere, anytime? Extant laws or conventions that in any
way check this power will be violated when the sovereign so decides. These
are now the unwritten rules of the road for our planet. They represent the
real American exceptionalism.
Alfred W. McCoy is professor of history at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. A TomDispatch regular, he is the author of Torture &
Impunity: The U.S. Doctrine of Coercive Interrogation, among other works.