Propaganda Wars—ISIS vs. the Shi'ite Popular Mobilization
06 May 2015
By
Diana Moukalled
When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured Iraq's second city
Mosul in June of 2014, the event brought to the fore the power of the
extremist group's propaganda machine and how it had paved the way for its
lightning advance across northern Iraq and its capture of the city, which
took place seemingly overnight. One of the most surprising things at the time
was the feeble way the Iraqi army had reacted to the onslaught. It was said
back then, and widely circulated, that all it took to erode the morale of
Iraqi soldiers and make them flee their posts so readily was receiving text
messages on their cell phones from colleagues warning them that fighters from
ISIS were approaching.
Since then the Iraqi government has been attempting to return morale and
prestige to its armed forces, who were left humiliated and marginalized by
this traumatic experience. Perhaps even more traumatizing was the event that
has subsequently become known as the Camp Speicher Massacre, when it is
estimated ISIS militants killed more than 1,000 Iraqi air cadets in June of
2014 when they captured Tikrit, where the training facility is situated.
Over the following months it did not seem like the Iraqi government was
serious about rehabilitating the image of its beleaguered armed forces,
instead seemingly satisfied with relying on the military efforts and
strategies of Iran's Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force,
a feared division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. It was Suleimani
who led the Iraqi Shi'ite volunteer forces who were now spearheading the
fight against ISIS in Iraq—and given free rein by Baghdad to operate parallel
to the country's army. And it was these volunteer forces, known as the
Popular Mobilization Forces, who were able to retake the city of Tikrit back
from ISIS about a month ago. At the present time, plans are underway to
retake the western Anbar province, large parts of which, including the
provincial capital Ramadi, are under ISIS's control, with the Tikrit
offensive forming a benchmark on which the current plans are being modeled.
At the same time, reports have spread like wildfire regarding ISIS's
''victories'' over the Iraqi army, with the atmosphere of fear leading
countless people to flee their homes in sheer panic. The Iraqi government,
meanwhile, has attempted to deny the reports of the continued spread of the
extremist group and its alleged massacres of Iraqi soldiers, branding these
reports as mere psychological warfare. I have no doubt that much of what is
being circulated is in fact subterfuge, but it is also clearly based on a
modicum of truth.
What we have now in Iraq is a situation fueled by propaganda and
counter-propaganda, all being exchanged in rapid-fire succession before a
single Iraqi army bullet has even been fired in Anbar. What is doubly more
dangerous is that all the misleading publicity campaigns and psychological
warfare conducted by either side in this conflict are occurring in a country
and within a context that provides a fertile breeding ground for incitement
and provocation that can take many dangerous forms. Moreover, the Tikrit
offensive has now cast a dark and foreboding shadow over what is about to
happen in Anbar. Many reports, which included photographic and video evidence
as well as eyewitness testimony, showed that following their victory in
Tikrit, the Shi'ite Popular Mobilization forces engaged in what can only be
described as acts of sectarian-fueled revenge over the city's Sunni
inhabitants. These human rights abuses are reported to have included mass
killings as well as the ransacking and burning of homes.
The operation in Tikrit was certainly necessary; more of the ISIS-occupied
territories in Iraq need to be taken back from the extremist group, a point
on which there is broad consensus. However, the transgressions by the Popular
Mobilization forces following their victory in Tikrit have now worked in
ISIS's favor. As part of its own propaganda efforts in the battle for the
''hearts and minds'' of Iraqis, it is now making reference to these actions
by the Shi'ite militias in a bid to drum up support for itself from Anbar's
majority-Sunni population. These are efforts which could find some success in
a restive region of the country that has felt marginalized ever since the
US-led invasion in 2003. After all, ISIS, whose propaganda machine is already
predicting a failure for Iraqi forces in the upcoming battle for Anbar, did
not just fall out of the sky. Its emergence and dominion over large parts of
Iraq is but a symptom of accumulated mistakes made over the previous decades,
all representing shameful episodes for the country.
So, going hand-in-hand with the preparations for the impending Anbar
offensive is a psychological battle being fought out by individual media
outlets, a battle which can distort and exaggerate the current atmosphere for
the benefit of the respective protagonists in the conflict.
It is now no longer possible to enter into a military conflict without
prefacing it with this kind of psychological warfare conducted against the
enemy. ISIS were trailblazers in this regard, but the Popular Mobilization
has proved an apt pupil and quick study: The student is attempting to surpass
the master.
Diana Moukalled is a prominent and well-respected TV journalist in the
Arab world thanks to her phenomenal show Bil Ayn Al-Mojarada (By The Naked
Eye), a series of documentaries on controversial areas and topics which airs
on Lebanon's leading local and satelite channel, Future Television. Diana
also is a veteran war correspondent, having covered both the wars in Iraq and
in Afghanistan, as well as the Isreali "Grapes of Wrath" massacre in southern
Lebanon. Ms. Moukalled has gained world wide recognition and was named one of
the most influential women in a special feature that ran in Time Magazine in
2004.