Lebanon: Is Cheat-and-Retreat Back on the Menu?
26 November 2017By Amir Taheri
The Arab League holds an emergency meeting on Lebanon. France and the United
States agree to work together to contain the Lebanese "Hezbollah." Russia
indicates support for compromise. Iran's official government invites everyone
to "joint diplomatic efforts" while the unofficial government promises fire
and brimstone against attempts at curbing "Hezbollah."
These recent Middle East headlines remind me of "The Adventures of Emir
Arsalan The Famous", a popular Persian picaresque novel written in the 19th
century.
At one point the eponymic hero, searching the world for the great beauty
Farrokh-Laqa who may be nothing but a fantasy, feels as if his life has become
a constant repetition of exactly the same events and images.
The novel's conceit echoes the Pythagorean theory of "eternal recurrence"
according to which whatever is going to happen has already happened again and
again.
In the case of "Hezbollah" the "eternal recurrence" started at the moment of
its birth in 1982 when then Iranian Ambassador to Damascus Ayatollah Ali-Akbar
Mohtashami informed his masters in Tehran that he had created "a structure" to
dislodge the network of Palestinian gunmen loyal to Yasser Arafat, who, until
the Israeli military intervention, had turned parts of southern Lebanon into "Fatahland".
At the time, Iran and Israel were both happy to see the back of Arafat's
fighters. Israel regarded their presence close to itself as a threat while
Tehran sought the destruction of the PLO because of Arafat's support for
Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran.
Soon, however, it became clear that Tehran meant to use its new branch of
Hezbollah as a Trojan horse to turn Lebanon into a satrapy in all but name.
The scheme scandalized and frightened many in Lebanon, including the then
one-star General Michel Aoun who emerged as a champion of the campaign against
the creation of a parallel army in Lebanon.
A promise to disband the armed section of Hezbollah became a major item in the
secret negotiations that the late Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini's government
held with the Reagan administration in Washington in 1985-86.
However, eight years later Tehran was trying to sell the same bill of goods to
a new US administration under President Bill Clinton.
In an 180-minute meeting in Damascus in 1993, Clinton's Secretary of State
Warren Christopher made a deal with then Syrian President Hafez Assad who
assured him that Tehran was also on board.
The supposed "deal", sold by Christopher to the Israelis as a major
achievement, persuaded Israeli leaders not to take military action against
"Hezbollah."
However, the belauded "deal" soon proved meaningless as "Hezbollah" continued
pinprick attacks against Israel's Lebanese allies while also seizing more
Western hostages on command from Tehran.
Three years later, Christopher was back in Damascus demanding that Assad put
the previous "deal" in writing in exchange for Israel ending its "Operation
Grapes of Wrath" without destroying "Hezbollah's" armed structures.
This time, other actors became involved in the charade.
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an old expert on the region,
embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to save "Hezbollah" from destruction in
exchange for a promise to dissolve its armed units.
France went further by inviting then Iran's Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar
Velayati to Paris where he signed an accord with his French counterpart Herve
de Charrette to guarantee the continued existence of "Hezbollah" in exchange
for giving up its arms.
The tactic that Tehran used is known in diplomacy as "cheat-and-retreat": When
your back is to the wall you sign whatever your adversaries want. And, because
your adversaries do not have the same attention span, they will soon forget
what you had signed. Then you can resume your shenanigans until the next
crisis.
In the past three decades the tactic has worked several times in saving
"Hezbollah".
The only concession that Iran has given is that, since 2006, it has not used
"Hezbollah" for attacking Israel. This may be because Tehran understands that
it might not be possible to deceive the Israelis a fifth time and that the
next round may force Israel to ignore "diplomatic initiatives" and UN
"resolutions", and go full Monty in removing "Hezbollah" from the equation.
Tehran has been using "Hezbollah" in other theaters, including Iraq, Syria and
Yemen as part of a strategy to dominate Arab states already weakened by civil
war and/or foreign intervention.
"We're fighting away from our borders so that we won't have to fight along
them," says Gen. Pour-Dastan, who was Commander of the Iranian Ground Forces
until last month.
Hezbollah may not be the sharpest knife in Tehran's drawer, but it certainly
is an element of instability in the region. As far as Iran is concerned this
is a low-cost strategy, requiring around $800 million a year only, according
to an analysis of Iran's budgetary allocations.
"Hezbollah's" primary victim remains Lebanon, a country that risks becoming an
ungoverned space because its state institutions are becoming shadows while
real power is exercised by "Hezbollah."
We shall soon see whether "cheat-and-retreat" will once again deceive the
Arabs and the Western powers into refraining from meaningful action to restore
the authority of the Lebanese state.
For Lebanon to regain its dignity as a nation-state "Hezbollah" must become a
normal political party not a Mafia-style armed group holding the nation to
ransom on behalf of foreign paymasters.
The absence of strong state structures has been singled out by many Muslim
scholars as the principal reason for the historic weakness of Islamic nations
and their domination by Western powers from the 19th century onward.
In 1883, Jamaleddin Assadabadi, known to Arabs as al-Afghani, gave a lecture
in Paris' Sorbonne University in which he argued that Muslim nations would
remain "vulnerable" for as long as their state structures could not exercise
authority in the face of non-state forces controlled by interest groups or
foreign powers.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications,
published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since
1987
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