After Islamic State: Staying in Syria? The US Presence Does Not Serve Effective Counterbalance To Iran
01 December 2017By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
As the war against Islamic State as an entity controlling territory comes to
an end, discussion is turning to the question of whether the US should retain
for the long run its current troop deployments, that are mostly concentrated
in areas held by the Kurdish- led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern
and eastern Syria.
Simply put, the answer depends on how the US interests behind retaining these
deployments are defined.
One line of argument could be that it is in US interests to stabilize the SDF-held
areas through continued training and development of forces as well as
providing reconstruction aid, helping to ensure that Islamic State (ISIS) does
not re-emerge in those areas where it first exploited a vacuum to develop its
state project.
The US could be seen as owing an obligation to the SDF for its key role in
fighting ISIS and thus required to protect it from adversaries such as Turkey,
which regards the SDF as a terrorist organization by virtue of its links to
the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
The US, it could be argued, should also not risk losing even more influence in
the wider region by being perceived as abandoning its allies through a troop
withdrawal.
These justifications, regardless of whether one endorses them, at least make
some sense. Yet the focus is instead turning toward the notion that the US
presence in the SDF areas can serve as leverage to bring about a transition
away from the Assad regime in Damascus and counter Iranian influence in the
arc stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean. Here, unfortunately, the logic
collapses.
To begin with, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish authoritarian
socialist party that is the main political power behind the SDF, has never
been part of the regime-opposition dichotomy that has been the primary driver
behind the civil war. While opposition forces (aka the rebels) still control
territory in the northwest and south of the country, these are holdings of
marginal importance compared to cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. The
regime, which refused to countenance a political transition even when its
position was far more precarious, feels even less pressure to negotiate with
the opposition on the matter.
For the PYD, the concerns have been much more limited: namely, establishing an
autonomous zone of governance in its areas of control, a goal that does not
necessitate regime change in Damascus.
It is certainly true that the SDF has some leverage over the Syrian
government, such as through controlling important oil fields in part of the
eastern province of Deir az-Zor. This leverage, however, is not such that the
regime can be made to agree to do away with itself. Rather, at best, Damascus
may concede some formal recognition of SDF autonomy. In other respects the SDF
has failed to acquire further leverage that might guarantee that outcome. The
recent race for the town of Albukamal on the eastern border with Iraq was won
by the Syrian government and its allies. As a result, the Syrian government
now has access to a crucial land trade route with Iraq.
In any case, the fact that the SDF faces a hostile neighbor to its north
(Turkey) means that it is compelled to do business with Damascus and the Iraqi
government if it wants to survive economically rather than depending
indefinitely on handouts of American aid.
Further, the US presence in the SDF areas does not serve as an effective
counterbalance to Iran, as it does nothing about the presence of Iranian
forces and allied militias in regime-held areas.
Indeed, Iran's key means of supplying its allies in Syria and Lebanon -
namely, the air corridor - remains wide open and fully functioning. In the
unlikely event that this air corridor were to be fully disrupted (e.g. if a
no-fly zone were to be imposed over all of Syria), there is still theoretical
access to a long and arduous land route following the capture of Albukamal.
In sum, there is a reasonable argument to be made for the moral principle of
standing by one's ally on the ground and taking responsibility for rebuilding
places like Raqqa that have been largely destroyed by the campaign to retake
them from ISIS. From the strict counter-ISIS logic, there is sense in staying
in that the US presence can be seen as preventing an all-out war between the
SDF and regime, which regards the SDF-controlled oil fields in Deir az-Zor
(for instance) as occupied assets that ultimately need to be reclaimed. It is
reasonable to argue that stopping a future SDF-regime war prevents the
creation of a new security vacuum that might allow ISIS to return.
But claiming that a long-term presence will bring about a political transition
in Syria and counter Iranian influence in the wider region lies in the realm
of fantasy, unless the US wishes to expand the troop presence into the tens of
thousands and encourage an active SDF campaign against the government and its
allies to acquire far more territory. There is no sign though of such an
option being seriously countenanced.
In the end, it needs to be recognized that the US has failed to link the
counter-ISIS campaign to bringing about a fundamental shift in Syria's
political environment. If the insistence is to focus on countering Iranian
influence in the wider Middle East, then efforts should be directed elsewhere
in the region.
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