Iran: Anatomy Of A National Revolt - The Change That May Be Delayed But Won't Be Denied
27 January 2018By Amir Taheri
With its flames declining after days of high blaze, the "events" that shook
Iran in December and early January are still attracting a tsunami of comment,
speculation and, as always in such cases, misrepresentation.
The first question is what should we call what happened.
The term "events" is too anodyne and the term "revolution" too hyperbolic to
do the job. The Khomeinist leadership in Tehran started by using the term
"disturbances" (eghteshashat) as if we were dealing with a stampede in a
bazaar or a crowd crash in a Spanish bullfight arena. When it became clear
that "disturbances" in some 100 cities couldn't be dismissed in so cavalier a
manner, the Khomeinist authorities went for their fallback position of blaming
foreign conspirators for the whole thing.
Thus, state propaganda gave us the term "conspiracy" (to-teheh) with a
colorful cast of characters supposedly involved. These included US President
Donald Trump, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, the Barzani clique in
Iraqi Kurdistan, a brother-in- law of Saddam Hussein, a cousin of Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani and a retired CIA spook converted to the "wrong kind of
Islam".
Within days, however, the Khomeinist tune had become laughable.
How could such a disparate cast of characters put so many angry Iranians on
the streets? And how could such big chunks of the Khomeinist establishment
itself express sympathy with the protesters rather than shower them with abuse
in the manner he mullahs have used since time immemorial?
No, the term "conspiracy" wouldn't do either.
The Khomeinist propaganda barons then turned to the term "sedition" (fitnah)
which has several advantages as far as they are concerned. To start with this
is a theological term that denotes a major schism in which the established
version of the faith of is challenged by a rival narrative backed by the
sword.
Thus, the Khomeinist message was the protesters were directly attacking Islam.
News outlets controlled by Islamic Security even put out footage and print
reportages with photos claiming that the protesters were burning mosques and
hussainiehs. The subtext was that Iranian protesters were like the Syrians who
had risen against Bashar al-Assad with the sole aim of: destroy holy shrines
and tombs.
However, the term "sedition" didn't stick either. In fact, one remarkable
feature of the protests was that, for the first time in Iranian contemporary
history, there was no religious undertone in any of the slogans and speeches
made by protest leaders. What we witnessed in Iran was a political movement
with political aims.
The next attempt to misrepresent the "events" was to brand them as "economic".
Some former Obama administration officials and Khomeinist lobbyists in the US
and Europe tried the gimmick to claim that the Khomeinist regime remains
politically popular but faces popular anger because of economic sanctions that
have made life difficult for most Iranians. When it became clear that most of
the slogans were political that term, too, became redundant. In any case, the
whole thing was based on a misreading of Marx's division of reality into
"economic infrastructure" and "political superstructure."
Many Iranians, including some within the regime, implicitly agree that the
mullahs took over a fairly prosperous country four decades ago and turned it
into a poor house where up to five million suffer from chronic hunger and a
further 25 million are housed in slums unfit for human habitation. And, yet,
they know that the nation's economic woes are a result of the regime's
reckless policies at home and abroad.
Thus, what we witnessed was a national political revolt against the status
quo.
The term national does not mean that the whole of Iran or even a majority were
involved. The revolt was national because it cut across class, regional ethnic
and religious divides. In some places, for example Isfahan, the richest local
families were marching alongside the poorest of the city with middle class and
lower middle class people also on side. In Arak, an industrial city, workers
and their industrialist employers marched shoulder to shoulder to indicate
they were fed up with the Khomeinist system.
The revolt also skirted the generation gap, bringing together people of all
ages. To be sure, most protesters were young; and over 90 percent of the 3,000
or so arrested by Islamic Security are aged below 30. But who could forget the
scenes in which men and women in their 80s led the marches in Mash'had, Tabriz
, Shiraz and Kerman?
The national revolt also cut across the gender gap by bringing together almost
as many women as men. In many places, even smaller towns, women assumed
leadership or revived the memory of Pasionaria with their fiery speeches.
While the Khomeinist set-up includes a few thousand clerics it certainly does
not represent the whole of the Shi'ite clergy; this is why many mullah and
students of theology joined the revolt, emphasizing its national character. It
is interesting that none of the top or even middle - ranking mullahs of Qom,
Mash'had or Najaf came out in support of the regime by condemning the national
revolt. The regime had to find its defenders among a few hundred mullahs on
government payroll.
Because the revolt took place in every one of 31 provinces it brought together
all of the nation's 18 ethnic communities
The revolt was national for another reason: no political party or group or
known political personality played a major role in it. Almost all parties,
including virtually all those who had supported Khomeini in 1978-79 joined the
revolt, at least verbally, as did an amazing roster of former top officials
and apologists of the Khomeinist system. Of the 290 members of the Islamic
Majlis, the ersatz parliament, at least 60 made some noise in support of the
revolt. Also remarkable was the reluctance of the military elite, especially
in the regular army, to stand against the national revolt, at least in its
early stages.
What happened was unprecedented in Iran's contemporary history.
It was a truly national revolt against the established order. It didn't offer
a clear alternative but helped clear the air by puncturing the Khomeinist
regime's claim of invincibility. Even a year ago few would admit that the
Khomeinist system was overthrowable. Now many, including some of the regime's
lobbyists abroad, publicly do so.
In 1989, Ali Khamenei had this to say to a session of the Assembly of Experts
that hastily named him "Supreme Guide": "One must shed tears of blood for
Islamic ummah if I am considered worthy of becoming its leader."
I don't think crying tears of blood is the only option. A soberer option is to
close the chapter of Khomeinism, Supreme-Guidism and related nonsensical
notions by allowing the Iranian nation to reshape its life in a rational
manner.
The national revolt was about the change that may be delayed but won't be
denied.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications,
published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since
1987
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