Non Elections... Lebanese-Style: The Uprooting And Displacement Of More Than 20 Million Arab Sunni Muslims
13 April 2018
By Eyad Abu Shakra
In one of Lebanon's ex-Prime Minister Dr. Selim Al-Hoss most relevant quotes,
he said: "Lebanon enjoys a lot of freedom but very little democracy!"; and in
the current elections' season, this quote is more truthful than ever.
Yes, there is a lot of freedom; perhaps, even too much. However, as far as
democracy is concerned, and regardless of the electoral law adopted, it is
supposed to embody well-informed and responsible freedom.
Alas, this is not the case. In Lebanon, there are no more criteria to run for
elections, and no point in throwing promises at an electorate that does not
care, is not interested in details, does not deal with the concept of
elections in a mature and responsible way, and, ignore the fact that
accountability is a vital part in practicing politics in an environment that
claims to be free and sovereign.
Some may argue that there were several landmarks in the history of
'Independent Lebanon' (since 1943) that have proven the futility of attempts
to keep a self-perpetuating 'clannish' and sectarian traditional political
system. This is actually true; as on more than one occasion, this system
staggered after an almost total rift remerged between its intellectual elites
and its traditional base. However, regional factors and global considerations
converged to aid, and then, rescue this system.
It is surely right to say that many intellectuals have rejected, for some
time, the ills of 'clientship', nepotism, and taking refuge and strength in
religious sects and feudal politics. But, they, either continued to adhere to
the 'idealism' of their 'ivory towers' or fell at the first test with reality;
and thus, some chose to coexist and accept the 'rules of the game' so becoming
part of the system, or got desperate and left, or even, immigrated.
On the other hand, political parties, long hoped for as the intellectual and
organizational vehicles for change, also changed. From the very beginning,
there were openly 'sectarian' - Christian and Muslim - parties, as well as
parties that were sectarian by nature although raising liberal banners and
seeking an elitist target audience. Next to these two sets of parties were
secular or semi-secular ideologies that were able to attract members and
supporters from all sects.
However, as time passed by, and benefitting from experience, some of the
sectarian parties managed to readjust its rhetoric and approach in order to
adapt to the new post-1920 politics, which were by far more complex than the
simple ones of Mt Lebanon of 1860-1865. On the other side of the arena, the
ideological cross-sectarian alternatives collapsed as a result of the retreat
of 'Syrian Social Nationalism' following the failed coup attempt of 1960-1961,
Arab Nationalism after the Six Days war of 1967 and later the Camp David
Accords (1978), and International Left as a result of the demise of the USSR
in 1991.
Furthermore, the experience with the Palestinian Resistance Movement, which
was penetrated by several Arab regimes that established loyal organizations
within it, became a living proof that even the noblest of aims could not
withstand regional pressures, whether through threats or financial 'support'.
This is exactly what happened in Lebanon, where many parties regarded as
potential alternatives to the traditional 'clannish' system, became
'mercenaries' to neighboring countries, following their dictates and even
joining their wars. Among the best examples, here, was the confrontation
between the "two Baaths" of Syria and Iraq. The conflict began as an
organizational difference between the 'National Command' hosted in Iraq and
Syria's 'Regional Command', but it soon developed into contradictory
subservient loyalties to two clan-based regimes, one 'Takriti' in Baghdad, the
other 'Assadi' in Damascus.
Later on, with the escalation of the Lebanese War, which almost brought down
the fragile system, an international decision was taken to ask a local
regional 'policeman' not only to save that system, but also destroy the then
catalyst to its imminent downfall, i.e., the Palestinian Resistance Movement.
This is exactly what happened, after giving the Syrian army the 'green light'
to enter and occupy Lebanon, with international and Israeli blessings.
The beginning of this episode was camouflaged by a flimsy Arab cover called
the 'Arab Deterrent Force', but soon afterwards, the Syrian regime
metamorphosed into a 'mandatory force' that began rebuilding Lebanon as it
wished. Thus, when wider interests, such as the adoption of the constitutional
'Taif Accords' of 1989, were not to Damascus' liking, the latter worked to
undo it, going as far as murdering the first post-Taif Lebanese President, and
suspending every item Damascus felt would jeopardize its interests.
The 'Taif Accords' which were signed ten years after the Khomeini Revolution
in Iran, were a serious internal - regional attempt to repair the Lebanese
system and help it withstand ongoing demographic changes since Independence.
But, unseen in the background, were the developing conspiracies against the
'Accords' between Damascus and Tehran.
For a long time, many thought that Damascus was the power in charge of the
'Lebanese file', more so after it was given a free hand in Lebanon as a reward
for Hafez Al-Assad taking part in the 'Liberation of Kuwait Campaign'
(1990-1991). However, the passing of Hafez Al-Assad and the takeover by his
son Bashar, provided an early sign that Tehran was becoming the principal
player, leaving Damascus the roles of Iran's 'bridge' to Lebanon, and the
'nanny' of its regional project in the Arab Middle East. This fact did not
take long to emerge in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Syrian troops from
Lebanon, after the assassination of Rafic Hariri (Lebanon's former Prime
Minister) and his colleagues in early 2005. The assassination, in retrospect,
was a necessary step in the advancement of Iran's crawling expansion in Iraq
and Yemen, including Iran's political and strategic 'war against political
Sunni Islam'.
Today the role accorded to Hezbollah of Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization
Forces in Iraq become unquestionably clear, as the map of the 'new Syria'
unfolds under Russo-Iranian sponsorship and tacit Israeli and Western
approval; including the uprooting and displacement of more than 20 million
Arab Sunni Muslims from the desert arc extending from Fallujah in the east to
Daraa in the southwest.
This is a fact, I claim, most Lebanese are aware of. Still, as the Lebanese
approach the 'elections' scheduled for May 6th, they behave as if this was an
opportunity to 'protest'.
Just a demonstration they would join, and then return home.
No one really wants to think how absurd it is to have elections in the shadow
of non-governmental weapons, and based on a sinister, distorted and
ill-intentioned electoral law.
These elections are, actually, intended to legitimize the 'status quo' and
make it 'constitutional', citing what is, in reality, an artificial stability
and a fake moderation.
©
EsinIslam.Com
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